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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to improve our understanding of the neural systems involved in 
schizophrenia by suggesting possible avenues for future computational modelling in an 
attempt to make sense of the vast number of studies relating to the symptoms and 
cognitive deficits relating to the disorder. This multidisciplinary research has covered 
three different levels of analysis: abnormalities in the microscopic brain structure, 
dopamine dysfunction at a neurochemical level, and interactions between cortical and 
subcortical brain areas, connected by cortico-basal ganglia circuit loops; and has 
culminated in the production of five models that provide useful clarification in this 
difficult field.  
 
My thesis comprises three major relevant modelling themes. Firstly, in Chapter 3 I 
looked at an existing neural network model addressing the Neurodevelopmental 
Hypothesis of Schizophrenia by Hoffman and McGlashan (1997). However, it soon 
became clear that such models were overly simplistic and brittle when it came to 
replication. While they focused on hallucinations and connectivity in the frontal lobes 
they ignored other symptoms and the evidence of reductions in volume of the temporal 
lobes in schizophrenia.  No mention was made of the considerable evidence of 
dysfunction of the dopamine system and associated areas, such as the basal ganglia. This 
led to my second line of reasoning: dopamine dysfunction. 
 
Initially I helped create a novel model of dopamine neuron firing based on the 
Computational Substrate for Incentive Salience by McClure, Daw and Montague (2003), 
incorporating temporal difference (TD) reward prediction errors (Chapter 5). I adapted 
this model in Chapter 6 to address the ongoing debate as to whether or not dopamine 
encodes uncertainty in the delay period between presentation of a conditioned stimulus 
and receipt of a reward, as demonstrated by sustained activation seen in single dopamine 
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neuron recordings (Fiorillo, Tobler & Schultz 2003). An answer to this question could 
result in a better understanding of the nature of dopamine signaling, with implications 
for the psychopathology of cognitive disorders, like schizophrenia, for which dopamine 
is commonly regarded as having a primary role. Computational modelling enabled me to 
suggest that while sustained activation is common in single trials, there is the possibility 
that it increases with increasing probability, in which case dopamine may not  be 
encoding uncertainty in this manner. Importantly, these predictions can be tested and 
verified by experimental data.  
 
My third modelling theme arose as a result of the limitations to using TD alone to 
account for a reinforcement learning account of action control in the brain. In Chapter 8 
I introduce a dual weighted artificial neural network, originally designed by Hinton and 
Plaut (1987) to address the problem of catastrophic forgetting in multilayer artificial 
neural networks. I suggest an alternative use for a model with fast and slow weights to 
address the problem of arbitration between two systems of control. This novel approach 
is capable of combining the benefits of model free and model based learning in one 
simple model, without need for a homunculus and may have important implications in 
addressing how both goal directed and stimulus response learning may coexist. 
Modelling cortical-subcortical loops offers the potential of incorporating both the 
symptoms and cognitive deficits associated with schizophrenia by taking into account 
the interactions between midbrain/striatum and cortical areas. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Overview of Thesis 
 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
The ultimate cause or causes of schizophrenia remain elusive in spite of the vast 
number of studies relating to the symptoms and cognitive deficits of the disorder. 
Much of the research into schizophrenia has been, and is still, centered on the robust 
finding that there is a remarkable correlation between the efficacy of antipsychotic 
drugs in treating psychosis and the ability of those drugs to block the dopamine D2 
receptors. However, while it is posited that psychosis results from a dysregulation of 
the dopamine mesolimbic system (Weinberger 1987; Grace 1991; Kapur & Mamo 
2003), there is still little evidence to support this hypothesis and no general consensus 
on why the medication is effective.  
 
Symptoms and cognitive deficits can be seen as being separable, as various different 
symptoms can occur without any cognitive deficits, and vice versa. It is likely that 
symptoms and deficits arise from different brain areas, and this adds to the general 
difficulty of finding the cause or causes of schizophrenia. It is important to seek a 
more tractable model of the psychology of schizophrenia: a model of both symptoms 
and classical cognitive abnormalities incorporating cortical and subcortical systems 
which are connected by cortico-basal ganglia circuit loops (Alexander & Delong 
1985). It may be possible to explain one in terms of the other, or it may be that the 
two cannot be equated, but computational modelling can help us to address these 
questions and to reach an answer to the longer term aims of this research, namely:  
How can computational models of the neural systems involved in schizophrenia help 
to improve our understanding of the symptoms and cognitive deficits associated with 
the disorder? 
 
This thesis aims to improve our understanding of the neural systems involved in 
schizophrenia by suggesting possible avenues for future computational modelling in 
an attempt to make sense of the vast number of studies relating to the symptoms and 
cognitive deficits of the disorder. Cognitive models of molecular theories are in a 
unique position to combine biological and psychological theories. They offer science 
through simulation and are a useful tool to help us to answer the challenging question 
of whether or not there is a simple mechanism on which higher level cognition can 
be built. However, it should be noted that the modelling in this thesis is a top down 
approach to providing a possible explanation of what may be occurring in the brain 
and cannot be predictive as there is no attempt to build a detailed replica of brain 
activity. Such computational insights can be used to generate quantitative findings, 
providing avenues for further empirical study or treatment strategies, and may 
contribute to biological theory.  
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1.2 Organisation of Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of an exploration of some of the existing models relating to the 
symptoms of schizophrenia and the dopamine system, with a view to building upon 
them in order to make a contribution to the research area. Time constraints have 
limited the number of models investigated from this large field of research; however, 
I have covered three different levels of analysis:  
• Abnormalities in the microscopic brain structure.  
• Dopamine dysfunction and the neurochemistry of the brain. 
• Interactions between cortical and subcortical brain areas, connected by 
cortico-basal ganglia circuit loops.  
This is an account of my progression through the research field. 
 
This multidisciplinary approach comprises of three major relevant modelling themes:  
• Modelling Theme 1: (Chapter 3) An investigation into the connectionist 
approaches of:  
- Hoffman and McGlashan (1997) addressing the Neurodevelopmental 
Hypothesis of Schizophrenia. 
- Braver, Barch and Cohen (1999) addressing the learning and gating 
roles of dopamine. 
• Modelling Theme 2: (Chapters 4 to 6) An investigation into the non 
connectionist Computational Substrate for Incentive Salience incorporating 
temporal difference (TD) by McClure, Daw and Montague (2003) addressing 
the dopamine system. 
• Modelling Theme 3: (Chapters 7 to 8) A novel use of a connectionist model 
containing dual weights by Hinton and Plaut (1987) to look at the interactions 
between cortical and subcortical brain areas, connected by cortico-basal 
ganglia circuit loops. 
 
This has culminated in the production of five models that provide useful clarification, 
given the complexity of the problem space: 
• Model 1: (Chapter 3.1) An implementation of the speech perception network 
of Hoffman and McGlashan (1997) which aimed to test the hypothesis that 
schizophrenia was associated with reduced cortico-cortical connectivity and 
therefore may arise from excessive synaptic pruning during adolescence. 
• Model 2: (Chapter 3.2) A simplified implementation of the feed forward 
connectionist implementation of Braver et al. (1999) that was able to learn 
the AX-Continuous Performance Test (CPT). 
• Model 3: (Chapter 5) My version of the Computational Substrate for 
Incentive Salience by McClure et al. (2003), which analysed the differences 
in the patterns of behaviour seen in simulations of animal experiments 
between high and low dopamine receptor antagonism. 
• Model 4: (Chapter 6) This was an extension of my third model, designed to 
address the ongoing debate as to whether or not dopamine encodes 
uncertainty in the delay period between presentation of a conditioned 
stimulus and receipt of a reward, as demonstrated by sustained activation 
seen in single dopamine neuron recordings (Fiorillo, Tobler & Schultz 2003; 
2005).  
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• Model 5: (Chapter 8) This used the ideas behind the dual weights model of 
Hinton and Plaut to address the problem of arbitration between two systems 
of control, and describes how both inflexible stimulus-response actions and 
flexible goal-directed learning may operate together in one simple artificial 
neural network (ANN) containing dual weights. 
 
The literature review is contained in chapters 2, 4 and 7:  
• In Chapter 2 I give a detailed account of the motivation behind this thesis. I 
provide a basic description of schizophrenia, how it manifests itself in the 
human body and its biological underpinnings.  I also outline the difficulties in 
finding the ultimate cause of the disorder and explain the advantages of using 
ANN models for this purpose.  
• The theory described in Chapter 4 follows as a result of preliminary 
modelling of the Neurodevelopmental Hypothesis of Schizophrenia in 
Chapter 3. Here I explain the theory behind my TD model of phasic 
dopamine neuron firing, developed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
• In Chapter 7 I identify the limitations of using TD alone to account for a 
reinforcement learning account of action control in the brain, and explain the 
reasoning behind the development of my dual weighted ANN in Chapter 8. 
 
Modelling Theme 1 
My initial instinct was to search for an existing connectionist model that could be 
used as a base for my future modelling and in Chapter 3 I describe my attempts at 
implementing two existing connectionist models. The first, a speech perception 
network by Hoffman and McGlashan (1997) designed to give rise to hallucinations, 
one of the major symptoms of schizophrenia (Section 3.1), and the second, a 
simulation of one of the cognitive deficits identified in schizophrenia relating to 
maintaining and updating working memory, demonstrated in the AX-CPT (Braver et 
al. 1999) (Section 3.2). While I did not pursue these two models further in this thesis, 
the modelling in this chapter made a valuable contribution to the direction of the 
remainder of this body of research. The flaws of these models, detailed in Chapter 3, 
pointed to a new line of reasoning to account for the symptoms and cognitive deficits 
of schizophrenia which included dopamine dysfunction and the neuroscience of the 
cortico-basal ganglia circuit loops, on which the remainder of this thesis rests. 
 
Modelling Theme 2 
Chapter 4 contains the second part of the literature review. Having justified 
switching to a new line of reasoning involving the dopamine system, I investigate a 
body of research inspired by the physiological recordings of dopamine neurons on 
alert monkeys, by Wolfram Schultz and colleagues (Hollerman & Schultz 1998; 
Ljunberg, Apicella & Schultz 1992; Romo & Schultz 1990; Schultz 1986; Schultz, 
Apicella & Ljunberg 1993; Schultz & Romo 1990) who showed that information 
about rewarding stimuli was encoded in dopaminergic activity. This includes:  
• The idea of dopamine acting as a reward prediction error (Section 4.1). 
• TD as an effective method of modelling the dopamine reward prediction error 
signal (Section 4.2). 
• The role of the basal ganglia in the production of that signal (Section 4.3). 
• The Incentive Salience Hypothesis (Section 4.4). 
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• Evidence of the dopamine reward prediction error in humans from fMRI 
studies (Section 4.5).  
This theory is encompassed in the Computational Substrate for Incentive Salience by 
McClure et al. (2003), an interesting exception to the typical actor-critic in that it is 
capable of addressing free-operant behaviour (Niv, Daw, Joel & Dayan 2007). This 
model is described in detail in Section 4.2 and I implement a version of this in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 5 contains a detailed description of the modelling of two sets of animal 
experiments by McClure et al. (2003) (Section 5.1). Firstly, they modelled the effects 
of a large concentration of dopamine receptor antagonist, in accordance with 
Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996) and secondly, they modelled the different effects of 
lower concentrations of dopamine receptor antagonism in a similar experiment by 
Wise et al. (1978). The difference in the pattern of the dopamine response between 
these two simulations provided evidence for the dual role of the dopamine reward 
prediction error as (i) a learning signal, and (ii) in action selection. In Section 5.2 I 
describe my own implementation based on the original model which replicates and 
explores the Computational Substrate for Incentive Salience by McClure et al. 
(2003). My simulations allow me to explore the changing parameters of the model, 
and to answer a number of interesting research questions that warrant further 
investigation.  
 
In Chapter 6 I extend the model developed in Chapter 5 to address the ongoing 
debate as to whether or not dopamine encodes uncertainty in the delay period 
between presentation of a conditioned stimulus and receipt of a reward, as 
demonstrated by sustained activation seen in single dopamine neuron recordings 
(Fiorillo et al. 2003; 2005; Niv, Duff & Dayan 2005). The key to this debate appears 
to be how frequently sustained activation occurs in individual trials. Furthermore, if 
sustained activation is greatest with maximum uncertainty then it could be said that 
dopamine is encoding uncertainty in the delay period as a product of TD. This 
alternate model permits this valuable single trial analysis and allows me to make 
predictions that could, in theory, be tested and verified by experimental data. The 
simulations detailed in this chapter are an example of science through simulation and 
demonstrate how computational modelling can help to clarify a position by 
generating testable predictions. The arguments presented will strengthen the use of 
TD as a valid method of modelling and quantifying the dopamine reward prediction 
error.  
 
Modelling Theme 3 
Chapter 7 marks a change in the direction of modelling and contains the third part of 
the literature review. While the focus of this thesis in Chapters 4 to 6 has centred on 
using TD as a model of dopamine function in reinforcement learning, it is important 
to note that there are limitations to using a model free reinforcement learning 
paradigm, such as TD, as a complete account of action control in the brain. In this 
chapter I draw attention to those limitations and point to some alternate models that 
address these shortfalls. This will allow me to shift the focus of this thesis away from 
TD and back to my longer-term aim of improving the understanding of the neural 
systems involved in schizophrenia; taking into account a wider perspective of the 
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interactions between cortical and subcortical brain areas, connected by cortico-basal 
ganglia circuit loops (Chapters 2.2 and 4.3). 
 
I begin Chapter 7 by looking at the alternative model based account of dopamine 
function by Smith, Li, Becker and Kapur (2004; 2006) in Section 7.1. Their line of 
reasoning bears important similarities to mine as we both have the long-term goal of a 
better understanding of schizophrenia through the ideas of incentive salience and 
dopamine dysfunction. Section 7.2 contains a brief account of a new algorithm 
developed by O’Reilly, Frank, Hazy and Watz (2007) as an alternative to TD, which is 
not developed further in this thesis, and in Sections 7.3 and 7.4 I look at two models by 
Dayan and Balleine (2002) and Daw, Niv and Dayan (2005) that combine the benefits 
of both model free and model based accounts of reinforcement learning. Finally, in 
Section 7.5 I describe a framework by Yin and Knowlton (2006) for the role of the 
basal ganglia in habit formation that distinguishes between goal directed actions and 
stimulus response habits via separate networks that correspond to different, but 
interconnecting cortico-basal ganglia loops.  
 
As well as offering alternatives to TD, Sections 7.1 to 7.5 all point to the concept of a 
dual system of control (Section 7.6): Smith et al. (2006) modelled both phasic 
dopamine in the learning process and tonic dopamine in the expression of previously 
acquired behaviour; the PVLV algorithm by O’Reilly et al. (2007) contains two 
different systems, where the PV system controls performance and learning during 
primary rewards and the LV system learns about conditioned stimuli; Dayan and 
Balleine (2002) distinguished between modelling Pavlovian and instrumental 
conditioning; and both Daw et al. (2005) and Yin and Knowlton (2006) distinguish 
between two different networks for goal directed actions and stimulus response 
habits. In particular, Daw et al. (2005) referred to the competition between multiple 
systems for behavioural choice in the brain, and the problem of arbitration between 
the systems when they disagreed. They suggested a model of dual action choice, 
where the systems operated separately and in parallel, governed by a Bayesian 
principal of arbitration. Their model based habit system of caching values was not 
immediately sensitive to the specific outcome information associated with animal 
devaluation experiments as it took time for a change in behaviour to occur following 
relearning of the values. Alternatively, their flexible model based system that was 
outcome sensitive and goal directed showed an immediate behavioural change.  
 
In Chapter 8 I return to a connectionist approach and develop a model with dual 
weights which is capable potentially of implementing a dual system of control. The 
model has several advantages over the model by Daw and colleagues in that it is a 
biologically inspired connectionist application that will allow for interactions 
between the two controllers, without the need for an arbiter or homunculus. In this 
third line of reasoning I adapted an existing dual weighted ANN by Hinton and Plaut 
(1987), originally designed to address the problem of catastrophic forgetting in 
multilayer ANNs. I suggest an alternative use for a model with fast and slow weights 
to address the problem of arbitration between two systems of control through rapid 
learning in the fast weights, which will allow for more rapid changes in the 
environment than in a standard network with one set of weights. Furthermore, I 
describe how this novel approach is able to combine the benefits of model free and 
model based learning in one simple model.  
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In Section 8.1 I refer to the general problem of arbitration between two systems of 
control and in Section 8.2 I introduce the original dual weighted model by Hinton 
and Plaut, before developing my own constrained version of the model in Section 
8.3. Here I conduct a series of experiments where I investigate the parameters of the 
model, the contribution of the fast weights and the interactions between fast and slow 
weights. This enables me to describe the mechanisms behind the dual system of 
control in Section 8.4 and its advantages over the model by Daw and colleagues in 
Section 8.5. Future improvements to the model, suggested in Section 8.6 may have 
important implications in addressing how both goal directed and stimulus response 
learning may coexist. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 9 I summarise the contributions of this thesis (Section 9.1), draw 
my conclusions (Section 9.2), and explain how future improvements to those models 
could help to improve our understanding of the neural systems involved in 
schizophrenia (Section 9.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6
Chapter 2 
 
Modelling Schizophrenia 
 
 
In this Chapter I provide a basic description of schizophrenia, how it manifests itself 
in the human body and its biological underpinnings.  I also outline the difficulties in 
finding the ultimate cause of the disorder and explain the advantages of using 
artificial neural network models for this purpose. 
 
Schizophrenia is a disorder of the human brain with many different symptoms and 
cognitive deficits, which may or may not occur, in many different combinations. One 
interpretation of the symptoms is that they fall within three syndromes: (i) Reality 
Distortion (positive symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions), (ii) 
Psychomotor Poverty (negative symptoms such as flat effect or affective 
unresponsiveness) and (iii) Disorganisation (e.g., thought disorder, a disturbance in 
the form of thinking which manifests itself as a loss of intelligibility of speech) 
(Liddle 1996). It has also been claimed that patients exhibit a general cognitive 
deficit, with impairments in executive function, memory and attention, over and 
above this general level (Bilder et al. 2000; McKenna 1997). In particular, it is seen 
as a disorder in which patients fail to make appropriate use of context, due to a 
failure to internally represent, maintain and update task relevant information (Cohen 
& Servan-Schreiber 1992; Braver, Barch & Cohen 1999). Diagnosis generally 
involves the presence of at least two positive symptoms plus the absence of 
significant manic-depressive mood changes (McKenna 1997).  
 
Although there are a vast number of studies relating to the symptoms and cognitive 
deficits of schizophrenia, the ultimate cause or causes of the disorder remain elusive. 
Historically, some have considered a psychodynamic or Freudian approach to 
understanding the aetiology of the disorder: a manifestation of the conflict in the 
inner self. However, current research seeks a biological approach and looks for a 
biological brain disorder. It is the biological approach that is developed in this thesis 
and Section 2.1 provides a brief account of some of the changes recorded in the 
schizophrenic brain. Section 2.2 describes the difficulties modelling schizophrenia 
and of finding a framework that incorporates both symptoms and cognitive deficits, 
and in Section 2.3 I explain how artificial neural network models can be used as a 
tool to help identify the causes, as they offer a noninvasive testing ground for 
theories by providing a link between the behaviour, and the biology of the 
schizophrenic. Such new models will generate quantitative findings, providing 
avenues for further empirical study or treatment strategies.  
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2.1 Schizophrenia: the Biological Approach 
 
This thesis takes a biological approach towards explaining the aetiology of 
schizophrenia. Unlike neurodegenerative diseases, such as Alzheimer’s and 
Parkinson’s, there are few obvious biological disturbances to the brains of 
schizophrenic patients, and so it is hard to ascertain the underlying causes of these 
symptoms and deficits. Much of the research into schizophrenia has been, and is still, 
centered on the robust finding that there is a remarkable correlation between the 
efficacy of antipsychotic drugs in treating psychosis and the ability of those drugs to 
block the dopamine D2 receptors. So, while it is posited that psychosis results from a 
dysregulation of the dopamine mesolimbic system (Weinberger 1987; Grace 1991; 
Kapur & Mamo 2003), there is still little evidence to support this hypothesis.  
 
In this section I discuss the limited evidence for brain disturbance in patients with 
schizophrenia. Research shows that the disorder has: (i) a known genetic component 
(Section 2.1.1); (ii) a few limited abnormalities in the macroscopic brain structure 
(Section 2.1.2) and (iii) changes in the neurochemistry of the brain (Section 2.1.3). 
These differences provide clues as to what processes underlie the disorder and offer 
explanations for the emergence of symptoms and cognitive deficits. 
 
2.1.1 Genetic Component 
With regard to the genetic component, Gottesman (1991) produced a table of risks, 
based on around forty studies for developing schizophrenia in first, second and third 
degree relatives of patients, suggesting a genetic role to the disorder. In particular, 
these results showed that if one of a twin with the same genes (monozygotic) 
developed schizophrenia there was a greater likelihood of the other twin developing 
the disorder than if the twins had different genes (dizygotic). However, while 
genetics has a role to play, this can only be a predisposition as there is no genetic 
certainty of developing the disorder and 63% of patients will have no family history 
at all (McKenna 1997). 
 
2.1.2 Structural Changes: The Neurodevelopmental Hypothesis  
There are some brain changes seen in schizophrenics, but compared to patients with 
Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s disease, these changes are often inconsistent across 
studies and are not always obvious at a macroscopic level.   For example, using 
computer assisted tomography (CT) Johnstone et al. (1976) identified lateral 
ventricular enlargement in schizophrenia, but the differences were small and found 
largely in male patients (McKenna 1997). Meta-analysis also points to reduced 
cerebral (cortical and hippocampal) volume (Egan & Weinberger 1997; Harrison 
1999) that is present even in first-episode patients (Lim et al. 1996). Post-mortem 
studies have identified increased neuronal densities in schizophrenics in prefrontal 
and occipital cortex. This is not believed to be due to a loss of neurons but to a 
reduction in the interneuronal spaces, the neuropil, consisting of neuronal processes 
and synaptic contacts (Selemon, Rajkowski & Goldman-Rakic 1995).  
 
Hoffman and McGlashan (2001) posited that schizophrenia may result from a 
pathological extension of normal reductions of neuropil and synaptic density during 
adolescent development, which also accounts for the characteristic age of onset of 
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schizophrenia in the late teens and early twenties. This neurodevelopmental 
hypothesis of schizophrenia as a disorder arising from aberrant brain development 
prior to the emergence of symptoms is developed further in Chapter 3, where I 
reproduce a speech perception network by Hoffman & McGlashan (1997) designed 
to produce speech hallucinations by synaptic pruning. 
 
2.1.3 Neurochemical Changes: The Dopamine Hypothesis 
It is not immediately apparent from a neurodevelopmental point of view how 
aberrant brain development transfers to the diverse and changeable symptoms and 
cognitive deficits associated with schizophrenia. Taking a different perspective and 
looking at the chemistry of the brain, neurochemical dysfunction could provide an 
answer. Drugs of abuse, such as amphetamine, LSD and PCP are known to induce 
abnormal mental states similar to some of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia 
(e.g., Ikemoto & Panksepp 1999; Carlsson et al. 2001; Smith, Becker & Kapur 
2005). In addition, a biochemical process will account for the fact that symptoms 
both appear and disappear, and wax and wane in intensity. 
 
The dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia arose in the 1960’s as a result of two 
different observations: (i) antipsychotic drugs prescribed to alleviate psychosis 
provide their effect by blocking dopamine receptors; and (ii) exposure to dopamine 
receptor agonists, such as amphetamine, induces psychosis (Abi-Dhargham 2004). In 
view of the remarkable correlation between the ability of antipsychotic drugs to block 
dopamine D2 receptors and the effectiveness of those drugs in the treatment of 
psychosis, it is posited that psychosis results from a dysregulation of the dopamine 
mesolimbic system (Weinberger 1987; Grace 1991; Kapur & Mamo 2003). A critical 
role for dopamine is its contribution to conferring reward during learning, or which 
choice gives the greatest pay back when making decisions (Chapter 4.1). More 
specifically it appears to be involved in attributing incentive salience to things we see 
or hear, or thoughts we generate ourselves (Chapter 4.4). A malfunction could then 
lead to us thinking that irrelevant ideas are suddenly really important, leading to 
feelings of persecution, or that a rustle of leaves may be a sign from God. 
Neurotransmitters such as dopamine are genetically controlled and could easily arise 
as expression of a genetic fault or disposition (McKenna 1997). The dopamine 
hypothesis is developed further in Chapter 4 and the remainder of this thesis relates to 
the function of the dopamine system.  
 
While this thesis focuses largely on the dopamine system there are many other 
neurotransmitters systems operating in concert in the brain at any one time. I do not 
pursue these alternatives further but it is important to note that any one transmitter 
will not be working in isolation. For example, the NMDA hypothesis of 
schizophrenia arose from observations that drugs such as PCP and ketamine (NMDA 
antagonists) lead to schizophrenia-like effects, in particular negative symptoms as 
well as hallucinations, delusions, thought disorder (Stone, Morrison & Pilowsky 
2007). This hypothesis seeks to explain some of the gaps in the dopamine hypothesis 
regarding the treatment-resistant negative symptoms and the onset of the disorder in 
late teens/early twenties. Carlsson et al. (2001) also take a wider view and see 
dopamine as one of many possible dysfunctional neurotransmitters affected in the 
brain in schizophrenia. Pharmacological evidence suggests that small differences in the 
fragile balance between multi-neurotransmitters at various points in local cortical 
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microcircuits leads to many of both the positive and negative symptoms associated 
with the disorder. They posit that although there may be an elevated baseline release of 
dopamine in schizophrenia, it is possibly secondary to hypoglutamatergia. 
 
Finally, while it is generally accepted that dopamine has an important role to play in 
the manifestation of schizophrenia, due to the robust finding that there is a striking 
correlation between the efficacy of antipsychotic drugs in treating psychosis and the 
ability of those drugs to block the dopamine D2 receptors, it should be noted that to 
date there is generally little evidence of dopamine receptor abnormality in 
schizophrenia (Stone et al. 2007). Although there is some evidence for a small 
elevation in D2 receptors in drug free patients (Laurelle 1998; Zakzanis & Hansen 
1998). 
 
 
2.2 A Model of Symptoms and Cognitive Deficits 
 
It is known that patients with schizophrenia suffer from a wide-spread cognitive 
dysfunction that affects memory, executive functioning and attention and there seems 
to be a dissociation between these cognitive deficits and psychotic symptoms 
(delusions, hallucinations). The former occur well in advance of the onset of 
symptoms, and the trajectory of symptom recovery is not matched by cognitive 
recovery (Harvey, Koren, Reichenberg & Bowie 2005). Symptoms and cognitive 
deficits can be seen as being separable as various different symptoms can occur 
without any cognitive deficits and vice versa.  
 
Some modellers have tried to explain symptoms in terms of neuropsychological 
impairment based on the neurodevelopmental hypothesis of schizophrenia (Section 
2.1.2), for example, Hoffman and McGlashan (1987) developed a speech perception 
network that gave rise to hallucinations as a result of synaptic pruning (Chapter 3.1). 
However they did not address the issue of cognitive deficits. Others have focussed on 
the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia (Section 2.1.3) and modelled cognitive 
deficits, for example, Cohen and Servan-Schreiber (1992) looked at a dysfunction in 
working memory. They used artificial neural networks to simulate normal and 
schizophrenic performance in three tasks that relied on the correct use of context 
(Chapter 3.2). However, they did not address the various symptoms of the disorder. 
These connectivity and dopamine based accounts of impairment are two examples of 
connectionist modelling at different levels of analysis, which cannot easily be 
equated; although it is possible that dopamine, at a lower neurochemical level than 
the connectivity between neurons, could be accommodated within the 
neurodevelopmental hypothesis. 
  
It is likely that symptoms and deficits arise from different brain areas and this adds to 
the general difficulty of finding the cause or causes of schizophrenia. It is posited that 
one of the symptoms, psychosis, is a state of aberrant salience, where excess levels of 
dopamine are no longer stimulus-linked and context-driven. Delusions (paranoia, 
aliens interfering with one’s brain), and hallucinations (hearing voices), may arise then 
as a result of the individual attempting to provide their own explanations for 
experiences which come out of the blue and are imbued with high importance (Kapur 
2003) (Chapter 4.4.1). This is in keeping with an earlier theory of schizophrenia by 
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Maher (1988) that patients make normal attributions, or reasoned normally to 
abnormal experiences. This would involve a subcortical abnormality, relating to the 
mesocorticolimbic dopamine pathway from the ventral tegmental area to the 
prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, amygdala and nucleus accumbens (Chapter 4.3), 
with normal cortical function.  
 
On the other hand cognitive dysfunction would appear to be associated with cortical 
areas (Abi-Dhargham 2004; Winterer & Weinberger 2005). Traditional cognitive 
models of schizophrenia based on cognitive dysfunction in executive 
dysfunction/memory/attention have poor face validity when used to explain the 
spontaneous experiences (delusions/hallucinations) which are bizarre, or strange, since 
these are unrelated to past experience and stored memories (Simpson, Done, Valeé-
Tourangeau 2002). It is important to seek a more tractable model of the psychology of 
schizophrenia: a model of both symptoms and classical cognitive abnormalities. 
Dopamine abnormalities in the cortex, in particular the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
would not only account for the neuropsychological deficits found in schizophrenia but 
they could also integrate the abnormal symptomatic experiences into dysfunctional 
attributional, executive and memory systems.  These dual roles pertaining to symptoms 
and cognitive deficits can be equated crudely as being due to dopamine abnormalities 
in the midbrain/striatum (Chapter 4.3) and cortex respectively. The interaction between 
these different levels via cortical-subcortical loops (Alexander & Delong 1985) means 
that they are able to operate in consort. This would permit a more tractable model of 
the psychology of schizophrenia: a model of both symptoms and classical cognitive 
abnormalities. 
 
In conclusion, there are two highly complex aspects of schizophrenia that need to be 
addressed in the attempt to make sense of the disorder: symptoms and cognitive 
deficits. An important question arises of how both symptoms and cognitive deficits 
fit together in a framework of explanation. It may be possible to explain one in terms 
of the other, or it may be that the two cannot be equated. To address the problem it is 
necessary to reduce the complex to manageable portions, and Section 2.3 describes 
how neural network modelling can help. 
 
 
2.3 Advantages of Neural Network Models of Schizophrenia  
 
Multidisciplinary research can often overcome the limitations of a single discipline 
by introducing novel techniques, such as the use of artificial neural networks, a 
useful tool for exploring the relationship between neurobiology and computational 
performance. By uniting neurobiology, neuropsychology, cognitive and 
computational science, neural networks provide an important link between the 
physical brain (in terms of different brain regions through to individual neurons and 
the smaller chemical elements such as neurotransmitters) and behaviour (our 
thoughts, plans, decisions and actions). They offer a non-invasive testing ground for 
theories by modelling the nervous system effectively at many different structural 
levels, including the biophysical, the circuit and the systems levels. Such new models 
will generate quantitative findings, providing avenues for further empirical study or 
treatment strategies. 
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Neural network models are a valuable tool for exploring complex systems with large 
volumes of data, and enable the exploration of relationships in a way that may not be 
possible in vivo. Given the complicated systems involved in the brain, it becomes 
very difficult to control different factors and to pin down the deficit. The more 
complex the system, the more the situation is inherently uncontrollable and the less it 
is amenable to standard experimental method. It is often the case that manipulating 
one variable at a time will have a downstream knock-on effect and there becomes a 
danger of changing the nature of the whole system. Neural network models are 
inspired by biological brain systems and enable the simulation of complex and 
distributed systems in the brain by manipulating one or more parameters to seek an 
optimal combination. They let us explore changing systems by looking at the larger 
picture and generating data that can be tested empirically.  
 
However, it is also necessary to understand the limitations of computer modelling. 
By its definition a model is an abstraction of the system or concept under scrutiny 
and, being underconstrained, it can never claim to be the real thing. Therefore, 
models are informative rather than definitive; qualitative rather than quantitative, and 
as such cannot be predictive. In order to combat the risks associated with speculation 
it is necessary for models to incorporate a wide range of empirical data spanning 
many different levels of analysis (O’Reilly 2006). In addition, the idea is to seek a 
broad qualitative correspondence between the model and experimental data that 
generalises to other experiments with minimal alteration to the model (Smith, Li, 
Becker & Kapur 2007). The modelling in this thesis involves top down modelling in 
an attempt to provide a possible explanation of what may be occurring in the brain 
and there is no attempt to build a detailed replica of brain activity. 
 
The dopamine system is an example of such a complex system that is difficult to 
understand through conventional methods. The tools available to us, such as brain 
imaging and animal studies have their own limitations. Images of our own brains are 
useful when there is something wrong with one part of our brain, such as in a stroke, 
but they are less informative when there is a malfunctioning of a system distributed 
throughout the brain. While studies of animals whose brains are structurally different 
from our own can make a valuable contribution to the subject area, for example 
amphetamine induced psychosis (Section 2.1.3); there are limitations to the extent 
that they can be used as a full explanation of a human disorder, like schizophrenia. 
Modelling brain systems using computer based, or artificial neural network models 
offer a useful alternative providing the model is both biologically and 
psychologically plausible. Computer algorithms such as Temporal Difference (TD) 
operate very much like the dopamine system in our brain (Chapter 4.2). One great 
advantage of using these artificial models is that an unlimited number of experiments 
can be conducted, including lesioning the network, which cannot be done on human 
brains for ethical reasons. Although artificial neural networks will not provide 
answers to the causes of schizophrenia, their heuristic value permits us to generate 
new ways of thinking about the disorder, and also provides guidance on new 
experiments which can then be carried out with patients. 
 
A review by Cohen, Braver and Brown (2002) gives a detailed account of the variety 
of computational models that exist at different levels of analysis pertaining to 
dopamine function in the prefrontal cortex. These include connectionist models of 
 12
the neuromodulatory function of dopamine (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber 1992) (see 
Chapter 3.2); biophysically detailed models incorporating the electropyhsiology of a 
neuron simulating the effect of dopamine on performance in cognitive tasks that rely 
on prefrontal cortex function (e.g., Durstewitz, Kelc & Gunturkun 1999; Brunel & 
Wang 2001) and connectionist models of the role of dopamine in learning and 
updating working memory (e.g., Braver, Barch & Cohen 1999) (see Chapter 3.2). 
Cohen et al. stress the value of a multilevel approach to model building as the 
biophysical models are useful in assessing the abstractions used in the connectionist 
models, and the connectionist models may help guide future research on the 
biophysical processes that underlie the basic mechanisms.  
 
Alternatively, Montague, Hyman and Cohen (2004) review the use of the Temporal 
Difference algorithm (Sutton 1988; Sutton & Barto 1998) (see Chapter 4.2) to model 
the role of dopamine as a reward prediction error (see Chapter 4.1) incorporating 
basal ganglia (see Chapter 4.3). Attempts have been made to incorporate both the 
cortical and subcortical effects of dopamine function in one model, for example, the 
Prefrontal Basal Ganglia Working Memory connectionist model of learning by 
O’Reilly & Frank (2006) and O’Reilly, Frank & Hazy (2007). However, much work 
remains to be done to apply this framework to various working memory tasks to test 
the cognitive neuroscience validity of the model. A neural network specifically 
designed to incorporate cortical and subcortical areas could, in theory, generate 
testable predictions concerning the symptomalogy and cognitive dysfunction seen in 
schizophrenia.  
 
2.3.1 Connectionist Networks  
 
Biologically inspired connectionist models are particularly suitable for modelling 
schizophrenia. They are a collection of artificial neurons (simplified versions of a 
biological neuron) with modifiable connections (representing synapses) between 
them. The brain consists of densely interconnected neurons in layers carrying signals 
in parallel and a connectionist architecture containing artificial neurons allows the 
integration and transfer of information from neuron to neuron in a similar manner. 
Examples of connectionist architectures can be found in Chapters 3 and 8, and an 
example of an artificial neuron is given in Figure 2.1., where the inputs and single 
output are analogous to the dendrites and axon in a biological neuron. Input is 
introduced to the neuron representing either external stimuli or input from other 
afferent neurons. This input is summed and if the total signal exceeds a 
predetermined threshold the signal will be passed as a single output to an efferent 
neuron(s). The strength of the connections (weights) between neurons is adjusted 
according to a learning rate permitting learning to occur from experience (a set of 
training patterns). Knowledge is held in the weights and is distributed across many 
neurons and many connections. 
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 Input Output 
Figure 2.1. A schematic representation of an artificial neuron, where total input to the neuron is 
summed. If the total exceeds a predetermined threshold, the signal will be passed to an efferent 
neuron(s). 
 
Connectionist models are metaphors of the brain because they are able to solve 
similar problems and because of their structural resemblance (Aakerlund & 
Hemmingsen 1998). They possess some of the advantages of the human brain, 
namely: (i) they are distributed in nature and process information in parallel, (ii) they 
have the ability to learn from experience, (iii) they are able to generalise to new 
situations by applying information from past experience, and (iv) they are fault 
tolerant and therefore resistant to damage (McLeod, Plunkett & Rolls 1998). By 
altering the network architecture, the numbers of neurons and learning rules to suit 
the occasion, connectionist models are flexible and capable of modelling a broad 
variety of human performance tasks. In particular, a connectionist system comprising 
of a collection of individual simplified artificial neurons brought together and 
working in parallel in a distributed manner to make a collective whole, is able to find 
patterns in otherwise streams of seemingly meaningless data. For example a newborn 
baby, incapable of speech, capturing exponentially over time the subtle patterns and 
nuances of a language to form words and sentences as a child, and even improving 
further into adulthood, with increasing vocabulary. In a similar manner a novice 
sports players actions will progress from random and awkward and improve over 
time to proficient and expertise, with practice. 
 
 
2.4 Chapter Conclusions 
 
This chapter contained a detailed account of the motivation behind this thesis: 
• It provided a basic description of schizophrenia, how it manifests itself in the 
human body and its biological underpinnings.  
• I outlined the difficulties in finding the ultimate cause of the disorder. 
• I explained the advantages of using computational modelling for this purpose; 
in particular, a biologically inspired connectionist approach. 
 
Cognitive models of molecular theories are in a unique position to combine 
biological and psychological theories. They offer science through simulation and are 
a useful tool to help us to answer the challenging question of whether or not there is a 
simple mechanism on which higher level cognition can be built. 
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Chapter 3 
 
In Search of a Connectionist Model of Schizophrenia 
 
 
The initial aim of this three year research period was to explore the application of 
connectionist models as a paradigm for schizophrenia, with a view to generating and 
testing theories of the disorder. There were few existing connectionist models on 
which to use as a base for my research, but I was drawn initially to an interesting 
application by Hoffman and McGlashan (1997) that claimed to simulate hallucinated 
voices (Section 3.1). This model was based on the neurodevelopmental hypothesis of 
schizophrenia and is described in detail in Section 3.1.1. My own simulations have 
allowed me to make a critical analysis of the model and have highlighted the 
limitations of a model of schizophrenia that does not incorporate dopamine 
dysfunction.  
 
Following my decision to abandon further attempts to simulate the Hoffman and 
McGlashan speech perception network, I was actively seeking a new model as a base 
for my future work. Some of the early connectionist models addressing the dopamine 
hypothesis of schizophrenia are discussed in Section 3.2, but I was drawn to a model 
by Braver, Barch and Cohen (1999) which identified a new Learning and Gating 
theory of dopamine, incorporating phasic dopamine firing patterns. I implemented a 
simplified simulation of the model performing the AX-CPT in Section 3.2.1.  
 
This chapter gives an indication of some of the early models of schizophrenia that 
were available, and the preliminary modelling I have performed in this chapter has 
provided the direction for the remainder of this thesis. 
 
 
3.1 Modelling the Neurodevelopmental Hypothesis of 
Schizophrenia 
 
In the late 1990’s early 2000’s neuropsychological models offered the potential to 
explore both symptoms and neuropsychological impairments as a window on the 
brain mechanisms of the schizophrenic. An interesting connectionist model came to 
my attention by Hoffman and McGlashan (1997) that claimed to simulate 
hallucinated voices. Their research focused on the Neurodevelopmental Hypothesis 
of schizophrenia, reflecting a popular approach at that time, temporarily dominating 
the dopamine hypothesis. While dopamine dysfunction was known to be associated 
with schizophrenia, it was not considered to be central to the etiology as: (i) 
Antipsychotic drugs targeting the dopamine system did not appear to be the perfect 
answer, as not all patients responded to drugs designed to reduce excess dopamine by 
blocking dopamine D2 receptors; (ii) Dopamine was unlikely to be the only 
neurotransmitter showing dysfunction in schizophrenia. For example, the use of 
phencyclidine (PCP, ‘angel dust’) gave rise to psychotic symptoms and could also be 
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used as a model for schizophrenia. However, this was known to be a powerful 
antagonist of the glutamate receptor subtype NMDA and did not affect the dopamine 
system (Carlsson et al. 2001).  
 
One of the strengths of the neurodevelopmental hypothesis was that it addressed the 
question of why the emergence of schizophrenia peaked in the late teens and early 
twenties, but did not show earlier in life. Using normal postmortem tissue from the 
middle frontal cortex, synaptic density was shown to peak during childhood, with a 
subsequent decline of between 30 to 40% during adolescence to reach adult levels 
(Huttenlocher 1979). It was posited that schizophrenia was associated with reduced 
cortico-cortical connectivity and therefore may arise from excessive synaptic pruning 
(Hoffman & McGlashan 1997). This would result in molecular and histogenic 
responses that would cumulatively lead to different developmental trajectories from 
those seen in a normal brain. In support of this hypothesis post-mortem studies have 
identified increased neuronal densities in schizophrenics in prefrontal and occipital 
cortex. This is not believed to be due to a loss of neurons but to a reduction in the 
interneuronal spaces, the neuropil, consisting of neuronal processes and synaptic 
contacts (Selemon, Rajkowski & Goldman-Rakic 1995). It is hypothesised that this 
reduction in neuropil could underlie abnormalities in information processing and 
cognitive dysfunction seen in schizophrenia (Selemon 2004). In particular, Hoffman 
and McGlashan (2001) posited that schizophrenia may result from a pathological 
extension of normal reductions of neuropil and synaptic density during adolescent 
development, which also accounts for the characteristic age of onset of schizophrenia 
in the late teens and early twenties. 
 
An investigation of the Hoffman and McGlashan model was considered to be an 
ideal starting point for a body of research using artificial neural networks to look into 
schizophrenia. As an experimental method connectionist models are perfectly placed 
to investigate synaptic pruning as weight connections can be easily removed to 
simulate both pruning and cell death. It was hoped that building upon the work of 
Hoffman and McGlashan would provide a good opportunity to tell us something new 
about schizophrenia. 
 
3.1.1. Simulation of a Speech Perception Neural Network (Hoffman 
& McGlashan 1997) 
 
The Hoffman and McGlashan simulation was not a model of the neurodevelopmental 
hypothesis of schizophrenia, but it did focus on the product of that hypothesis. The 
emphasis was on neuropsychological dysfunction, specifically the changes to the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex reflected during working memory type tasks, rather 
than symptoms. They produced an artificial neural network trained to identify the 
semantics of words in sentences from a limited vocabulary of thirty words. The 
network was recurrent and so word order gave rise to a rudimentary working 
memory. By testing the effect of degraded and undegraded test sentences on both 
grammatical word sequences and randomised word sequences, Hoffman and 
McGlashan demonstrated dependence of the network on word order in decoding 
input information. They modelled both loss of synapses and cell death on the fully 
trained network. The former involved clamping to zero the absolute values of 
connection weights, linking the temporary and hidden layers, that fell below a 
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threshold; and the latter where certain hidden layer neurons were eliminated by 
clamping their levels of activation to zero. They demonstrated that eliminating up to 
65% of these working memory connections improved performance, but beyond that 
level of pruning, performance was adversely affected and, with synaptic elimination, 
speech hallucinations emerged at synaptic losses of around 80 to 95%. Their implied 
scaling claimed that an optimal 64% reduction in working memory connections 
corresponded to an overall synaptic reduction of 29% when all the connections in the 
network were taken into account, and that this figure approximated the 30-40% 
reduction of frontal area synapses from childhood to adult, identified from 
postmortem studies (Huttenlocher 1979). In the model cell death produced no 
hallucinations and they concluded that psychosis may arise from synaptic 
elimination.  
 
In the first instance I decided to attempt to replicate the Hoffman and McGlashan 
model and pursue their argument of schizophrenia as a neurodevelopmental disorder 
resulting from irregularities in synaptic pruning during adolescence. It was my 
intention to use this information to implement my own model in order that I may 
model speech perception and carry out a series of experiments to explore the 
emergence of hallucinated voices from a connectionist model. 
 
METHODS 
 
In order to replicate Hoffman’s results I needed answers to many questions that were 
not addressed in the original journal paper. For example, the criteria for assessing 
correct identification and misidentification of words by the network, how to separate 
the sentences in the input; feature coding; learning rate parameters etc. I contacted 
Hoffman who was good enough to send me details of the original program in Q 
BASIC, which was designed to generate the data and run the simulation. As we did 
not have the facilities to use Q BASIC it was necessary to convert the program into 
VISUAL BASIC, and some further modifications were necessary before it was 
possible to recreate the original data sets. 
 
Preferring to use more sophisticated software packages, simulations were 
implemented in PDP++ (O’Reilly and Munakata, 2000). A four-layer speech 
perception neural network with 148 neurons was implemented, exactly the same as 
Hoffman and McGlashan (see Figure 3.1). The network had 25 inputs, 43 outputs 
and a temporary storage layer of 40 neurons (layer 3) that received a copy of the 
activation of the 40 hidden layer neurons (layer 2), with the aim of learning a 
collection of sentences over a period of time and to differentiate between 
grammatical word sequences and randomised word sequences.  
 
The network was trained using the standard backpropagation algorithm with 
momentum (Rumelhart, Hinton & Williams (1986) and was a typical Elman 
recurrent network architecture (Elman 1990) containing a context layer (the 
temporary storage layer in Figure 3.1). Elman used a recurrent link, where a copy of 
the hidden layer activations from the previous timestep was passed to the context 
layer. This had the effect of providing a dynamic memory where internal 
representations were created reflecting task demands in the context of prior internal 
states.  
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Figure 3.1. Architecture of speech perception network. Taken from Hoffman & McGlashan (1997) 
 
A. Training on grammatical word sequences 
Training Inputs - Phonetic 
I used exactly the same training set as Hoffman, where two hundred and fifty six 
grammatically correct sentences of three to six words were constructed from a 
vocabulary of 30 words (14 nouns, 11 verbs, 4 adjectives, plus the negative - ‘won’t). 
An example of typical sentences used include: large boy tell Jane story; cop give 
Sam warning; bill love girl. Each word was given a unique phonetic representation 
consisting of a random 25 bit binary code, where approximately 25% of the inputs 
were turned on (set to plus one). This random allocation of the input vector simulates 
the random correspondence between phonetic input and semantic output, where 
similar sounding words do not have a similar meaning.  
 
Although it was not clear from the journal paper, it was evident from Hoffman’s 
program that in the original model the sentences in the training set were separated by 
a nil input, where all 25 input neurons were turned off (set to zero), in order to 
signify the end of a sentence. I was using PDP++ which requires input sequencing in 
groups and has no need for further separation of the input sentences. However, I 
found that it was still necessary to include the nil input at the end of each sentence in 
the training set; otherwise the errors on the nil inputs presented in the test set were 
very high, as the network had not yet encountered a nil input. Therefore, in my 
simulations the sentences were presented to the network as 256 groups, each 
containing 3-6 words from the word set plus the additional nil input, in order to 
replicate Hoffman exactly.  
 
Training Outputs – semantic and syntactic 
Each of the 43 neurons in the output layer represented a feature in exactly the same 
way as Hoffman. Each word input was allocated three to six of these features, 
providing semantic and syntactic information (Figure 3.2). By training the network to 
detect feature codes of the sentence words a word can be classified as detected or 
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misidentified when testing with novel data. For example, when Jane is input, 
represented by a unique 25 bit binary code, the corresponding semantic output will 
contain three of the 43 neurons in the output layer turned on: noun, human and Jane. 
The remaining 40 neurons will be turned off.  
It is important to note that it is intended for the network to learn the simple 
association between a word and its output features (syntax and semantic meaning). It 
is not intended that the network should learn to predict the next word, as in Elman 
(1990). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 giving examples of output neural codes. Taken from Hoffman & McGlashan (1997). 
 
Training 
Hoffman designed a special program with an ‘online’ variant of backpropagation 
learning, where training consisted of 60 repetitions of a set of 256 different 
grammatical sentences, separated by one nil (equivalent to 1200 input vectors). With 
no clear indications from the paper as to the values for learning rate and momentum, 
I ran a number of pilot studies with starting weights at various initialisation points to 
find an optimal combination of learning rate and momentum which would reduce the 
network error to a minimum. With an optimal combination of a learning rate of 0.18 
and momentum of 0.81 the network was trained ten times, using ten different 
initialisations for starting weights, on a total sequence of 1200 vectors (words and 
nils), each represented by 25 bits. The optimal initialisation point trained to a 
minimal sum squared error of 0.94 for the entire training set, over 60 epochs, at 
which point no further reduction in error was seen. All results shown are for this 
optimal initialisation point. 
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Testing 
In exactly the same manner as Hoffman, four test sets were constructed containing 
23 novel sentences using the same vocabulary and presented in 23 groups. Each 
group contained a sentence of 3-6 words, from the word set, followed by a pause 
consisting of 5 nil inputs, giving a total of 5250 inputs (210 words and nils  x 25 bit 
binary code), detailed below: 
(i) Grammatically correct and undegraded: Grammatically correct sentences 
containing words with the same inputs and targets as those words learnt in the 
training set (undegraded). 
(ii) Grammatically correct and degraded: In order to test the network on 
phonetically degraded information, the same test set as in (i) above was used, but two 
of the inputs for each word that were previously on, i.e., set to 1, were turned off, by 
setting them to 0 (degraded). 
(iii) Randomly constructed (grammatically incorrect) and undegraded: In order 
to demonstrate that the network had taken account of the order of the words within 
the sentences in the training set, and was learning syntax, the same words in the test 
set were presented in undegraded form, but in random order within their individual 
groups. 
(iv) Randomly constructed (grammatically incorrect) degraded: A test set with a 
combination of random words and phonetically degraded information. 
 
The total sum squared error across all 43 output neurons for each test set were 
compared to determine the effect on the network of both phonetically degraded 
information and randomly constructed test sentences.  
 
B. Training on randomised (grammatically incorrect) word 
sequences 
This was an important stage in the simulation as Hoffman used it to demonstrate 
dependence of the network on word order and that it was acting effectively as a 
working memory. To see the effect of training on grammatical word sequences 
versus randomised word (grammatically incorrect) sequences, the network was also 
trained with 256 randomised word sequences and tested with the four test sets in A 
above. Reductions in word detection rate and increased word misidentifications were 
expected (Hoffman & McGlashan 1997).  
 
The effect of training on grammatical word sequences (in A. above) and randomised 
(grammatically incorrect) word sequences (in B. above) was investigated by 
comparing the effects of the four test sets on each training set, as demonstrated in 
Table 3.1. If there is a difference between testing on grammatical versus randomised 
word sequences, and the network is able to detect more output features correctly 
associated with the words when trained on grammatical word sequences, then the 
network is acting as an effective working memory and neuroanatomic alterations can 
be applied. 
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Table 3.1 summarising training and test sets 
 
TRAINING 
SETS  
256 sentences 
5250 inputs 
TEST SETS 
 
23 Novel Sentences 
215 inputs 
Grammatically 
Correct  
Sentences 
Grammatically 
Incorrect 
(Randomised) 
Sentences 
Grammatically 
Correct and 
Undegraded 
Grammatically 
Correct and 
Degraded 
Grammatically 
Incorrect and 
Undegraded 
Grammatically 
Incorrect and 
Degraded 
 
C. Word detection and misidentification rates 
According to Hoffman & McGlashan (1997) an algorithm was used to decide which 
word was the best fit for a particular semantic output pattern. The best fit became the 
detected word and when there was no clear best fit the word was classed as not 
perceived. Hoffman clarified the position further in an e-mail and explained that their 
criterion for word detection was built into their program. In effect, each output 
produced a distance calculation for each word (that was adjusted for the number of 
output neurons that originally were coded as ‘on’ so as not to penalize words 
associated with a larger number of output neurons turned ‘on’). The algorithm 
calculated an adjusted mean square between the observed output and the target 
output for all output neurons that were turned on. It then ranked each word according 
to its distance from the actual output, and if one word outranked another by 0.12 then 
that word was scored as detected. If no word outranked any other by 0.12 or more 
then the network was said to produce a null output. A misidentification was when the 
network confused one word with another. The figure of 0.12 was derived empirically 
to produce a very high rate of word detection success without spurious word outputs 
produced by nil inputs once the network was well trained. 
 
It was difficult to incorporate Hoffman’s criterion for word detection into my 
simulation as I was using a standard simulation package and he had written his own 
program from scratch. However, after various pilot studies to determine a criterion in 
line with that used by Hoffman, I decided on two criteria in order to give the network 
as great a chance as possible to produce a very high rate of word detection. I used a 
liberal criterion of a total sum squared error of 3.9 and below, and a stricter criterion 
of a total sum squared error of 0.9 and below (the error, being the squared difference 
between the desired output and the actual output for each output neuron, summed 
over all output neurons). For sentences trained with grammatical word sequences the 
model achieved 100% word detection success, according to both criteria, when tested 
with grammatically correct, undegraded sentences; while models trained with 
randomised word sequences achieved word detection successes of 95% and 92% 
with liberal and strict criteria respectively, using the same test set (see Figure 3.6 in 
Results Section).  
 
I was able to look at word detection rates for each training set, but my simulations 
did not allow for misidentification rates at the present time. A hallucination would be 
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recorded if output layer activations gave rise to words during the 5 nil pauses with no 
phonetic inputs. 
 
RESULTS 
 
A. Training on grammatically correct sentences 
It can be seen from figure 3.3 that the network trained with grammatical word 
sequences gave rise to a minimal sum squared error of 0.18, being the difference 
between the desired output and the actual output seen over all output neurons when 
tested with grammatically correct and undegraded test sentences, but the error rose to 
182.32 when tested with grammatically correct, but degraded sentences. A similar 
pattern was seen with randomly constructed test sentences as the network gave a 
minimal sum squared error of 9.54 with randomly constructed and undegraded test 
sentences, which rose to 187.77 when the randomly constructed test sentences were 
degraded. Degradation would appear to have an effect on the total error produced by 
the network as turning off (setting to zero) two of the input neurons increased the 
error on both grammatically correct and randomly constructed undegraded test 
sentences by factors of approximately 90 and 18 respectively. 
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Figure 3.3 results from A. showing the effect of testing a network trained with grammatically correct 
sentences, with grammatically correct undegraded, grammatically correct degraded, randomly 
constructed undegraded and randomly constructed degraded test sentences 
 
A small effect was seen also when testing with grammatically correct, undegraded 
sentences as opposed to randomly constructed, undegraded sentences (Figure 3.3) 
where sum squared errors are 0.18 and 9.54 respectively. An analysis of multiple 
networks was undertaken: while a paired samples t test showed that there was no 
significant difference between the two means of 0.0005 and 0.0440 respectively, t 
(214) = -1.59 (p > 0.05), there was a small to modest effect size, with a Partial Eta 
squared of 0.02. The increased error for the randomly constructed undegraded test 
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sentences shows that the network was relying upon word order, to a limited extent, in 
the 256 grammatical word training sequences.  
 
B. Training on grammatically incorrect (randomly constructed) 
sentences 
Similar error patterns were recorded for the four test sets when randomised word 
sequences were trained (Figure 3.4, purple bars) to those when grammatical word 
sequences were trained in A above (Figure 3.4 blue bars, taken from Figure 3.3). 
Minimal sum squared errors were seen of 4.22 and 4.49 when tested with 
grammatically correct undegraded and randomly constructed undegraded test 
sentences respectively, rising to 171.56 and 184.09 when tested with grammatically 
correct  degraded and randomly constructed degraded test sentences respectively. 
However, contrary to the findings in A. above, there was negligible difference 
between the errors from testing with grammatically undegraded and randomly 
constructed undegraded sentences, of 4.22 and 4.49 respectively. This reflects the 
lack of reliance of word order in the randomised word sequences training set. 
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Figure 3.4 results from A and B showing the effect of testing networks, trained with both grammatical 
and randomised word sequences, with grammatically incorrect undegraded, grammatically correct 
degraded, randomly constructed undegraded and randomly constructed degraded test sentences. 
 
C. Word detection and misidentification rates 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 above provide detail not included in the original paper. Hoffman 
and McGlashan recorded the percentage of words successfully detected by the 
network together with the percentage of misidentifications (Figure 3.5). I was able to 
look at word detection rates for each training set, but my simulations did not allow 
for misidentification rates at the present time. 
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My results for word detection can be seen in Figure 3.6. With both liberal and strict 
criteria, word detection rate for randomized word sequences was particularly high at 
95% falling to only 93%, or 82% with no reductions due to degradation, respectively, 
in comparison to Hoffman’s 70% falling to about 40%. In accordance with Hoffman 
& McGlashan’s results, no hallucinations were recorded at this stage. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 A. Word detection and B. misidentification rates. Effects of reducing phonetic information 
and randomization of input word sequences are represented. These data demonstrate that the network 
utilizes meaning intrinsic to grammatical sequences of words to facilitate translating phonetic inputs 
into percepts. Taken from Hoffman & McGlashan (1997). 
 
Contrary to Hoffman and McGlashan, there appeared to be a good correspondence of 
output features to words with both grammatical and randomised word sequences. In 
this simulation there were no dramatic reductions in word detection rate as a result of 
using randomised word sequences. Therefore, unlike the Hoffman and McGlashan 
network, the present model did not appear to demonstrate dependence on word order 
in decoding input information and thus, I was not able to demonstrate the specific 
contribution of verbal working memory and grammatical word order shown by 
Hoffman and McGlashan.  
 
While in Section A. above, there was a small effect seen for word order for 
grammatical word sequences, which was reflected in the total errors for the test sets, 
this was not reflected in word detection rates. Degradation of both grammatical and 
randomised word sequences appeared to be the only major variable to cause an 
effect. Without dramatic reductions in word detection rate or the corresponding 
increased word misidentifications seen as a result of using randomised word 
sequences, I was not in a position to proceed with neuroanatomic manipulations 
involving synaptic pruning and cell death that may obtain the purported 
hallucinations. 
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Figure 3.6 Word detection rates taken from my simulation, using both strict and liberal criteria, 
showing little effect of reducing phonetic information and randomisation of input word sequences.  
 
Training on 5 nil inputs 
As the network was trained with 1 nil but tested with 5 nils, I wanted to see if any 
findings were an artifact of the difference between the training and test sets. Two 
grammatical word sequences training sets, containing one and five nil inputs between 
sentences, both gave rise to the same minimal error of 0.18 (Figure -) when tested 
with grammatically correct, undegraded sentences. It was therefore concluded that 
the results did not appear to be due to an artifact of training with one nil input 
between each sentence and testing with five nil inputs between each sentence. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
As there were no dramatic reductions in word detection rate or increased word 
misidentifications seen as a result of using random sentences, the present model did 
not appear to demonstrate the dependence on word order in decoding input 
information exhibited by the Hoffman and McGlashan model. While there was a 
small effect seen for word order for grammatical word sequences, which was 
reflected in the total errors for the test sets, this was not reflected in word detection 
rates. Degradation of both grammatical and randomised word sequences appeared to 
be the only major variable to cause an effect on word detection rate and I was, 
therefore, unable to proceed with neuroanatomic manipulations involving synaptic 
pruning and cell death that may obtain the purported hallucinations. 
 
While my criterion for correct word detection was not exactly the same as Hoffman 
and McGlashan’s and I did not look at misidentification rates, my results did provide 
a comparison between networks trained on both grammatically correct and randomly 
constructed sentences. However, early indications suggested that my simulations 
were not demonstrating the required dependence on word order in decoding input 
information.  It is possible that using exactly the same criteria may have made a 
difference, but, in view of the considerable amount of work that was still needed to 
be done in order to improve the model, and advances in other directions that 
appeared to be more fruitful, I decided to abandon the model at this stage. 
 
For a sizeable network of 148 neurons and 5920 connections the training set of 1200 
items used by Hoffman was very small. Elman (1990) used 3500 connections and 
worked with a training set of nearly 30,000 items. It was nearly half the size and used 
twenty-five times as many items in the training set as Hoffman and McGlashan. It is 
generally acceptable that for every free variable (or connection) there should be at 
least one training item. A training set that is too small allows the network to find a 
solution to the problem in many ways and it is probably the case that Hoffman’s 
original experiment had some flaws and was under-constrained. In effect it is 
possible that Hoffman had a non repeatable experiment which may explain why in 
our experiment behaviour is no different between syntactic and non-syntactic strings. 
No mention was made in the original paper of replication in order to seek a number 
of solutions to the problem. This practice was typical of early connectionist models, 
where they tended to be over resourced with too many free parameters, and I 
encounter a similar problem with the model of Hinton and Plaut (1987) which is 
described in Chapter 8.3. A statistical analysis would have strengthened their 
argument, providing robustness and validity to their findings. In addition, it would 
have been interesting to see the contribution of the dynamic memory in the recurrent 
link by removing the temporary storage layer. It may well have been the case that the 
network could learn the associations using a simple feedforward network 
architecture. 
 
Regrettably the program Hoffman sent to me was complicated and not easy to 
replicate and there were still too many unanswered questions. Hoffman’s training set 
contained one nil between each sentence, but the testing sets used five nils. This 
should have been mentioned in his discussion as a possible artefact of the model and 
once again, the issue of replication is very important. In addition, the purported 
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hallucinations that emerged from the Hoffman and McGlashan model was actually 
only a single word hallucination ‘won’t’ that occurred during the pauses between 
sentences. While it is feasible that a larger network with a more complex vocabulary 
may generate hallucinations of other words and possibly sentences, it is also possible 
that this particular one-word hallucination was an anomaly of either the data set or 
the nature of the word and the function of the negative in the sentences.  
 
In the Hoffman model speech hallucinations emerged with synaptic losses of around 
80 to 95%, which they claimed corresponded to an additional 20% loss of synapses 
in the frontal cortex compared to normal adult levels. However, later evidence 
(Shenton 2001) suggests that there is no significant volume loss in frontal cortex in 
schizophrenia.  
 
As I began to look at other research in this area, other questions began to arise that 
were not addressed by the Hoffman and McGlashan model. Their model focuses on 
connectivity in the frontal lobes, but subsequent connectivity models pointed to 
reduced parahippocampal connectivity in the temporal lobes as an explanation of 
schizophrenia-like episodic memory deficits (Talamini, Meeter, Elvevag, Murre & 
Goldberg 2005). Furthermore, Hoffman and McGlashan only modelled the end point 
of the neurodevelopmental process and not the formation and progression, which is 
thought to be pre-programmed and to begin in early life. 
 
In addition, I found other models that focused more on the neural basis of 
schizophrenia. In particular, dopamine was seen to play an important role in both the 
symptoms and cognitive deficits associated with the disorder. Hoffman and 
McGlashan did not focus on dopamine aberration, for accepted reasons at the time, 
with possible dopamine dysfunction as an exacerbating factor, but not central to the 
issue. No mention was made of the considerable evidence of dysfunction of the 
dopamine system and associated areas, such as the basal ganglia. While Hoffman and 
McGlashan addressed one of the symptoms, hallucinations, it ignored other 
symptoms and cognitive deficits and therefore a degree of biological plausibility. 
Their mistake, and the community at that time, was to downgrade the importance of 
DA dysfunction.  
 
To conclude: i) my model was a valid first attempt to implement an early 
connectionist model given the zeitgeist in 1997, i.e. the focus on connectivity in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; ii) I learnt a lot about how to replicate and critically 
evaluate an existing model. My critique of the limitations of this model, given the 
change of emphasis toward dopamine dysfunction, provides a plausible reason for a 
major switch in my modelling approach. In view of other models which came to light 
I decided not to pursue the neuropsychological approach any longer as it was 
difficult to instigate and would yield a limited set of results. If the modelling had 
been successful, further work could have been undertaken to strengthen the model in 
these areas to make it more biologically plausible. However, the above forms a 
valuable part of the argument for the exploration, and future choice, of a valid model 
that would permit the change of theoretical emphasis on the causes of schizophrenia. 
This 'change' should embrace the shift of emphasis from a brain dysfunction based 
on a neuropsychological profile, to one based upon the mechanism responsible for 
the positive symptoms and the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia.  
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3.2 Modelling and the Dopamine Hypothesis of 
Schizophrenia 
 
Very early on in my research I noticed that much of the literature on the 
computational modelling of dopamine and schizophrenia referred to an early 
connectionist model by Cohen and Servan-Schreiber (1992).  This seminal work 
used artificial neural networks to simulate normal and schizophrenic performance in 
three tasks that relied on the correct use of context: the Stroop task, the continuous 
performance test and a lexical disambiguation task. It was posited that damage to the 
dopamine system could account for the inability to use context appropriately. 
Dopamine was modelled as a change in the slope (or gain G) in the activation 
function of processing units and was shown to modulate the responsivity of neurons 
(corresponding to the prefrontal cortex) to external input, thus increasing the signal 
to noise ratio (Servan-Schreiber, Printz & Cohen 1990). Essentially, dopamine was 
believed to be crucial for optimising the signal-to-noise ratio thought to enhance 
working memory by reducing interference or noise. This theory related to the slow-
acting (tonic), diffuse, non-specific effects of dopamine in the system. 
 
However, since that time, the discovery of rapid (phasic), behaviour-specific bursts 
of dopamine (Schultz 1992; Schultz et al. 1993), discussed further in Chapter 4, led 
Cohen and colleagues to expand and update their existing ideas. They identified a 
transient gating role for dopamine where dopamine was able to modulate both 
afferent input and local inhibition in the prefrontal cortex (Braver 1997). This phasic 
gating system was very different to the earlier ideas of tonic changes in dopamine 
activity aiding the signal to noise ratio in working memory mentioned above, and 
posited a separate mechanism for salience. Instead, dopamine was able to control 
what was to be retained, by actively gating salient information into the prefrontal 
cortex. Salient information causes positive dopamergic activity, which opens the gate 
to update working memory. When there is no salient information, the gate remains 
closed, nothing is able to enter working memory and the representations currently 
active are maintained (Figure 3.7). 
 
Figure 3.7 Illustration of active gating. 
When the gate is open, sensory input can 
rapidly update WM, but when it is 
closed, it cannot, thereby preventing 
other distracting information (C) from 
interfering with the maintenance of 
previously stored information. Taken 
from O’Reilly & Frank (2006). 
 
Following recognition of the shorter, phasic effects of dopamine in the Reward 
Prediction Error Hypothesis (Chapter 4.1) and the subsequent discovery that 
Temporal Difference Learning was a good way of modelling this phenomenon 
(Chapter 4.2), a new Learning and Gating Theory of Dopamine was developed 
(Braver, Barch & Cohen 1999). This new theory conformed more closely to 
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accumulating neurobiological evidence and also claimed to be a more powerful and 
complete theory of the mechanism of cognitive control. 
 
The new theory updated previous ideas of dopamine as a neuromodulator and its role 
in active memory (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber 1992; Braver 1997), by combining it 
with the work of Montague, Dayan and Sejnowski (1996) on reward prediction error 
and learning. They hypothesised that schizophrenia resulted from increased noise in 
the dopamine system, leading to abnormal updating and maintenance of context 
information in working memory. Specifically, dopamine was seen as a unitary 
function which enabled an organism to predict and respond appropriately to events 
that led to reward. 
 
It was believed that dopamine provided flexible access of task relevant information 
to active memory in the prefrontal cortex, but at the same time protected against 
interference from competing irrelevant information. The phasic dopamine prediction 
error mediated both learning and gating effects where learning was driven by 
prediction errors that affected synaptic strength and biased on-going processing, 
while the same responsivity effectively gated access to active memory, via the effects 
of excitatory afferent and local inhibitory input. 
 
A connectionist model was produced in support of the new theory based on the AX 
continuous performance task (CPT) (Braver et al. 1999), which suggested that 
reduced phasic activity, i.e., reduced update to active memory, led to perservatory 
behaviour; while increased phasic activity, i.e., increased update, led to poor 
interference control, and therefore distractibility. Additionally, increased tonic (or 
longer-term background) activity led to delay related decay of active memory, and 
therefore maintenance deficits. 
 
Both perseverations and distractibility are known disturbances to the prefrontal 
cortex and are typical symptoms of schizophrenia, along with poor maintenance 
control. Perseveratory behaviour occurs when a patient becomes preoccupied with a 
task and is unable to change strategy or appropriately update goal representations, 
while distractibility is the inability to concentrate or focus on the task at hand. This 
model posited that both perseverations and distractibility were due to impairments in 
phasic dopaminergic activity which affect working memory. However, the model 
was of two very different systems in the brain doing different jobs and possibly 
coding for two different things; salience in the midbrain and working memory in the 
prefrontal cortex. It is important, therefore, to investigate how these behaviours relate 
to each other and it is this interaction that will be explored in the current research. 
 
3.2.1 Simulation of the AX-Continuous Performance Task (CPT) (Braver, 
Barch & Cohen 1999) 
 
Following my decision to abandon further attempts to simulate the Hoffman and 
McGlashan speech perception network (3.1.1), I was actively seeking a new model 
as a base for my future work. Any model incorporating the cognitive deficits of 
schizophrenia should be able to demonstrate the impairments in both the 
maintenance and updating of context seen in the AX-CPT. To understand the task in 
more detail, I implemented an extremely simple version of the original model using a 
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supervised simple feed forward architecture implemented in T Learn (Plunkett & 
Elman, 1997). 
 
Prior to the addition of the new gating mechanism Braver and colleagues were able 
to demonstrate both normal and defective schizophrenic performance in the AX- 
CPT using a simple feed forward connectionist network. The gating mechanism was 
added later to see whether it could also capture both performances and provide a 
more refined model of dopamine activity.  I did not add the gating mechanism at this 
stage as I did not intend to use this particular mechanism in my model. 
 
The AX-CPT provides a measure of cognitive control function, involving both the 
maintenance and updating of context (Chapman & Chapman 1978; Braver et al. 
1999). Specifically, during the sequential visual presentation of single letters, it is 
necessary to identify a target letter, but only when it is preceded by a specific cue. 
For example, if the cue is an A and the target is an X, it is necessary to signal when 
an X is shown, but only when it is preceded by an A. 
 
METHODS 
 
The simple feed forward network architecture (Figure 3.8), containing a hidden layer 
was implemented in T Learn. 
   Output:     Target             Non Target 
 
  Input:        A        Not A            X             Not X 
 
Figure 3.8 Simple feed forward architecture to demonstrate the AX-CPT 
 
Training 
Letters were presented to the network in bipolar form, where the presence of an A or 
an X was represented by plus one, and their absence by minus one. The network was 
trained to output a value of plus one when an A was followed by an X, but to output 
a minus one when it was followed by a non X, or when no A was presented. During 
training, in accordance with Braver et al., cue A followed by target X was presented 
to the network on 70% of occasions, while the other permutations: A followed by 
non-X; non-A followed by X and non-A followed by non-X, were each presented 
10% of the time (see Table 3.2 for the four training set representations). 
 
The network was trained ten times at different initialisation points. 
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Table 3.2 Showing input and output representations. Positive inputs/outputs are in bold. 
 
Input Output   
A non A X non X Target Non-Target 
A-X 
(70%) 1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 
A-non X 
(10%) 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 
non A-X 
(10% -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 
non A-
non X 
(10%) 
-1 1 -1 1 -1 1 
 
Testing 
In order to test the robustness of the network to the task, the fully trained network 
was tested with noisy data, where a value of 0.5 was substituted for all values of plus 
one, for the four representations in the training set. The noisy data represents a 
confound in the experiment where, for example, the X may be on screen for an 
insufficient length of time to be attended to, it may be blurred, or it may represent a 
deliberate distraction to the participant. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Training 
Extensive training over 20,000,000 iterations was undertaken to produce a minimal 
sum squared error of less than 0.004 for maximum learning. The network was trained 
ten times, with ten different initialisations. An example of one of the actual outputs 
can be seen in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3 showing actual outputs and sum squared error per pattern following training compared to 
expected outputs, in brackets. 
 
Input Actual Output (expected)  A non-A X non-X Target Non-Target 
 
A-X 1 -1 1 -1 1.00 (1) -1.00 (-1) 
 
non A-non X -1 1 -1 1 -1.00 (-1) 1.00 (1) 
 
non A-X -1 1 1 -1 -0.99 (-1) 0.99 (1) 
 
A-non X 1 -1 -1 1 -1.00 (-1) 0.99 (1) 
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Testing 
The fully trained network responded correctly to the noisy test data by producing the 
correct output, to a total sum squared error of 3.64 across all input patterns (Table 
3.4), and the model successfully simulated the AX-CPT. 
 
Table 3.4 showing actual output and sum squared error per pattern when test input data given to 
trained network. Positive inputs/responses are in bold. 
 
Input Actual Output (expected)  A non-A X non-X Target Non-Target 
Noisy 
A-X 0.5 -1 0.5 -1 0.98 (1) -0.98 (-1) 
Noisy 
Non A-non X -1 0.5 -1 0.5 -1.00 (-1) 1.00 (1) 
Noisy 
non A-X -1 0.5 0.5 -1 -0.99 (-1) 0.99 (1) 
noisy 
A-non X 0.5 -1 -1 0.5 -1.00 (-1) 1.00 (1) 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A simple feed forward network was able to learn the CPT. The four test cases show 
that the model responds correctly, in a categorical manner, to all the input tests even 
when the input is noisy. This model could have been developed further to include the 
gating system and the dopamine reward prediction error (Braver, Barch & Cohen 
1999), and been subjected to lesioning techniques, but as with Hoffman & 
McGlashan (1997), the model appeared to have major shortcomings for use in 
schizophrenia research.  
 
In particular, the model focussed on the direct dopamine pathway from the ventral 
tegmental area, which delivers a homogeneous signal to prefrontal cortex, and does 
not include the basal ganglia and the cortico-basal ganglia circuit loops (see Chapter 
4.3). The indirect pathway, via the basal ganglia, allows for hierarchical updating of 
the prefrontal cortex, where differentiated inputs are received by prefrontal sub 
regions. This indirect pathway is better equipped to address the important 
fundamental issue of selective updating, where higher order goals are actively 
maintained, while updating lower order sub-goals (Cohen, Braver and Brown 2002).  
 
In addition, the model focused on the dysfunctional processing of context in 
schizophrenia using the AX-CPT. This task is a device often used as a measure of 
executive dysfunction, with emphasis on both the inhibition and correct use of 
context. However, there are many instances of damaged contextual processing in 
patients with amnesia, executive dysfunction and frontal lobe damage that do not 
suffer from psychotic episodes. While the model made a valuable contribution to the 
understanding of the neural systems underlying schizophrenia at that time, as the task 
used does not apply uniquely to schizophrenia, I question the validity of such models 
as an explanation of schizophrenia. 
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While I chose not to pursue this particular model and task, the literature referred to 
the work of Montague et al. (1996) and their theoretical framework for 
mesencephalic dopamine systems using temporal differences (Sutton 1988). In 
addition, a later review on computational perspectives on dopamine function in 
prefrontal cortex by Cohen et al. (2002) pointed to other research by Houk, Adams 
and Barto (1995) and Schultz, Dayan and Montague (1997) involving phasic 
dopamine as a reinforcement learning signal and the basal ganglia. This opened up a 
whole new avenue of research of dopamine as reward prediction error and is the 
foundation on which the remainder of my thesis rests. 
 
 
3.3 Chapter Conclusions 
 
The principal objective of this chapter was to implement two important, fundamental 
models of aspects of schizophrenia; the speech perception network of Hoffman and 
McGlashan (1997) and the learning and gating model of Braver et al. (1999). I have 
attempted to describe and explore both models by implementing some aspects of 
them in two different neural network packages, PDP++ and T Learn. While I do not 
intend to progress further with these models, the modelling already undertaken has 
made a valuable contribution to the direction of this body of research. Subsequent 
research and the flaws of the models have pointed to a new line of reasoning to 
account for the symptoms and cognitive deficits of schizophrenia which include 
dopamine dysfunction and the neuroscience of the cortico-basal ganglia circuit loops. 
Dysfunction of the dopamine system should be a ‘cornerstone’ of any neuroscientific 
model of schizophrenia and this is the focus of Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Dopamine, the Basal Ganglia and Temporal 
Difference: The Prediction Error Hypothesis 
 
 
Preliminary models described in Chapter 3 provided the direction for future 
modelling work and the remainder of this thesis. Braver et al. (1999), and a 
subsequent review on the computational perspectives of dopamine function in 
prefrontal cortex by Cohen, Braver and Brown (2002), pointed to other modelling 
work regarding the role of dopamine in learning, by Houk, Adams and Barto (1995), 
Montague, Dayan and Sejnowski (1996) and Schultz, Dayan and Montague (1997).  
 
In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s Wolfram Schultz and colleagues conducted a 
series of experiments where they recorded the activity of single midbrain dopamine 
neurons in alert monkeys while they performed behavioural acts, such as reaching for 
food or pressing a lever, for a juice reward (Hollerman & Schultz 1998; Ljunberg, 
Apicella & Schultz 1992; Romo & Schultz 1990; Schultz 1986; Schultz, Apicella & 
Ljunberg 1993; Schultz & Romo 1990). The major finding that the fluctuating 
outputs of dopamine neurons signals changes in reward prediction errors had an 
enormous impact on the direction of research at that time. Houk, Davis & Beiser 
(1995) gathered together multidisciplinary contributions from researchers, including 
Schultz, linking theoretical studies with experimental approaches at various different 
structural levels, with the aim of modelling and understanding the nervous system. 
The basal ganglia networks, including dopamine and their linkages with the cerebral 
cortex, played a central role in reward processing; and the book culminated in a 
model by Houk, Adams and Barto (1995) of how dopamine neurons in the basal 
ganglia predict reinforcement, and how outputs from those neurons could be used to 
reinforce behaviours leading to reward, using an actor-critic architecture (Barto 
1995). 
 
Shortly after, Montague et al. (1996) and Schultz et al. (1997) suggested that the 
activity of dopamine neurons could be represented by Temporal Difference (TD) 
(Sutton 1988; Sutton & Barto 1998) errors in the predictions of future reward. The 
correspondence between dopamine reward prediction error and TD error was 
striking, and they both developed theoretical frameworks to explain the physiological 
and behavioural data by Schultz and colleagues. Montague et al. explained how 
fluctuations in the firing of dopamine neurons above and below baseline could 
deliver reward prediction errors to both cortical and subcortical targets, (1) during 
learning, and (2) during ongoing behavioural choice. Furthermore they used TD to 
model those errors and were able to make testable predictions about human choice 
behaviour. Schultz et al. also went on to explain the functional role of the dopamine 
signal through the TD algorithm and developed a novel way of representing a 
stimulus through time, where a representation of each sensory cue had more than one 
associated adaptable weight. 
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The important messages from this early modelling work were: (i) the idea of phasic 
dopamine acting as a reinforcement learning signal, or reward prediction error, 
indicating the difference between actual and expected reward, with a view to 
reducing subsequent prediction errors; and (ii) the dopamine reward prediction error 
could be modelled effectively using TD; specifically using an actor-critic 
architecture, which can be related to basal ganglia circuits and dopamine neurons. 
These two ideas are discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. 
 
In addition to reward processing, the basal ganglia have an important role to play in 
the contextual analysis of the environment by receiving input from diverse areas of 
the cerebral cortex, generating the reinforcement signal and relaying this information 
for use in planning and behaviour (Houk, Davis & Beiser 1995). The functional 
suitability of the basal ganglia for this role is discussed in Section 4.3.  
 
It has been suggested that the dopamine system mediates the incentive salience of 
rewards (Section 4.4), modulating their motivational value, which is dissociable from 
hedonia and reward learning (Berridge & Robinson 1998). In order to relate the 
dopamine prediction error hypothesis to schizophrenia, a framework is described in 
Section 4.4.1 that describes psychosis in terms of aberrant saliences (Kapur 2003). 
Ideally, the ideas of incentive salience should be incorporated into future 
neurocomputational models of the role of dopamine in psychosis and the positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia.  
 
Finally, I include evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging studies that 
the reward prediction error model of dopamine activity applies to human reward 
learning and not just non-human primates (Section 4.5). This is a theoretical chapter 
and it is the work detailed in the next five sections that has inspired the modelling in 
the remainder of this thesis. 
 
 
4.1 Dopamine as a Reward prediction Error Signal 
 
Current theories of the effects of dopamine on behaviour focus on the role of 
dopamine as a neuromodulator, where organisms learn to organise their behaviour 
under the influence of goals, and expected future reward is believed to drive action 
selection, as seen during conditioning (Montague et al. 1996; Schultz et al. 1997). 
Specifically, it is dopamine that signals a reward prediction error of the difference 
between the current and expected future reward. 
 
In this section I give a basic account of conditioning (Section 4.1.1), which puts into 
context the work of Wolfram Schultz and colleagues, who demonstrated the role of 
dopamine as a reward prediction error (Section 4.1.2). 
 
4.1.1 Conditioning 
Classical and instrumental conditioning are examples of Associative Learning, i.e., 
making a new association or connection between two events. The classic Pavlovian 
conditioning paradigm (Pavlov 1927) looked at dogs salivating, the unconditioned 
response (UR), when provided with food, the unconditioned stimulus (US). The dogs 
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were trained to associate light, the conditioned stimulus (CS), with food, resulting in 
salivation, the conditioned response (CR), at the earlier stage when the light came on. 
Here, the CS (the light) takes on the specific motivational properties of the US and 
elicits the response previously given to the US. 
 
 Before Conditioning: CS (light) Æ No response 
              US (food) Æ UR (salivation) 
 After Conditioning:   CS (light) Æ CR learned (salivation) 
 
Should a new stimulus occur that predicts the food reward earlier than the light, for 
example, the sound of a bell, the animal will learn the new association. The bell will 
become the new CS and the light will no longer elicit the CR. This is known as 
secondary conditioning. Accordingly, the earliest stimulus that confidently predicts 
the reward becomes the CS. 
 
In classical conditioning the animal is passive, but in instrumental conditioning the 
animal is active; it learns that a response it makes leads to a particular consequence, 
for example, pressing a bar leads to access to food. Wolfram Schultz and colleagues 
used classical and instrumental conditioning to demonstrate that dopamine provides a 
reward prediction error of the difference between current and expected future reward 
(Section 4.1.2). 
 
A reinforcer is any event that increases the probability of a response. A positive 
reinforcer, or reward, is a stimulus that, when presented following a response, 
increases the probability of the response. An example of positive reinforcement is 
detailed in Chapter 6, where a rat learns to traverse a maze to receive a juice reward. 
In Chapter 7 I describe an example of negative reinforcement, where a rat learns to 
associate a neutral CS, such as a light or tone, with an aversive US or outcome, such 
as an electric foot-shock, that has preceded the CS. This produces a conditioned 
avoidance response, thus avoiding the US. A negative reinforcer is a stimulus that, 
when removed following a response, increases the probability of the response. If 
conditioned behaviour is not reinforced, the CR gradually diminishes and extinction 
occurs, where the CS will eventually cease to be a reliable predictor of reward and 
will no longer take on the specific motivational properties of the US. 
 
4.1.2 Single Cell Recordings of Dopamine Neurons 
Physiological recordings of dopamine neurons on alert monkeys, by Wolfram 
Schultz and colleagues (Hollerman & Schultz 1998; Ljunberg, Apicella & Schultz 
1992; Romo & Schultz 1990; Schultz 1986; Schultz, Apicella & Ljunberg 1993; 
Schultz & Romo 1990) have shown that information about rewarding stimuli is 
encoded in dopaminergic activity. Figure 4.1, is taken from Schultz et al. (1997) and 
represents the firing pattern of a single dopamine neuron over time (x-axis) and 
across different trials (y-axis). Firing of a single neuron is recorded as a single dot in 
the raster of impulses and the sum of these firings across trials is recorded in the 
histogram above. When an unexpected reward is given, such as a drop of juice, 
dopamine neurons respond with a short phasic response shortly after receipt of the 
reward. This effect can be clearly identified in Figure 4.1A as an increased rate of 
firing, above baseline, reflected in the increased density of impulses in the raster and 
in the height of the associated histogram. Phasic responses occur in the majority of 
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dopamine neurons (55-80%) in a homogeneous fashion and do not discriminate 
between different types of rewarding stimuli.  
 
When a reward is fully predicted by a CS, for example when a monkey is trained 
over the course of several days to touch a lever following a burst of light, there is no 
phasic dopamine activity following receipt of the reward. Instead the timing of the 
phasic activation changes to just after presentation of the CS (Figure 4.1B). This 
reflects the transfer seen during conditioning, where an animal’s appetitive 
behavioural reaction transfers from an unconditioned stimulus (the drop of juice) to 
the CS (the light), as the associations develop over a period of learning.  
 
Figure 4.1C shows the effect of non delivery of an expected reward. The CS elicits 
the same phasic response, but when no reward is received there is a depression of 
dopamine firing (below baseline) at the expected time of reward. This demonstrates 
that the dopamine neurons encode the timing of the expected reward. 
 
¾ A. Unpredicted rewards 
result in a positive phasic 
reward prediction error. 
Discrepancy: things are 
better than expected. 
 
¾ B. Fully predicted rewards 
result in no reward 
prediction error. No 
discrepancy: things are just 
as expected. 
 
¾ C. When an expected reward 
fails to arrive, there is a 
negative reward prediction 
error corresponding to 
inhibition of the neurons. 
Discrepancy: things are 
worse than expected. 
Figure 4.1 Electrophysiological recordings from a single dopamine neuron in the brain of a monkey taken 
from Schultz et al (1997). Each dot represents a neuron firing, while the histograms at the top of each 
diagram represent cumulative values of spiking activity from a population of dopamine neurons. The x -axis 
of each diagram represents time in seconds relating to presentation of the conditioned stimulus (CS) or 
reward (R) and the y-axis relates to the number of trials; with early trials at the top and later trials at the 
bottom. Diagram A is a selection of trials at the beginning of training, Diagram B represents trials when 
learning has taken place. Diagram C is also after learning has taken place, but shows the effect on dopamine 
neuron firing when an expected reward is not given. 
 
The dopamine neurons appear to be encoding a reward prediction error signal of the 
discrepancy between actual and expected future reward. Unpredicted rewards 
provide a discrepancy where things are better than expected, resulting in a positive 
reward prediction error following receipt of the reward (Figure 4.1A). Fully 
 37
predicted rewards provide no discrepancy as things are just as expected, resulting in 
no reward prediction error at the time of the reward (Figure 4.1B). When an expected 
reward fails to arrive there is a discrepancy as things are worse than expected, 
resulting in a negative reward prediction error at the expected time of the reward 
(Figure 4.1C). 
 
 
4.2 Dopamine and Temporal Difference Learning 
 
Life is a chain of actions undertaken to satisfy our basic needs and desires to survive 
and reproduce (Doya 2007). The results of rewards and punishments given in animal 
studies (e.g., Section 4.1.2 and Chapters 5.2, 6 and 7.1) are used to explain these goal 
directed behaviours by linking actions to positive and negative rewards in 
reinforcement learning, where organisms learn to organise their behaviour under the 
influence of positive or negative reinforcers. Reinforcement learning maps situations 
to actions in order to maximise reward, and has two distinguishing characteristics: a 
trial-and-error search, and a delayed reward (Sutton & Barto 1998). It is a 
computational framework for an active agent to learn behaviours from a scalar 
reward signal and provides a coherent account of the basal ganglia (Doya 2007). 
Reinforcement learning theory models the many internal states between the stimulus 
and its associated response, and expresses how animals learn to achieve goals and 
rewards efficiently, using reinforcement signals that maximise total future reward 
(Montague, Hyman & Cohen 2004).  
 
A detailed account of the various different reinforcement learning algorithms 
available can be found in Sutton and Barto (1998), but in this thesis I focus on 
Temporal Difference (TD) (Sutton 1988; Sutton & Barto 1998), a model of classical 
conditioning, which extends the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner 1972) 
to take account some of the fine temporal structure of conditioning. TD was 
originally used by engineering systems to optimise actions in complex environments, 
but following recognition of dopamine as a reward prediction error, it has been used 
also as an explicit method of modelling and quantifying this error (Montague et al. 
1996; Schultz et al. 1997; Hollerman & Schultz 1998). In order to move from passive 
classical conditioning to the active control seen in instrumental learning it is 
necessary to incorporate actions into the basic TD algorithm. This can be achieved 
by adding a policy, a set of rules that dictate which actions are to be taken in each 
state. Alternatively, direct assessment of state-action pairs, or Q values, obviates the 
need for a policy (Watkins & Dayan 1992). Both methods are taught by a TD error, 
but in this thesis I focus on policy optimisation in an actor-critic architecture (Barto 
1995), where the aim is to optimise actions in different states to maximise long-term 
reward. However, I do refer to Q learning briefly in Chapter 7 when I discuss the 
limitations of TD. 
 
In this thesis I do not attempt a thorough investigation of existing actor-critic models 
but focus instead on a particular variation of a TD model by McClure, Daw and 
Montague (2003). This model was inspired by the decision model of Egelman and 
Montague (1998), and incorporated an actor-critic architecture capable of extending 
the TD algorithm to address action selection (Section 4.2.2). This model is an 
interesting exception to the typical actor-critic in that it is capable of addressing free-
 38
operant behaviour (Niv et al. 2007). In Chapter 5 of this thesis, I implement a version 
of this model to conduct an investigation of the effects of dopamine receptor 
antagonism on running speed in a maze, and in Chapter 6 I extend the model to 
perform an analysis of the relationship between TD learning and uncertainty coding 
in a computational model of dopaminergic signaling. 
 
The actor-critic architecture is capable of using the TD learning algorithm to model 
dopamine neuron firing patterns (Section 4.1) in a manner that can be related to basal 
ganglia circuits (Section 4.3). The dopamine cells in the ventral tegmental area and 
the substantia nigra pars compacta are posited to report the same prediction error, but 
the former are believed to be associated with the critic, controlling the learning of 
values held in the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex; and the latter with the actor, 
controlling the learning of actions in competitive cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical 
loops (Dayan & Balleine 2002). The TD error signal generated is used in two ways:  
 (i) The Critic (Section 4.2.1): As a prediction error or learning signal used to 
 create better estimates of future reward.  
 (ii) The Actor (Section 4.2.2): To bias action selection towards situations that 
 predict the best reward. 
The actor-critic is a way of organising the architecture of an agent. The critic learns 
to anticipate reinforcing events by learning predictions of long term future reward 
and storing these estimates as values associated with a particular state. The actor 
adjusts behaviour to maximize the frequency and magnitude of reinforcing events by 
using a policy to specify action choices. The critic is able to solve the temporal credit 
assignment problem of determining the contribution of a particular action from 
general feedback of a full sequence of actions. It assumes some actions are more 
desirable than others and learns to provide useful immediate evaluative feedback as 
to which are to be reinforced and which are to be avoided, based on predictions of 
future reinforcement (Barto 1995). The corresponding biological problem is getting 
reinforcement signals to the correct synapses at the right time to effectively guide the 
learning process and to achieve goals by maximizing total future reward.  
 
With regard to the neural underpinnings of the actor-critic architecture, Houk, Adams 
& Barto (1995) originally suggested a model where the critic and actor may be 
analogous to striasome and matrix modules in the striatum respectively. Later 
research by O’Doherty et al. (2004) involving functional magnetic resonance 
imaging pointed to a dissociation between ventral and dorsal striatum in instrumental 
conditioning, where dopaminergically controlled plasticity in the ventral striatum is 
associated with the critic, while the dorsal striatum is better associated with the actor 
(Section 4.5). Recent research using temporary lesions in rat striatum suggests more 
of an actor-director-critic architecture in the striatum, where the dorsal striatum only 
partially conforms to an acting role as it is involved in the performance of actions, 
but plays no part in learning them. Thus, the ventral striatum, which is responsible 
for both learning and performance of skills, acts more like a director than a trainer to 
the dorsal striatum, mediating the effects of the critic (inputs from the ventral 
tegmental area and substantia nigra) on the actor (Atallah, Lopez-Paniagua, Rudy & 
O’Reilly 2007).   
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4.2.1 The Critic: Dopamine as a Reward Prediction Error 
The TD algorithm is designed to learn to predict future reward, which can be 
expressed as a value function V*, representing expected total future reward, from any 
state, s, (Equation 4.1), where t represents a period of time and subsequent arbitrary 
discrete time steps t = 1, t = 2 etc. E is the expected value and r represents the value 
of the reward. The discounting parameter, γ, between 0 and 1, has the effect of 
reducing previous estimates of reward exponentially with time, so that a reward 
tomorrow is worth slightly less than the same reward today. Equation 2 is Equation 1 
in a recursive form that can be used in the learning process.  
 ( ) [ ]...33221* ++++= +++ ttttt rrrrEsV γγγ  [Eqn 4.1] 
 ( ) ( )[ ]1** ++= ttt sVrEsV γ                          [Eqn 4.2] 
 
Because V* is unknown the TD algorithm proceeds by calculating an estimate V of 
V*. If V is equal to V*, then the system will have perfect information about the 
environment and the difference between the estimated value of reward, now and in 
the future, V(st), (value of the current state) and the estimated value of reward in the 
future, V(st+1), (value of the next environmental state) will be equal to the intrinsic 
reward associated with the current state, rt (Equation 4.3). However, this is unlikely 
in practice, as the environment is usually stochastic and V is only an estimate, and so 
it is usual for an error signal, δ(t), to be generated. The TD prediction error, δ(t), is a 
measure of the inconsistency for estimates of value at successive time steps and is 
derived by rearranging Equation 4.2 into Equation 4.4, which is a measure of the 
relationship between two successive states and the current reward. δ(t), takes into 
account the current reward, plus the next prediction multiplied by the discounting 
parameter γ, minus the current prediction. The TD error δ(t) is used to create better 
estimates of future reward by nudging V(st) towards a better estimate of the value 
function V*(st) (Equation 4.5). 
 
           If , then *VV = ttt rsVsV =− + )()( 1                  [Eqn 4.3] 
 ( ) ( ) ( )ttt sVsVrt −+= +1γδ              [Eqn 4.4] 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )tsVsV ii αδ+←                                    [Eqn 4.5] 
  
For example, suppose an agent believes that they will receive a reward of £20 per 
annum, now and for the next four years. The estimate of reward now and in the 
future, V(st), will be £100. If they receive an actual reward of £20 now, this is just as 
expected, V(st) is equal to V*(st); they expect to receive a sum of £80 in the future, 
V(st+1), and there will be no error, δ(t). As long as the £20 is received the following 
four years, things will be as expected and no TD errors will occur as in Table 4.1. If 
however, they only receive a sum of £15 in year 3, V(st) is NOT equal to V*(st); 
things will be worse than expected and a TD error will be produced, δ(t), of minus 5, 
which will be used to modify a proportion of V(st), the estimate of expected future 
reward, now and in the future (Equation 4.5). This scenario is shown in Table 4.2, 
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resulting in a reduction in the estimated future reward for year 3 of 17.5 (40 + (0.5 x 
-5)), where learning rate, α, is 0.5. 
 
Table 4.1. When V(st) is correct at all timesteps and equal to V*(st), there will be no phasic burst of 
surprise, δ(t). 
 
Time Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
V(st) 100 80 60 40 20 
V(st+1) 80 60 40 20 0 
rt £20 £20 £20 £20 £20 
δ(t) 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Table 4.2. V(st) is NOT always correct. For example, in year 3 a sum of £15 was received instead of 
the expected £20, giving rise to a phasic burst of surprise, δ(t), of minus 5. 
 
Time Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
V(st) 100 80 60 37.50 
V(st+1) 80 60 40 20 
rt £20 £20 £20 £15 
δ(t) 0 0 0 -5 
 
 
The correspondence between artificial models of learning using TD and 
electrophysiological studies of the role of dopamine in the ventral tegmental area is 
remarkable. Examples of TD errors can be seen in Figure 4.2, where values of δ(t) 
have been assigned to the circumstances in Figure 4.1 above. In Figure 4.2A, 
unpredicted rewards result in a positive TD error, where δ(t) is +1, as things are 
better than expected. In Figure 4.2B there is no TD error; δ(t) is 0, as fully predicted 
rewards result in no reward prediction error and no change in firing because things 
are just as expected. In Figure 4.2C, when expected reward fails to arrive, there is a 
negative TD error; δ(t) is -1, as things are worse than expected. 
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 ¾ A. TD error, δ, is +1. 
Unpredicted rewards result in a 
positive phasic reward 
prediction error. Discrepancy: 
things are better than expected. 
 
¾ B. TD error, δ, is 0. Fully 
predicted rewards result in no 
reward prediction error. No 
discrepancy: things are just as 
expected. 
 
¾ C. TD error, δ, is -1.When an 
expected reward fails to arrive, 
there is a negative reward 
prediction error corresponding 
to inhibition of the neurons. 
Discrepancy: things are worse 
than expected. 
 
Figure 4.2 Temporal Difference can quantify the prediction error in Figure 4.1 above. In Diagram A 
where no reward is predicted, δ(t) is +1, in Diagram B where a reward is predicted by a CS, δ(t) is 0 
and in Diagram C when an expected reward fails to arrive, δ(t) is -1. 
4.2.2 The Actor: Dopamine to Bias Action Selection 
McClure et al. (2003) designed an extension to the basic TD algorithm to include a 
role for dopamine in biasing action selection using the same prediction error signal, 
δ(t), to teach a system to take the best actions to maximise the long term accumulated 
reward. In this policy the actor randomly chooses a possible action and the 
anticipated TD error, δ(t), is calculated using Equation 4.4. The probability of taking 
this action is then calculated from this δ(t) value using a softmax function in 
Equation 4.6 (where m and b are parameters of the softmax curve, a sigmoid, Figure 
4.3), which has the effect of squashing any input to the space between 0 and 1. This 
is a non-linear function, where the effect on the activation value of changing the net 
input varies at different points along the curve, in a similar manner to biological 
neural systems (Freeman 1979). Accordingly, changes in net input close to zero (at 
the centre of the curve) have a greater effect on output than changes in net input 
when it is very large. In this context the x-axis represents the TD error, δ(t), input and 
the y-axis, the probability of action selection. When the TD error is high and positive 
there will be a greater probability of that action being selected than when the error is 
low and negative, due to the shape of the curve. Actions are generated with a 
probability of selection based on the predicted values of their successor states and 
there is a greater probability of remaining at the same state and not making a move 
when the error signal is low as all states become increasingly probable. If no action is 
selected, time is increased by one step and another random action is considered. 
 42
 Probability (of taking action) ( )( )( ) 11 −−−+= btme δ      [Eqn 4.6] 
 
 
Figure 4.3 showing a sigmoid function. Here the 
x-axis represents the reward prediction error, δ(t), 
and the y-axis, the probability of action selection. 
When delta is high there will be a greater 
probability of that action being selected than 
when delta is low. 
 
Once an action has been selected, learning takes place according to Equation 4.5, 
where α is a learning rate parameter and is used to update the values of states with a 
proportion of the dopamine reward prediction error.  It is noteworthy to mention that 
as our model was inspired by McClure et al. (2003), which incorporated the ideas of 
incentive salience (Section 4.4, Chapter 5.1 and Chapter 6), we maximise ‘surprise’ 
rather than reward, however, most other policies used in TD models maximise 
reward, for example Daw, Niv & Dayan (2005) (Chapter 7.4). 
 
4.2.3 Explanation of TD Learning  
Consider a one way maze of n states where only one intermediate state contains a 
reward and the value, V(st), of all states is initialised to zero, i.e. pre learning. For 
simplification, the discount factor, γ, is 0 and learning rate, α, is 0.5. The three states 
of interest are the pre-reward state A, where no reward is received; the reward state 
B, where a reward with a value of 1 is received; and the post-reward or initialisation 
state C (Figure 4.4).  
 
It is necessary to ensure that a virtual rat is always surprised when entering the maze, 
so that it has no expectation of future reward prior to being placed in the maze. In 
this way, the act of entering the maze becomes the earliest predictor of reward or the 
conditioned stimulus. The initialisation state contains no reward and is where V(st) 
for that state is reset to zero every time the rat visits that state. This means whenever 
the virtual rat is moved into the pre-reward state it will always be surprised and a 
corresponding TD error will be produced. 
 
 
    A. Pre-reward state       Æ            B. Reward state        Æ C. Post-reward/  
    r = 0    r = 1    Initialisation state 
         r = 0, V(st) = 0  
 
 
Figure 4.4 showing the three states, in a maze of n states that are of interest during TD learning 
 
In this particular model the virtual rat is put in a maze in the pre-reward state where it 
has the ability to think ahead before selecting an action and making a move to the 
next state. (It is important to note that considerations of moves are an artefact of our 
model of action selection. A real rat operates in continuous time and will not plan 
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moves in this manner). A comparison is made (Equation 4.4) between V(st) of the 
current state and V(st+1) of the next state to determine any inconsistency, or TD error. 
As there is no reward and values of the current state, V(st), and the next state,V(st+1), 
are zero, there is no inconsistency and the TD error is zero, δ(t) = 0 + 0 - 0. This TD 
value is then used in the process of action selection (Equation 4.5); however, as the 
TD error is low the action is unlikely to be selected. If no action is selected, the 
virtual rat will remain in the same state and another move will be considered. An 
action is more likely to be selected when δ(t) is high, but even with a TD error of 
zero, an action will be selected eventually, by chance, and the rat will move to the 
next state. There may be a number of pre-reward states and the rat will travel to each 
of these, quite by chance; but until a reward is encountered the value of the reward 
state cannot be updated and compared with other states, and no TD errors will be 
recorded.  
 
Eventually, by chance, the rat considers a move to the reward state containing a 
reward of 1. The value of that state, V(st), is zero and, as the reward has not yet been 
encountered, there is no dopamine burst, δ(t) = 0, (0 + 0 – 0). The dopamine burst is 
only experienced when the rat is in the reward state, having received a reward, and is 
considering a move to post reward state, δ(t) = 1, (1 + 0 – 0). The value of the reward 
state is updated for the first time only when the probability of action selection has 
been accepted, an actual move is made away from the reward state, and a dopamine 
burst has been experienced, (Equation 4.6). With a learning rate of 0.5, the update to 
V(st) is 0 + (0.5 x 1) = 0.5. On considering the move from the reward state to the post 
reward state, there will be no dopamine burst as no reward is received in the post 
reward state, δ(t) = 0 + 0 – 0 = 0. It will be necessary for the rat to return to the pre 
reward state, and consider a move to the reward state for the second time, before any 
more dopamine bursts are experienced.  
 
On the second occasion the reward is received in the reward state, the dopamine 
burst will be reduced from 1 to 0.5, δ(t) = 1 + 0 – 0.5 = 0.5, as the value of that state 
was updated on the last run and a reward expected, so actual receipt of the reward is 
less surprising the second time around. On each successive run the dopamine burst 
will halve, as a result of the increasing value of that state. Eventually there will be no 
further TD error at that state and the value of that state will reach a maximum of 1 as 
the reward becomes fully predicted. The second run through the maze will both 
increase the value of the reward state and affect the value for the pre-reward state (or 
the closest of a number of pre-reward states) for the first time. Each subsequent run 
through the maze will affect earlier pre reward states until all states are affected by 
the reward received in the reward state. The values of all the pre-reward states will 
gradually increase to a maximum of 1 (if γ is 0), by which time full learning will 
have occurred, and the earliest pre-reward state effectively becomes the conditioned 
stimulus, whereby it is the only state that elicits a maximum dopamine burst of 
surprise, δ(t), of 1. 
 
It is important to note that considerations of moves are an artefact of our model of 
action selection. A real rat operates in continuous time and will not plan moves in 
this manner. However, these considerations of moves permit the modelling of time 
and it is this product that is investigated in Chapter 6 where I implement a model by 
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McClure et al. (2003) and model the effect of dopamine receptor inhibition on the 
running speed of a rat in a maze.  
 
4.2.3.1 An Example of the Learning Process 
Consider a one way maze of eight states plus a post reward initialisation state, with a 
reward of 1 in state 7, where movement is permitted only in the direction of the 
arrows (Figure 4.5). Prior to learning the values of all states in the maze, V(st), are 
initialised to zero, and the rat has no expectation of reward, in or out of the maze.  
 
 
  Start 
r = 0
S1        
r = 0
S2 
r = 0
 S3 
r = 0
 S4 
r = 0
S8 
r = 0 
S6        
r = 0
 S7 
r = 1
S5        
r = 0
 
Figure 4.5 Maze with 8 states (S0-S7) plus initialisation state (S8). A reward of 1 is given in S7. All 
other states provide rewards of zero. 
 
Complete learning takes place over the first 30 runs through the maze, during which 
time the values of each state converge to 1 (except for reset state S0), and maximum 
TD error transfers from the reward state to the start state, by which time the start 
state acts effectively as a conditioned stimulus. The effect of the transfer of the TD 
error can be seen in Figure 4.6, which shows the TD error, δ(t), for the first 30 runs 
for two of the state transitions: (A) reward state S7 to initialisation state S8; and (B) 
initialisation state S8 to start state S0 (the CS). On the first run a large prediction 
error, δ(t), was recorded for the transition from the reward state to the initialisation 
state only, and this error, or measure of surprise, reduced with each successive run, 
until there were no further TD errors for that state from run 9 onwards. The effect of 
the TD error, the inconsistency between states, was propagated back through all 
states through time (not shown) and the first effects were seen in the transition to the 
CS from the initialisation state, in run 10. The TD error in the CS reached a 
maximum of 1 by run 29, when full learning had taken place and the full effect of the 
reward was propagated back to the CS, and remained at that level as the only state 
showing a TD error, or surprise. 
 
Appendix I contains raw data from the simulation for runs 1-3, 15-16 and 27-29 
through the maze in Figure 4.5. The data is for actual moves taken and does not 
include considerations of moves not made, which are an artefact of the model and do 
not occur in reality. The information includes: (i) the state from which the move is 
made; (ii) the state moved to (iii) the TD error, δ(t); (iv) The values, V(st), for each 
state in the maze; and (iii) a brief explanation of how progression through the maze 
occurs.  
 
Although Appendix I does not show the considerations of moves not made, prior to 
learning traversing the maze will be slow. There is a greater probability of remaining 
in the same state and not making a move when the error signal is low, as all states 
become increasingly probable. As learning progresses the time taken to reach the 
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reward state (modelled by the ability of the rat to reject a move and remain in the 
same state) decreases, and reaches a minimum when full learning has taken place. In 
this way the simulation is capable of modelling time, and advantage of this is taken 
in Chapter 5.1, where I model the effects of antipsychotic drugs and subsequent 
dopamine receptor antagonism on the time taken to progress through a similar maze. 
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Figure 4.6 A demonstration of learning, where the TD error transfers from the reward delivery state 
(US – yellow bars) to the CS (blue bars), over time (30 runs through the maze). The TD error, δ(t), is 
shown over these 30 runs for two state transitions:  A. S7 (the reward state) to S8 (the initialisation 
state), beginning at 1 and reducing to zero by run 9; and B.  S8 (the initialisation state) to (S0) the CS, 
which begins at zero and increases gradually to 1, from run 10 to run 30. By run 30 the value of all the 
states are learnt (except initialisation state) and the reward is fully predicted by the CS. 
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4.3 The Basal Ganglia 
 
In addition to reward processing the basal ganglia have an important role to play in 
the contextual analysis of the environment by receiving input from diverse areas of 
the cerebral cortex, generating the dopamine reward prediction error signal and 
relaying this information for use in planning and behaviour. The basal ganglia form 
part of the functional cortical/subcortical circuit loops in the brain, also involving 
cortex, thalamus, and ventral tegmental areas (Alexander et al. 1986). They are a 
collection of interconnected nuclei comprising striatum (putamen, caudate nucleus 
and nucleus accumbens); globus pallidus (external and internal segments), 
subthalmic nucleus and substantia nigra (pars compacta, pars reticulate and pars 
lateralis), and are associated with motor control, cognition, emotions and learning. 
The basal ganglia are an area of huge convergence and summation of synaptic input, 
mainly from the cerebral cortex and thalamus (Figure 4.7), but also from the 
brainstem. The function of these nuclei involves the coordination of dynamically 
changing representations of sensory inputs, motor programmes and internal states; 
and the selection of appropriate behaviours for survival, as a result of those inputs 
(Yin & Knowlton 2006). 
 
        Cerebral Cortex 
        Striatum 
             
 
Globus Pallidus Ext 
            Subthalamic Nucleus       Globus Pallidus Int 
Thalamus 
INDIRECT 
 
Figure 4.7 Direct (red) and indirect (blue) pathways in basal ganglia. Projections are excitatory 
(arrows) and inhibitory (circles). Basal ganglia nuclei in turquoise. 
 
The dopamine system provides a reward prediction error signal of the discrepancy 
between actual and expected future reward (Section 4.1) whereby the spiny input 
neurons in the striatum recognise complex contextual patterns through the 
reinforcing influence of dopamine. They are particularly suited to this function 
because of the density of synaptic spines on the long dendrites in the spiny neurons 
in the striatum. There are 25-30 dendritic terminal branches and each spiny neuron 
receives input from about 10,000 different afferent fibres. The combination of the 
large number of terminals and the heavy afferent innervations enables the basal 
ganglia to function as a contextual processor (Wilson 1990). In addition to cortical 
synapses at the tips of the spine, spiny neurons also receive up to 5,000 dopaminergic 
DIRECT
             
 
Brainstem 
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synapses at the stems of the spines. Specifically, it is the timing of the dopamine 
phasic bursts that is important; only those inputs that coincide with the dopamine 
burst are strengthened, imbued with salience and cause striatal neurons to fire. Other 
non-salient input is inhibited by the strengthened, salient input through lateral 
inhibition (Schultz, Romo et al. 1995). In the short term dopamine exerts its effects 
immediately through neuronal activity, but in the longer-term through synaptic 
plasticity (Wickens & Kotter 1995). 
 
In terms of design, single afferent fibres from each area of the cortex extend over 
much of the striatum, leading to a widespread, distributed cortical control. As a 
result, striatal neurons fire infrequently, and only when a particular combination of 
thalamocortical input, which is salient in terms of survival, is received (Wilson 
1990). Evidence suggests that it may be the extensive dopamine projections from the 
ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra that meet thalamocortical inputs on the 
same dendrite that determine when these striatal cells fire (Wickens & Kotter 1995).  
 
Output from the striatum is mainly inhibitory and is to other basal ganglia nuclei. 
The main direct output pathway (Figure 4.7, red line) is to the internal globus 
pallidus and the pars reticulate of the substantia nigra, which in turn project to areas 
outside the basal ganglia: the thalamus, and eventually back to the cerebral cortex. In 
addition, there is an indirect pathway (Figure 4.7, blue line), via the external pallidus 
to the subthalmic nucleus, before rejoining the main pathway and the internal 
pallidus (Houk 1995). Contrary to the rare firing of striatal neurons, neurons in the 
globus pallidus and substantia nigra fire tonically at high rates, which constantly 
inhibit neurons in the thalamus. When context is detected, the spiny neurons fire in 
the direct pathway, leading to a pause in the sustained inhibitory output from pallidal 
neurons and a brief burst of thalamic discharge. Effectively the inhibitory GABA 
projections from the striatum disinhibit the thalamus and thus responses are 
facilitated. Alternatively, the indirect pathway provides net excitatory positive 
feedback, resulting in an inhibition of responses (Houk, Adams & Barto 1995). 
These two pathways work together as a brake and accelerator system (Carlsson et al. 
2001), which is also described by Frank (2005) as ‘go’ and ‘no-go’ pathways. 
Concurrent activity in both pathways thus controls competitive selection. 
 
There are two main dopaminergic pathways in the human brain: the nigostriatal 
system, projecting from the substantia nigra to the striatum, and the 
mesocorticolimbic system, from the ventral tegmental area to the prefrontal cortex, 
hippocampus, amygdala and nucleus accumbens. The second pathway is the focus of 
this thesis and can be subdivided into the mesolimbic system, associated with reward 
and locomotion; and the mesocortical system, the modulator of cognitive function 
(Adell & Artigas 2004).    
 
 
4.4 Incentive Salience 
 
Evidence suggests that the dopamine system mediates the incentive salience of 
rewards, modulating their motivational value, which is dissociable from hedonia and 
reward learning. The Incentive Salience Hypothesis (Berridge & Robinson 1998) 
distinguishes conscious pleasures, ‘liking,’ from the unconscious core processes of 
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reward, ‘wanting.’ Liking without wanting occurs as the result of extensive damage 
to brain dopamine systems, leaving individuals without motivation for any incentive, 
conditioned or unconditioned, while positive hedonic reactions to sweet tastes remain 
normal in animals that have lost nearly all of their mesolimbic dopamine neurons that 
project from midbrain to forebrain (See animal experiment by Ikemoto and Panksepp 
(1996), described in Chapter 5.1). It is also possible for wanting to occur without 
liking. Increased appetite (want) is usually accompanied by increased hedonic 
appreciation of food (like) but it was found that eating caused by electrical 
stimulation of the lateral hypothalamus was not accompanied by enhanced hedonic 
reactions. Wanting but not liking can also be triggered by microinjections of 
amphetamine (Wyvell & Berridge 2000) and microinjections of muscimol (Reynolds 
& Berridge 2000) that activate dopamine neurons in the nucleus accumbens. There is 
evidence to believe that the same dopamine-accumbens neural system may become 
sensitised or hyper-responsive to drugs and conditioned stimuli in the brain of drug 
addicts, who also demonstrate wanting without liking. This may cause heightened 
incentive salience to be attributed to drug cues, causing ‘want’ without ‘like’ 
(Berridge 2001).  
 
The bases of the modern incentive theory came from contributions from Bolles 
(1972), Bindra (1974) and Toates (1986; 1994), known collectively as the Bolles-
Bindra-Toates Theory (Berridge 2001). The Incentive Salience Theory arose as a 
result of factors that were not accountable under reward theory, such as the existence 
of salient stimuli, such as lights and tones that result in rapid phasic dopamine 
release, but are not rewarding (Ljungberg et al. 1992; Horvitz et al. 1997). In 
addition, novel stimuli, aversive (non-rewarding) stimuli, and even stimuli that 
predict aversive events, were seen to increase firing of some dopamine neurons 
(Schulz & Romo 1987; Guarracui & Kapp 1999; Ikemoto & Panksepp 1999). 
 
Implications of the theory suggest that incentive and hedonic value of stimuli rise 
and fall with changes in internal drive and that the drive states may be potentiated by 
encountering external incentives or a conditioned stimulus representing those 
incentives. Furthermore both external incentive stimuli and internal physiological 
cues are necessary for motivation to occur; it is the combination that is important. 
The model suggests that Pavlovian incentives become both ‘liked’ and ‘wanted’ as a 
consequence of reward learning and, consequently, conditioned incentive value is 
equivalent to conditioned hedonic value (Berridge 2001).  
 
Opposition to the Incentive Salience Hypothesis exists, for example, Ungless (2004) 
offers an alternative explanation for the anomalies that led to the incentive salience 
explanation. He argues that midbrain dopamine neurons are activated specifically by 
reward rather than by all salient stimuli, and that reward theory provides a better 
explanation of the role of dopamine, and is able to incorporate the effects of salience. 
Indeed novelty in itself may be rewarding and salience may therefore be 
accommodated within reward theory. However, since publishing the Incentive 
Salience Hypothesis (Berridge & Robinson 1998) there have been a considerable 
number of papers published that incorporate incentive salience into their findings, 
covering a large range of topics including schizophrenia and attentional disorders, 
drug addiction and consummation of pleasurable foods, nicotine and alcohol intake. 
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The incentive salience hypothesis would appear to be a robust finding at the present 
time and a relatively solid base upon which to build. 
 
In order to link the idea of incentive salience to schizophrenia I describe in Section 
4.4.1 a framework by Kapur (2003) that sees psychosis as a state of aberrant 
salience. 
 
4.4.1 Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience (Kapur 2003) 
The framework builds on the Incentive Salience Hypothesis and suggests that 
dopamine is a mediator of contextually relevant saliences by converting stimuli into 
either attractive or aversive representations which can then be acted on accordingly.  
Here dopamine production is stimulus-linked and context-driven, converting 
motivation into action, and has the ability to predict reward and pleasure, allowing us 
to focus on what we think is important.  Kapur posits that during psychosis excess 
levels of dopamine result in the creation of ‘aberrant saliences,’ where the release of 
dopamine is independent of context and no longer stimulus-linked. 
 
The strength of the framework lies in its ability to explain psychosis and its 
progression, and the effects of antipsychotic drugs exhibited by patients.  Psychosis 
manifests itself in patients as delusions, hallucinations and the secondarily related 
behaviour arising from those positive symptoms.  An individual will be diagnosed as 
psychotic when the symptoms interfere with their thoughts and actions making it 
impossible to lead a normal life.  The framework accommodates these symptoms and 
suggests delusions to be a disorder of inferential logic, where the individual will 
attempt to apply top-down cognitive explanations for the fears and anxieties 
experienced as a result of the aberrant saliences.  Hallucinations are considered to be 
exaggerated, amplified and aberrantly recognised internal percepts which emerge 
from the delusions.  Secondarily related behaviours and the disruption to daily life 
arise as a direct result of these manifestations. 
 
Endogenous psychosis evolves in stages over a period of time, and psychosis arising 
from use of amphetamine will not usually result from one single exposure to the 
drug.  The framework accommodates these findings by suggesting that there is a 
gradual build-up of exaggerated, stimulus-independent release of dopamine before 
the onset and diagnosis of psychosis eventually leading to the inappropriate 
assignment of salience to stimuli.  Prior to psychotic episodes, individuals often 
report feeling a heightened sense of awareness, perplexity and anxiety and are unable 
to account for their experiences. Over a period of time and with persistently 
increased levels of dopamine, full-blown psychosis begins to emerge, with delusions 
and hallucinations, as patients attempt to make sense of their situation.  In this way 
the framework also accounts for the personal nature of the delusions to an individual 
as each will make sense of their delusions according to their own environment and 
culture.  Differences in the severity of hallucinations, from internal thoughts to alien 
voices, can also be attributed to these aberrant saliences and their effects on 
individual’s internal percepts.  In conclusion the same dopamine imbalance between 
individuals can lead to many different manifestations within individuals. 
 
When delusions and hallucinations have sufficient impact on the individual, 
adversely affecting their behaviour, antipsychotics can help to alleviate the 
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symptoms.  It was previously believed that antipsychotic drugs did not provide 
overnight success and, while blocking of the dopamine D2 receptors began within 
hours of taking the drug, there was a delay of 2-3 weeks before an improvement was 
seen in positive symptoms.  However, Kapur and colleagues (Kapur 2004; Kapur, 
Mizrahi & Li 2005) found that an anti-‘psychotic’ effect was evident in patients 
experiencing a psychotic exacerbation who were treated within the first 24 hours.  
These findings suggest a close relationship between dopamine, psychosis and the 
action of antipsychotics and lend further support to the framework. 
 
Antipsychotics do not provide a cure as patients still report a core-belief in the truth 
of their delusions, the symptoms simply lie dormant. But antipsychotics do help the 
patient to lead a more normal life by stopping the delusions from interfering with 
thought and function.  Typical antipsychotics are often of limited use as patients 
often suffer from dsyphoria or a deficit-like state, where they report an indifference 
to life and the dampening of motivation, drive and pleasure. As a result many 
patients prefer not to take these drugs and will often stop the medication with the 
result that the symptoms return as the drugs are only effective while being taken.  
 
The framework proposes that antipsychotics dampen aberrant saliences by blocking 
excess dopamine, leading to an attenuation of motivational salience of ideas and 
perceptions.  Antipsychotics remove the degree to which symptoms occupy the mind, 
but not the core content of the symptom.  They simply provide a neurochemical 
balance where dopamine levels return to normal, new aberrant saliences are less 
likely to form and existing ones are more likely to stop.  It is only in the weeks to 
come that an individual may work through and resolve their delusions in their own 
time.  In this way the delusions and hallucinations may be deconstructed, but this is 
not always the case as some patients are never able to resolve their symptoms 
psychologically.  Implications arising from the framework suggest that patients need 
psychological help and time, as well as medication, to work through their remaining 
delusions and hallucinations once the aberrant saliences have been dampened.  In this 
way the framework accounts for an individual’s persistence in the core-belief of their 
delusions, even when the delusions do not bother them any more. Antipsychotics 
only provide remission and no cure as symptoms return when the drugs are no longer 
taken. Without the dampening effect, the aberrant saliences and eventually the same 
delusions and hallucinations will re-emerge from dormancy.   
 
To summarise, the framework suggests a way of uniting a patient’s positive 
symptoms with the Dopamine Hypothesis and the pharmacological interventions of 
antipsychotic drugs, and provides a plausible explanation of how excess dopamine 
levels may lead to psychosis, linking brain and mind.  It suggests that under normal 
conditions dopamine acts as a stimulus-linked mediator of contextually relevant 
saliences, whereas in psychosis dopamine is a stimulus-independent creator of 
aberrant saliences.  It successfully incorporates the nature, progression and personal 
nature of psychosis and the effects of antipsychotics on psychosis.  However, it is 
only a framework and does not attempt to specify the nature of the relationship 
between the brain and the mind.  It only looks at the effects of the dopamine 
imbalance on the positive symptoms of schizophrenia and does not take into account 
other negative and cognitive symptoms.  Current research in schizophrenia is 
beginning to focus also on the roles of other neurotransmitters (such as glutamate and 
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GABA), and neurodevelopmental, cognitive and interpersonal deficits that occur 
before the effects of dopamine.  Not all patients respond to antipsychotics and so 
dopamine transmission via D2 receptors does not fully explain psychosis.  Atypical 
antipsychotics still act on the same D2 receptors but often have less distressing side 
effects and could provide clues in the future of other possible actions on either the 
dopamine system or of a different neurotransmitter system. 
 
4.4.2 Interim Conclusions 
A model of the role of dopamine in psychosis and the positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia should ideally incorporate the ideas of incentive salience. In Chapters 
5 and 7 I describe models by McClure, Daw and Montague (2003) and Smith, Li 
Becker and Kapur (2004; 2006), respectively, to demonstrate how the ideas of 
incentive salience may be addressed by future neurocomputational models of 
dopamine function. In Chapter 7.1.3 I look at how a model based account of 
dopamine function by Smith et al. (2006) can relate to understanding psychosis and 
schizophrenia. 
 
 
4.5 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Evidence  
 
Dopaminergic models provide a way to understand neuroimaging experiments on 
reward expectancy and cognitive control in humans (Montague et al. (2004) and, in 
turn,  functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have provided evidence 
that the reward prediction error model of dopamine activity applies to human reward 
learning and not just primates. Noninvasive neuroimaging studies have examined 
brain responses to a broad range of rewarding stimuli, including money, art and 
social rewards and found a striking consistency in the set of neural structures that 
respond, which include the orbitofrontal cortex, ventral striatum and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (Montague, King-Casas & Cohen 2006).  
 
McClure, Berns & Montague (2003) and O’Doherty et al. (2003) found transient 
learning-related changes in both the striatum (putamen), and the orbital frontal cortex 
of the brains of humans subjected to classical conditioning procedures. These 
patterns were consistent with predictions from a TD model of learning, confirming 
the role of both brain areas in reward prediction learning (Braver & Brown 2003). 
Furthermore, O’Doherty et al. (2004) demonstrated a dissociation between ventral 
and dorsal striatum in instrumental conditioning, where dopaminergically controlled 
plasticity in the ventral striatum was associated with the critic, while the dorsal 
striatum was better associated with the actor. In addition, Seymour et al (2004) used 
fMRI to show that neural activity in the ventral striatum and the anterior insula 
corresponded to the signals for sequential learning predicted by TD models, in 
humans in higher-order learning. 
 
 
4.6 Chapter Conclusions 
 
In the above five sections I have described:  
• The idea of dopamine acting as a reward prediction error. 
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• TD as an effective method of modelling the dopamine reward prediction error 
signal, and how outputs from dopamine neurons in the basal ganglia could be 
used to reinforce behaviours leading to reward, using an actor-critic 
architecture. 
• The functional role of the basal ganglia in contextual analysis. 
• The Incentive Salience Hypothesis. 
• Evidence of the dopamine reward prediction error in humans from fMRI 
studies.  
 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 gave rise to the important research question of ‘How do 
computational models of the role of dopamine as a reward prediction error map on to 
current dopamine theories.’ A paper addressing this question (Thurnham, Done, 
Davey & Frank 2006a) was published in the proceedings of XXV111 Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Vancouver, Canada, 26-29 July 2006, 
pp 2263-2268, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates and can be found in Appendix II. 
 
The sections in this chapter provide the methodology behind a model by McClure, 
Daw and Montague (2003) that incorporates the Incentive Salience Hypothesis into 
an Actor-Critic model of dopamine as a reward prediction error. In Chapter 5 I 
describe and implement a simulation of the Computational Substrate for Incentive 
Salience by McClure et al. and this model is expanded to look at the relationship 
between TD learning and uncertainty coding in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 5 
 
A Model Free Account of Dopamine Function: 
Temporal Difference Learning 
 
 
In Chapter 3, I described the search for an effective connectionist model to be used 
as a paradigm for schizophrenia, with a view to generating and testing theories of the 
disorder. My simulations in that chapter pointed to other modelling work regarding 
the role of dopamine in learning, by Houk, Adams and Barto (1995), Montague, 
Dayan and Sejnowski (1996) and Schultz, Dayan and Montague (1997). The ideas 
behind this line of research were explored in Chapter 4, explaining: (i) the idea of 
dopamine acting as a reward prediction error; (ii) the role of the basal ganglia in the 
production of that signal; (iii) Temporal Difference (TD) as an effective method of 
modelling the dopamine reward prediction error signal; (iv) the Incentive Salience 
Hypothesis; and (v) evidence of the dopamine reward prediction error in humans 
from fMRI studies. 
 
The theory explored in Chapter 4 pointed to an interesting model by McClure, Daw 
and Montague (2003) incorporating the Incentive Salience Hypothesis into an Actor-
Critic model of dopamine as a reward prediction error; a possible base for my 
research. This model is described in detail in Section 5.1, and in Section 5.2 I 
describe my own implementation based on the original model, which replicates and 
explores the computational substrate for incentive salience by McClure et al. (2003). 
In particular, I highlight the difference between higher and lower levels of dopamine 
receptor antagonism in an attempt to reveal the possible dual function of dopamine: 
as a learning signal and in action selection. 
 
 
5.1 A Computational Substrate for Incentive Salience 
(McClure, Daw & Montague 2003) 
 
McClure et al. (2003) highlighted a gap that existed at that time between what 
appeared to be conflicting theories of dopamine function. On the one hand there were 
computational models of dopamine as a reward prediction error signal with two roles 
in learning and action selection (e.g., Montague, Dayan & Sejnowski 1996; Schultz, 
Dayan & Montague 1997), while other pharmacological lesioning studies identified a 
role for dopamine in the allocation of incentive value rather than reward (e.g., 
Berridge & Robinson 1998; Ikemoto & Panksepp 1996).  
 
In order to bridge this gap McClure and colleagues incorporated the concept of 
incentive salience (Chapter 4.4) into a model of dopamine as a reward prediction 
error (Chapter 4.1), capturing the temporal nature of the relationship with TD and an 
Actor-Critic architecture (Chapter 4.2), which included the role of the basal ganglia 
in the contextual analysis of the environment (Chapter 4.3). This computational 
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substrate successfully united these psychological and formal computational theories 
by interpreting expected future reward as incentive salience.  
 
The Incentive Salience Hypothesis separates hedonic ‘liking’ from ‘wanting,’ and 
dopamine release is thought to assign incentive value to objects or acts, transforming 
‘liked’ into ‘wanted,’ thus enabling reward-seeking behaviours (Berridge & 
Robinson 1998). The more valuable the action, the more likely it is to be selected by 
the action selection system. The approach by McClure et al. sees dopamine receptor 
antagonism, characteristic of the effects of antipsychotic drugs, as the inhibition of 
the ability to initiate actions necessary for gaining rewards, that is, it affects the 
‘wanting’ without having an effect on the actual value of the reward, the ‘liking’. In 
this way dopamine receptor blockade does not influence the assignment of value, but 
does inhibit the use of such values.  
 
In order to illustrate the concept of incentive salience with the computational notion 
of expected future value, McClure and colleagues simulated the findings in two sets 
of animal experiments. Firstly, they modelled the effects of a large concentration of 
dopamine receptor antagonist, in accordance with Ikemoto and  Panksepp (1996), 
who found that dopamine receptor antagonism in rats affected the ability to ascribe 
incentive salience (want) without affecting the motivation for the reward (like). 
Secondly, they modelled the different effects of lower concentrations of dopamine 
receptor antagonism in a similar experiment by Wise et al. (1978). The difference in 
the pattern of the dopamine response between these two simulations provided 
evidence for the dual role of the dopamine reward prediction error as (i) a learning 
signal (Chapter 4.3.1), and (ii) in action selection (Chapter 4.3.2). They suggested 
that this dual role served as the formal counterpart to the ideas of Berridge and 
Robinson (1998) about the role of dopamine in attributing and using incentive 
salience. 
 
In Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996), rats were trained in a one-arm maze (Figure 5.1a), 
to obtain a sucrose reward. Dopamine receptor antagonism, either by application of 
the dopamine receptor antagonist cis-flupentixol in the nucleus accumbens or by 
injection of GABA into the ventral tegmental area, resulted in (i) significantly slower 
running speed in the maze immediately after drug delivery (Figure 5.1b, blue bars), 
severely disrupting the approach (wanting) and (ii) reduced baseline activity in the 
start box (Figure 5.1b, green bars), outside the context of the task. However, once the 
rats reached the sucrose reward they still drank the same amount and ‘liking’, or 
motivation for the reward, was unaffected (Figure 5.1b, grey bars). Dopamine was 
interpreted as enabling reward-seeking behaviours, supporting the Incentive salience 
Hypothesis (Berridge & Robinson 1998). 
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Figure 5.1. Results of animal experiments by Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996): (a) Rats were trained to 
traverse a one-armed maze to obtain sucrose solution at the end. Photosensors (arrows) were used to 
determine running speed [blue bars in (b)], in addition to the baseline level of movement in the start 
box [green bars in (b)], while access to the runway was blocked by a door. X1, X2 and X3 represent 
intermediate states in the model. (b) After training, dopaminergic neuron activity was reduced (see 
text). Both manipulations reduced the ability of the rats to initiate the running needed to acquire the 
sucrose solution [P<0.01; loss of ability to ascribe incentive salience (Ikemoto and Panksepp 1996)], 
while leaving the volume of sucrose they consumed unaffected (grey bars). Figure taken from 
McClure et al. (2003). 
 
 
Specifically, McClure et al. modelled the effect of dopamine receptor antagonism 
resulting in slower running speeds in the maze (Figure 5.1b, blue bars), severely 
disrupting the approach (wanting). This was achieved using a constant decrease in 
the TD error signal, and provided a similar pattern of results as the original animal 
experiment by Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996). McClure et al. achieved a 75% 
reduction in running speed (Figure 5.2b), which favours well with the animal 
experiments by Ikemoto and Panskepp, who achieved around a 60% reduction using 
cis-flupentixol in the nucleus accumbens and about 70% reduction in the ventral 
tegmental area (Figure 5.1b).  
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Figure 5.2 Taken from McClure et al. (2003): TD model captures rat behaviour in a maze. (a) The 
maze for a virtual rat is represented as five states. Movements between states were determined by 
considering state transitions, which produced a reward prediction error signal, δ(t), and a probability 
of taking the considered action. (b) When virtual dopamine receptor antagonists are added (Chapter 
4.3, Equation 4, where b=1), the speed the rat traverses the maze is significantly decreased, as seen in 
real animals (e.g. Ikemoto and Panksepp 1996). 
 
It was explained that in a dopamine-rich environment, a reliable pattern of values 
built up over time using the phasic dopamine signal, which predicted the occurrence 
of the reward, and the rat learned the optimum route to the reward and was able to 
traverse the maze quickly. However, following dopamine receptor antagonism, in a 
dopamine-deficient state, the attribution of incentive salience associated with the 
reward (or conditioned stimulus) was disrupted, which had the immediate effect of 
reducing running speed in the maze. This reduction in running speed was explained 
as a discouragement of motivated behaviour through both the direct and indirect 
effects of dopamine (see Methods Section). High concentrations of dopamine 
receptor antagonism caused an immediate decrease in incentive salience via the TD 
error signal, disrupting the actions that led to reward.  
 
Wise et al. (1978) also used a one-arm maze to test the effects of low concentrations 
of the dopamine receptor antagonist pimozide on the behaviour of rats. Unlike 
Ikemoto and Panksepp, they found no immediate effect of the drug on running times 
(day 1), but effects were seen when tested one week later (day 2), in a similar manner 
to a different group of rats from which food was withheld at the goal [No reward 
(NR) condition], to model extinction (Figure 5.3a). McClure and colleagues captured 
the different patterns seen with low concentrations of antagonists (Figure 5.3b) and 
described the effect as a discouragement of motivated behaviour through only the 
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indirect effects of dopamine (see Methods Section). Here, low concentrations of 
pimozide or dopamine receptor antagonism caused a progressive decrease in 
incentive salience through reductions in the TD error signal, disrupting the actions 
that led to reward, having a similar effect to extinction.  
 
McClure and colleagues claimed that the differences in the patterns of behaviour 
seen in the above two animal experiments resulting from high and low dopamine 
receptor antagonism, reflected in the timing of the changes to running speed, reveals 
the dual function of dopamine, as a learning signal and in the bias of action selection. 
The immediate effect of the reduction in running speed seen with high dopamine 
receptor antagonism in Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996) was a result of the 
discouragement of motivated behaviour through both the direct and indirect effects 
of dopamine, while the delayed, progressive effect of low concentrations of 
dopamine receptor antagonism in Wise et al. (1978) arose as a result of the indirect 
effects of dopamine only, through the slow unlearning of the value estimates, 
characteristic of the effects of experience-dependent extinction. When the changes in 
levels of dopamine were too weak to disrupt the direct effect on action selection, 
there was still an indirect effect on learning the values of states.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Taken from McClure et al. (2003). (a) Using data from Wise et al. (1978): When rats are 
given low concentrations of the dopamine-receptor antagonist pimozide after learning to run a maze 
for a food-pellet reward, behavioural effects are not immediately seen. Instead both latency and 
running speed remain unaffected during repeated trials on the first training day (day 1). When tested 
again one week later (day 2), deficits become apparent and become stronger in an experience-
dependent manner. Rats show a slow increase in latency before entering the maze, and decreased 
running speed through the maze [0.5mg kg-1 (blue) and 1.0 mg kg-1 (green) pimozide conditions] in a 
manner that parallels the effect of extinction (NR condition, grey). (b) This effect is captured by the 
prediction error hypothesis as a slow decrease in estimated values (V) of each state in the maze. The 
different concentrations of pimozide were captured in the model as different scalar values, b, 
subtracted from the dopamine signal, δ[b – 0.2 (green) and b = 0.4 (blue), arbitrary units]. Extinction 
(NR, grey) is captured by setting to zero the reward value of arriving at the goal box. 
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5.2 An Investigation of the Effects of Dopamine Receptor 
Antagonism on Running Speed in a Maze  
 
Having reviewed the computational substrate for incentive salience by McClure et 
al., a number of interesting research questions arose that warranted further 
investigation. The current study was influenced by the model of McClure et al., 
where my aim was to repeat the simulations in order to provide an exploration into 
the changing parameters of the system. This will help to highlight the difference 
between the high and low concentrations of dopamine receptor antagonism in the 
two animal studies, providing a clearer interpretation of the dual function of 
dopamine as a learning signal and in action selection. My simulations will provide 
additional weight to the claims of McClure and colleagues that their single model can 
capture the ideas of dopamine (i) as a reward prediction error and (ii) as a purveyor 
of incentive salience, by uniting psychological and formal computational theories 
and interpreting expected future reward as incentive salience. 
 
In order to ascertain that my version of the model was working correctly, I simulated 
the results of animal experiments by Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996) and Wise et al. 
(1978) by looking at (A) the effects of a high dopamine receptor antagonism and (B) 
the effects of lower levels of dopamine receptor antagonism on running speed, 
respectively. In addition to replicating the simulations of McClure and colleagues, I 
was able to look into their claims in greater depth than the limitations of a journal 
publication will allow. While simulating Ikemoto and Panksepp, I looked at the 
following points which were not addressed in the original paper: (i) the indirect 
effect of the bias, b (Equation 5.2), on the values of states in the maze; (ii) the effect 
of a range of biases on running speed; (iii) the direct effects of changing the bias on 
the shape of the sigmoid decision curve from Equation 5.2; and (iv) modelling 
dopamine receptor antagonism via changes to the scaling constant m, (Equation 5.2).  
 
Modelling the animal experiments of Wise et al. also led to the following additional 
investigations that were not addressed in the original paper: (i) a comparison between 
high and low dopamine receptor antagonism; (ii) the effect of extinction on running 
speed; (iii) a look at the effects of high and low dopamine receptor antagonism on the 
TD error; and (iv) the indirect effects of high and low dopamine receptor antagonism 
on the values of states in the maze. These additional investigations will provide 
further evidence for the dual function of dopamine as a learning signal and in action 
selection. 
 
 
5.2.1 Methods 
 
The Model 
The TD model by McClure and colleagues, inspired by the decision model of 
Egelman and Montague (1998), is described in detail in Chapter 4.2. The model 
incorporated the concept of incentive salience as expected future reward, where the 
dual roles of dopamine: (i) to bias action selection towards situations that predict the 
best reward; and (ii) as a learning signal used to update the values of states and so 
create better estimates of future reward, equated with the Incentive Salience 
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Hypothesis (Berridge & Robinson 1998) and the role of dopamine in attributing and 
using incentive salience. In both TD and incentive salience, increased dopamine 
levels increase the likelihood of choosing an action that leads to a reward. 
 
The model is mathematically detailed and is capable of underpinning an artificial 
neural network. The aim was to model the acquisition process where dopamine 
signals the difference between predicted future reward and actual reward. McClure et 
al. used the concept of TD learning using trial by trial computation, which requires 
less memory and less peak computation than conventional methods (Sutton 1988) 
and there is no need for any explicit representation other than using received reward 
to learn a value function which maps current information to a prediction of expected 
future reward. 
 
I implemented a computer program in LISP (Steele 1990), incorporating the TD 
algorithm with an Actor-Critic architecture (see Appendix II). The program was 
capable of modelling the tasks of Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996) and Wise et al. 
(1978), where rats were trained to traverse a one-arm maze for a reward, in a similar 
manner to McClure et al. (2003).  
 
The maze 
Positions in the maze were captured by McClure et al. as five possible states: start, 
goal and three intermediate states X1, X2 and X3 (see Figure 5.2a). As in the animal 
studies, a reward with a value of 1 was given in the goal state. The other four states 
had reward values of 0.  
 
According to the journal article the virtual rat was permitted to move towards or 
away from the goal from any position within the maze until it reached the goal, after 
which it was returned to the start state. However, the diagram of the maze provided 
(Figure 5.2a) did not show the return to the start state after reaching the goal state. 
Instead it showed a recurrent connection at the goal state, where it implied the 
opportunity to revisit that state and obtain the reward of that state an unlimited 
number of times. Samuel McClure was good enough to clarify the situation and 
confirmed that he treated the goal state as a terminal state and once the model 
reached the goal, it received a reward and was then reset (Personal communication 
2005). Figure 5.4 shows the maze used in my simulations, which is in accordance 
with that contained in the text of McClure et al. (2003), but not with their diagram.  
  Start 
  r = 0 
   X1 
  r = 0 
   X2 
  r = 0  
   X3 
  r = 0 
  Goal 
  r = 1 
 
Figure 5.4 showing the maze used in our simulations, containing five possible states: start, goal and 
three intermediate states (X1, X2, and X3). A reward, with a value of 1, was given in the goal state. 
The other four states had reward values of 0. Arrows show permitted movement through the maze. 
There were recurrent connections on all states except for the goal state, where the only option was to 
return to the start state. 
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Modelling Time 
McClure et al. modelled time by including the possibility of remaining in the same 
state without having to move on each trial. If dopamine levels decreased as a result 
of adding a bias, the likelihood of remaining in the same place increased, as the 
dopamine receptor blockade stopped the phasic dopamine bursts necessary to signal 
that one position was better than the other. All options became increasingly probable, 
and thus the time to complete the task increased. 
 
As in McClure et al., time was recorded in this model as a consideration of a move 
through the maze from one state to another. Each consideration produced an error 
signal, δ(t) [Equation 5.1, (cf Chapter 4.2.1, Equation 4.4)], and was recorded as a 
timestep.  ( ) ( ) ( )ttt sVsVrt −+= +1γδ                             [Eqn 5.1] 
 
Whether or not the move was taken depended on the probability of taking that action, 
which depended on the TD error, δ(t) [Equation 5.2, cf Chapter 4.2.2, Equation 4.6)]. 
It is in Equation 5.2, where learned incentive value is converted into a probability of 
action that is equivalent to the Incentive Salience Hypothesis.  
P (of taking action) ( )( )( ) 11 −−−+= btme δ          [Eqn 5.2] 
 
As detailed in Chapter 4.2.2, the probability of taking this action was calculated from 
this δ(t) value using a softmax function, where the shape of the sigmoid decision 
curve had an effect on action selection. When the TD error was high and positive 
there was a greater probability of that action being selected than when the error was 
low and negative. If the move was not taken, the virtual rat remained in the same 
state pending another consideration or timestep. A timestep was recorded whether or 
not a move was actually made.  
 
My simulations followed the methodology of McClure and colleagues as closely as 
possible and I provide clarification of the following terms which are specific to my 
simulations.  
• A state transition was taken to be an actual movement from one state to 
another, following a timestep where an action was selected.  
• One run through the maze was a series of state transitions from the start state 
to the goal state, which could be either towards or away from the goal. A run 
was concluded once the virtual rat was returned to the start state.  
• The number of timesteps taken for a run differed according to the probability 
of a run being selected, which depended on the TD error. The probability of 
action selection increased as learning progressed and learning progressed 
with repeated iterations through the maze, as values of states converged to 1. 
 
McClure et al. looked at the effect of increasing dopamine receptor antagonism, on 
running speed (timesteps-1). In accordance with McClure et al., running speed was 
taken to be the reciprocal of the average number of timesteps for a state transition. 
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Modelling Dopamine Receptor Inhibition 
In accordance with McClure et al., the effect of dopamine receptor antagonism was 
modelled: (i) directly, by subtracting a constant bias, b from the dopamine signal, δ(t) 
[Equation 5.2 (cf Chapter 4.2.2, Equation 4.6)]; and (ii) indirectly, by updating the 
stored value estimates according to Equation 5.3 (cf Chapter 4.2.2, Equation 4.5)].  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) btsVsV ii −+← αδ                                              [Eqn 5.3] 
 
According to Equation 5.2, fluctuations in dopamine signaling, or TD error, will 
affect the probability of action selection directly, by changing the shape of the 
sigmoid decision curve (Chapter 4.2.2). This will have an immediate effect on action 
selection, via the ‘actor’.  
 
Indirect effects of dopamine arise from updating the stored values of V according to 
Equation 5.3, where α is the learning rate and si is the previous state. Following 
receipt of a reward the values of each state are updated by adding a proportion of the 
prediction error, αδ(t), where α is the learning rate, and subtracting b, a constant 
representing dopamine receptor inhibition. For example, if the current V(st) for a state 
was 0.30 and αδ(t) - b = 0.4 (0.5 – 0.2) = 0.12, where α = 0.4 and b = 0.2, the new 
value of V(st) would be 0.30 + 0.12 = 0.42. Here, it will take longer for the effects of 
dopamine antagonism to affect the system as the stored value estimates of the ‘critic’ 
are updated by successive runs through the maze. 
 
Thus, the same dopamine reward prediction error can be seen to be acting in two 
different parts of the model: Direct effects of dopamine were seen on action selection 
(the actor) and indirect effects from its role in learning the estimated values that 
underlay the actions (the critic).  
 
Simulations 
Simulations were effected as detailed in the following sections: 
 
A. Simulation of Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996) 
In accordance with McClure et al. (2003) I investigated the effect of dopamine 
receptor antagonism on running speed by increasing the bias, b, after the value 
estimates were learned in a maze with a bias of zero, to a bias of 1, in Equations 5.2 
and 5.3. Trials consisted of 1000 state transitions through the maze with no bias (b = 
0), and then a further 1000 state transitions through the maze with a bias of 1 (b = 1). 
The effect of the change in bias was reflected in the number of timesteps taken for 
the second 1000 state transitions compared to the first 1000 state transitions, and the 
corresponding running speeds (timesteps-1). Results are shown for the average values 
recorded for five different trials.  
 
Modelling the animal experiments of Ikemoto and Panksepp also led to the following 
additional investigations that were not addressed in the original paper:  
 
(i) The Indirect Effect of Dopamine Receptor Antagonism on the Values of 
States in the Maze 
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I show the effect of dopamine receptor antagonism on the values of states, by 
comparing the values of all the states in the maze for the first 1000 state transactions, 
when b = 0, to the second 1000 state transitions, when b = 1.  
 
(ii) Looking at a Range of Biases 
The effect of a range of biases, from 0 to 1.55 was investigated, on the number of 
timesteps and corresponding running speed for 1000 state transitions through the 
maze.  
 
(iii) The Direct Effect of Adding a Bias to the Sigmoid Decision Curve 
Here I demonstrated the direct effect of dopamine receptor antagonism on running 
speed, by showing the effect on the shape of the sigmoid decision curve of changing 
the bias, b, from Equation 5.2. 
 
(iv) Investigating the Gain Constant, m, from Equation 5.2 
The effect of changing the scaling constant, m, was investigated (see Figure 5.11 in 
Results Section). Timesteps and corresponding running speeds were recorded for 
1000 state transitions through the maze for values of m, from 1 to 23, for four 
different biases of 0, 0.5, 1 and 1.5. I also looked at the effect on the sigmoid 
decision curve of changing the value of m in Equation 5.2. 
 
B. Simulation of Wise et al. (1978) 
As in McClure et al., I looked at the effect of lower levels of dopamine receptor 
antagonism on running speed. The journal paper did not explain precisely how 
running speed was modelled in this series of simulations, only that the values of bias 
used were b = 0.2 and b = 0.4. Their results were shown as increases in running time 
(unlike the decreases in running speed in Results Section A above) over 8 test 
numbers prior to a change in bias and for 10 test numbers after the change, modelling 
dopamine blockade (Figure 5.3b). I have therefore interpreted their running time as 
the number of timesteps for each state transition (their test number) during the test 
period, and have not converted these timesteps into running speeds.  
 
My trials consisted of 1000 state transitions through the maze with no bias (b = 0), 
and then a further 1000 state transitions through the maze with dopamine receptor 
antagonism, modelled with biases of either zero (a control), 0.2, or 0.4. In addition, 
extinction was modelled by setting the reward in the goal state from 1 to zero, after 
the first 1000 state transitions, so that there was no reward given during the second 
set of 1000 state transitions. The effect of the change in bias or reward was reflected 
in the critical period between the first and second set of 1000 state transitions, where 
the number of timesteps was recorded for each of a number of state transitions prior 
to and after this critical period in each trial. In order to make a direct comparison to 
the results of McClure et al. and Wise et al., I detail the number of timesteps taken 
for each of the eight state transitions before any change of bias or reward (i.e., at 
1001 state transitions), and for ten state transitions after any change. All other 
parameters of the model remained constant: m (scaling constant) was set to 5; γ 
(discount parameter) was set to 0.9 and α (learning rate) was set to 0.5.  
 
Modelling the animal experiments of Wise et al. also led to the following additional 
investigations that were not addressed in the original paper that will provide further 
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evidence for the dual function of dopamine as a learning signal and in action 
selection:  
 
(i) A Comparison between High and Low Dopamine Receptor Antagonism  
Here I compared the results for running speed obtained for high dopamine receptor 
antagonism, where b = 1, in (A) above, to the results for low dopamine receptor 
antagonism. 
 
(ii) The Effect of Extinction on Running Speed 
I compared the effects of extinction on running speed to the results in (i) above. 
 
(iii) The Effects of high and Low Dopamine Receptor Antagonism on TD error 
I looked at the effects of the control (b = 0), low dopamine receptor antagonism (b = 
0.2 and 0.4), high dopamine receptor antagonism (b = 1) and extinction (r = 0), on 
the TD error, δ(t), for the goal states only, and recorded the results for the critical 
period for their respective changes (ten runs before and ten runs after the changes). 
 
(iv) The Indirect Effects of High and Low Dopamine Receptor Antagonism on 
Values of States 
By looking at the values of just the goal states for (A) 1000 state transitions prior to, 
and following the critical period, and (B) ten state transitions prior to, and 50 state 
transitions after the critical period, the effects of low or high dopamine receptor 
antagonism, or extinction on the values of states in general were ascertained.  
 
 
5.2.2 Results 
 
A. Simulation of Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996): High Dopamine 
Receptor Antagonism  
In accordance with McClure et al., after the value estimates were learned for the 
maze with no bias (b = 0 for 1000 state transitions), I modelled dopamine receptor 
antagonism by increasing the bias from zero to 1 in Equations 5.2 and 5.3 (b = 1 for a 
further 1000 state transitions). The effect of the bias on the number of timesteps for 
1000 state transitions through the maze for each bias can be seen in Figure 5.5, where 
the average number of timesteps rose from 2337 with no bias, to 11,347 with a bias 
of 1. 
 
As a direct comparison to the results of McClure et al., Figure 5.6 shows the effect of 
the bias on the corresponding running speed (timesteps-1). My simulations show a 
reduction in running speed of nearly 80% which is comparable to the 75% reduction 
achieved by McClure and colleagues (Figure 5.2b). Although, both sets of results are 
slightly higher than the original animal experiments by Ikemoto and Panskepp 
(1996), who achieved around a 60% reduction using cis-flupenthixol in the nucleus 
accumbens and about 70% reduction in the ventral tegmental area (Figure 5.1b). 
However, the figures for running speeds are parameter dependent and changes to m 
could give a better fit to the experimental data (see (iv) below). 
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Figure 5.5 showing the effect of adding a bias of 1 in Equations 5.2 and 5.3, on the average number of 
timesteps for 1000 state transitions through the maze. (α = 0.5, γ = 0.9 and m = 5). 
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Figure 5.6 When virtual dopamine receptor antagonists are added (b=1), the speed the rat traverses the 
maze is reduced. This figure can be directly compared to the results of McClure et al. (2003) in Figure 
5.2b and is intended to model the results of animal experiments by Ikemoto and Panskepp (1996) in 
Figure 5.1b. (α = 0.5, γ = 0.9 and m = 5). 
 
(i) The Indirect Effect of Dopamine Receptor Antagonism on the Values of 
States in the Maze 
Figure 5.7 shows the values of states (A) for the first 1000 state transitions with no 
bias and (B) for the second 1000 state transitions with a bias of 1. The effect of 
adding a bias to the second 1000 state transitions is reflected in the first 300 or so 
state transitions in Figure 5.7B, where values of states change from a maximum 
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value of +1.99 to a minimum of -8.31 (for the goal state). Each graph shows the 
indirect, gradual build up of values over time to their maximum value for each state. 
These indirect effects arise from Equation 5.3, by updating the stored value estimates 
according to a fraction of the TD error, δ(t). It can be seen that learning in both 
graphs took place over the first 300 or so state transitions and after learning had 
taken place, the values fluctuated around these maximum levels for the remaining 
700 state transitions. The fluctuations seen thereafter resulted from the variability 
introduced to the model in respect of action selection and choice of route through the 
maze.  
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Figure 5.7 showing the values of states in the maze (A) for the first 1000 state transitions with no bias 
and (B) for the second 1000 state transitions with a bias of 1. (α = 0.5, γ = 0.9 and m = 5). NB note 
difference in scale of y-axis. 
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With the discounting factor, gamma, at 0.9, a preceding state will only achieve 90% 
of the total reward value from the state to its right. For example, the value of state 3 
for a bias of 1 will reach 90% of the value for the goal state, and the value of state 2, 
90% of the value for state 3, and so on. 
 
 
(ii) Looking at a Range of Biases 
Without modelling dopamine receptor antagonism, I investigated the effect of 
increasing values of bias, b, for 1000 state transitions through the maze for each 
value.  
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Figure 5.8 showing the exponential effect of increasing bias to model dopamine receptor antagonism 
on (A) the average number of timesteps for 1000 state transitions and (B) corresponding running 
speed (timesteps-1). (α = 0.5, γ = 0.9 and m = 5). 
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With this particular model I was able to increase the bias from a range of 0 to 1.55, 
but the program was unable to cope with a bias of over 1.55, as the number of 
timesteps became exponentially high. Figure 5.8 shows the effect of a using a bias on 
(A) timesteps and (B) corresponding running speed, respectively, for bias values of 
zero to 1.55. There is an exponential increase in timesteps with increasing bias and a 
corresponding exponential decrease in running speed with increasing bias. 
 
 
(iii) The Direct Effect of Adding a Bias to the Sigmoid Decision Curve 
A high level of dopamine receptor antagonism, where b = 1, will have a direct effect 
on action selection, resulting in slower running speed through the maze. According 
to Equation 5.2, fluctuations in dopamine signaling, or TD error, will affect the 
probability of action selection directly, by changing the shape of the sigmoid 
decision curve (Chapter 4.3.2). The effect of changing the bias, to the sigmoid 
function can be seen in Figure 5.9, where an increase in bias, from 0 to 2 results in an 
overall shift of the sigmoid to the right, altering the position in relation to the x-axis, 
but not the shape of the curve.  
 
  
Probability  
of Action  
Selection 
 TD Error, δ(t) 
 
Figure 5.9 showing effect of increase in bias, on position of curve relative to x-axis, of sigmoid 
function. Here the x-axis represents the reward prediction error, δ(t), and the y axis, the probability of 
action selection. With an increase in bias there is a shift of the sigmoid to the right, resulting in a 
decrease in running speed. 
 
Actions are generated with a probability of selection based on the predicted values of 
their successor states, preferring those actions that give a high burst of dopamine, or 
TD error signal. When the error signal is low there is a greater probability of 
remaining in the same state as all states become increasingly probable. During a 
timestep with a bias, there is an even greater probability of remaining in the same 
state and not making a state transition, as the shift in the sigmoid decision curve 
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results in a lower probability of that particular action being taken. In effect, the part 
of the curve most sensitive to action selection, at around 0.5 on the y-axis, is shifted 
to the right as the bias increases. It can be seen from Figure 5.9 that the difference in 
the positions of the two curves, for a bias of 0 (blue line) and a bias of 2 (red line), 
would be reflected in the decisions made to make a state transition, or remain in the 
same state for another timestep. For example, reading off the x-axis for a TD error of 
zero would give a y-axis value for probability of action selection of around 0.5 with a 
zero bias, compared to a value of about 0.25 with a bias of 2. Thus an action would 
be more likely to be selected with a zero bias than with a bias of 2.  
 
The overall effect of introducing a bias will result in a greater number of timesteps as 
the bias increases, which is reflected in Figures 5.5 and 5.8A. This will have a 
corresponding effect on running speed through the maze, reflected in Figures 5.6 and 
5.8B, and is in accordance with the findings of Ikemoto and Panskepp (1996) and 
McClure et al. (2003). 
 
 
(iv) Investigating the Scaling Constant, m, from Equation 5.2 
I looked at the effect of increasing values of the scaling constant (m), from 1 to 23, 
for four different biases, 0, 0.5, 1 and 1.5, for 1000 state transitions through the 
maze. The program was unable to deal with any further increases in m above 5 for a 
bias of 1.5, 9 for a bias of 1, and 21 for a bias of 0.5, as the number of states 
examined above these values of m became exponentially high. The number of 
timesteps for 1000 state transitions and corresponding running speeds (timesteps-1) 
were recorded in Figure 5.10, from which it can be seen that as values of m increase 
within biases of 0.5, 1 and 1.5, the average number of timesteps increases (Figure 
5.10A) and the corresponding running speed decreases (Figure 5.10B).  
 
In order to model the behavioural effect of cortical dopamine (Chapter 3.2), Cohen 
and Servan-Schreiber (1992; 1993) originally modified the net output of a neuron by 
increasing the ‘gain’ or steepness in slope of the sigmoid curve using G, analogous to 
the constant m in Equation 5.2, while keeping the bias constant. Although, the 
present study models a different process (the probability of action selection as 
opposed to the role of dopamine in optimising the signal-to-noise ratio thought to 
enhance working memory by reducing interference or noise), the two studies are 
comparable as they use either the ‘gain’ or the scaling constant m to change the 
‘decision’ of the sigmoid function. Accordingly, it can be seen that there are two 
possible ways of modelling dopamine receptor inhibition: via the gain (m) or the bias 
(b). 
 
The result in Figure 5.10, where m is 5 and b is 1, is comparable to that seen in 
Figure 5.8B, where m is 5 and b is also 1, as both figures show the same running 
speed of 0.000135. Increasing m would have a similar effect to modelling increased 
dopamine receptor inhibition to increasing the bias alone; although this was only 
effective when there was already a bias (i.e., 0.5, 1 or 1.5), as when the bias was 0, 
running speeds remained unchanged (approximately 0.00025 for each value of m, 
Figure 5.10B). By keeping the bias constant, the effect of a higher value of m alone 
modelled dopamine blockade by modifying the bias.  
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Figure 5.10 showing effect of m on (A) Number of timesteps for 1000 state transitions and (B) 
corresponding running speed, for biases of 0, 0.5, 1 and 1.5. (α = 0.5, γ = 0.9). 
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The effect of changing the scaling constant, m, to the sigmoid function can be seen in 
Figure 5.11, where an increase in m, from 1 to 9 resulted in a change in the shape of 
the curve without altering the position with respect to the x-axis. With increasing 
values of m, the shape changes from a deterministic straight line at m = 1, to the 
typical s-shaped curve, characteristic of the sigmoid function and associated with 
biological systems, at m = 9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 showing the effect of an increase in the scaling constant, m, on the shape of the sigmoid 
curve (Equation 5.2). Here the x-axis represents the reward prediction error, δ(t), and the y-axis, the 
probability of action selection. When the TD error is high there will be a greater probability of that 
action being selected than when the error is low.  
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B. Simulation of Wise et al. (1978): Low Dopamine Receptor 
Antagonism 
In a similar manner to McClure et al., I modelled lower levels of dopamine receptor 
antagonism after the value estimates were learned for the maze with no bias (b = 0 
for 1000 state transitions), by increasing the bias from zero to 0.2 (Simulation 2) and 
from zero 0.4 (Simulation 3) in Equations 5.2 and 5.3 (i.e., b = 0.2 or 0.4) for a 
further 1000 state transitions. Extinction was modelled by setting the reward in the 
goal state from 1 to zero, after the first 1000 state transitions, so that there was no 
reward given during the second set of 1000 state transitions (Simulation 5). These 
results were compared to a control condition, which consisted of no change in bias 
for the second set of 1000 state transitions through the maze, where the bias 
remained at zero (Simulation 1). These four simulations are summarised in Table 5.1. 
 
 
Table 5.1 summarising the four simulations to determine the effects of lower levels of dopamine 
receptor antagonism. Simulation colours match those in the graphs in the figures below and changes 
between the first and second set of 1000 state transitions are highlighted in red. 
 
 First 1000 state transitions Second 1000 state transitions
Simulation 1 
Control 
No bias (b = 0) 
Reward given in goal state 
 
No bias (b = 0) 
Reward given in goal state 
Simulation 2 
Low Dopamine 
receptor antagonism 
No bias (b = 0) 
Reward given in goal state 
Bias (b = 0.2) 
Reward given in goal state 
Simulation 3 
Low dopamine 
receptor antagonism 
No bias (b = 0) 
Reward given in goal state 
Bias (b = 0.4) 
Reward given in goal state 
Simulation 4 
Extinction 
No bias (b = 0) 
Reward given in goal state 
 
No bias (b = 0) 
No reward given in goal state 
 
 
For Simulations 2 to 4, the critical period for examination was the change between 
the first and the second set of 1000 state transitions, where the changes of bias or 
reward occurred. The effects of these three simulations on the number of timesteps 
were compared to the control (Simulation 1) and recorded in Figure 5.12 for eighteen 
state transitions; eight state transitions prior to the changes and the ten state 
transitions after the changes which simulated dopamine receptor blockade. Figure 
5.12A shows all four simulations in one graph, but due to the different scales it is 
difficult to see the effects of the lower levels of dopamine receptor antagonist, and so 
Simulations 2 and 3 are plotted separately In Figure 5.12B and compared to the 
control, Simulation 1. 
 
The results in Figure 5.12 can be compared directly to those of Wise et al. and 
McClure et al. in Figure 5.3a and 5.3b, respectively. Figure 5.12 reflects the results 
of the simulations of low concentrations of dopamine receptor antagonism by 
McClure and colleagues, where a bias of 0.4 (green line) produced a greater increase 
in running time than a bias of 0.2 (blue line), which, in turn, produced a greater 
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increase in running time than the control, with no change in bias (black line) and no 
increase. This is most clearly seen in Figure 5.12B.  
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Figure 5.12 shows the effect of dopamine receptor antagonism on running time (number of timesteps 
for each state transition) at the critical period of the change of bias or reward, between the first and the 
second set of 1000 state transitions for eighteen state transitions (eight state transitions prior to the 
changes and ten state transitions after the changes), for: (A) all four simulations and (B) Simulations 2 
and 3 for low dopamine receptor antagonism only, compared to a control. Please note the change in 
scale between (A) and (B). 
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However, there is a difference between the simulated results of McClure and 
colleagues and my results, as my simulations do not show a steady increase in 
running time; rather there are dips seen that return to baseline levels between the 
periods of increased running speed. No mention was made in the McClure paper of 
the exact periods of time between their test numbers, but whatever periods of time I 
used; I still did not obtain the steady increase seen in the simulations of McClure and 
colleagues. For example, Figure 5.13 shows the same results of the same simulations, 
for fifty state transitions before and fifty state transitions after the change of bias or 
reward. As in Figure 5.12B, Figure 5.13B shows that the larger of the two biases is 
the first to affect running speed, but clearly identifies the dips seen in running speed 
between the increases. The effects of biases of 0.2 and 0.4 are evident by state 
transitions 3 and 4 after dopamine blockade, when running speed per state transition 
increases to 9 and 18, respectively, but overall the effect of increased running time is 
seen earlier for a change in bias to 0.4, than for a change in bias to 0.2. This is in 
accordance with the animal experiments of Wise et al. and the simulations of 
McClure et al. 
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Figure 5.13 shows the effect of dopamine receptor antagonism on running time (number of timesteps 
for each state transition) for fifty state transitions before and fifty state transitions after the change of 
bias or reward (the critical period of the change of bias or reward is at state transition 50) for: (A) all 
four simulations and (B) Simulations 2 and 3 for low dopamine receptor antagonism only, compared 
to a control. Please note the change in scale between (A) and (B). 
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(i) A Comparison between High and Low Dopamine Receptor Antagonism 
It is useful to compare the results for low dopamine receptor antagonism in Figure 
5.13A to the results in Results Section A above, of a higher level of dopamine 
receptor antagonism, with a change in bias from zero to 1 (Figure 5.14, light blue 
line). Here the larger increase to the bias results in a much higher running speed, 
which is seen immediately when the bias changes, with the number of timesteps 
increasing from an average of 2 per state transition and peaking at 208, 404, 568 and 
1591 timesteps for the first, fifth, fourteenth and twenty-seventh state transition 
following dopamine blockade, respectively. The effects of the lower levels of 
dopamine blockade take a little longer and are not so pronounced as with a bias of 1 
and can be interpreted as being due to the indirect effects of updating the stored 
values of states, only, as opposed to both the direct and indirect effects associated 
with higher dopamine receptor antagonism (McClure et al. 2003). 
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Figure 5.14 shows the effect of adding a higher level of dopamine receptor antagonism (a change in 
bias from zero to 1, light blue line) to Figure 5.13A. Please note the change in scale. 
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(ii) The Effect of Extinction on Running Speed 
It is also interesting to look at the effect of extinction on running speed, which is only 
implied in McClure et al. and not shown in detail. In Figures 5.12A and 5.13A the 
delayed effect of extinction is evident, as running speed is not affected until seven 
state transitions after the reward is withdrawn, at which time 185 timesteps are 
recorded for one state transition. One further large running speed of 31 is seen in 
state transition fourteen, but all other values of running speed remain at control 
levels. 
 
(iii) The Effects of high and Low Dopamine Receptor Antagonism on TD error 
When the effects of the control (b = 0), low dopamine receptor antagonism (b = 0.2 
and 0.4), high dopamine receptor antagonism (b = 1) and extinction (r = 0), on the 
δ(t) recorded for the goal states only, are plotted for the critical period for their 
respective changes (ten runs before and ten runs after the changes), the differences at 
the time of the change become apparent. In particular, it can be seen in Figure 5.15 
that the effect on values of δ(t) immediately after the change are greatest for 
extinction, which results in a negative TD error of -0.94 (almost a maximum value of 
-1). Second, is high dopamine receptor antagonism with a TD error of -0.39, 
followed by low dopamine receptor antagonism with a bias of 0.4 and a TD error of -
0.12, and finally, the lowest dopamine receptor antagonism tested with a bias of 0.2 
and a TD error of -0.03, which was well within the range of values of plus or minus 
0.09 recorded for the control condition.  
 
The delayed effects of lower dopamine receptor antagonism compared to higher 
dopamine receptor antagonism are also evident in Figure 5.15. With a bias of 1, the 
maximum negative TD error is recorded in Run 1, immediately following the 
change, while the maximum negative TD errors for biases 0.2 and 0.4 are not 
recorded until runs 3 and 6, respectively. This is in line with the animal experiments 
of Wise et al. and supports the claims of McClure et al. that lower levels of dopamine 
receptor antagonism have a delayed effect on running speed, as opposed to the 
immediate effects seen with higher levels of antagonism. In my simulations, plotting 
the TD error for each run of the ten runs prior to and after the critical period of 
change provides additional evidence for the difference between high and low 
dopamine receptor antagonism. With the smaller TD errors seen, when b = 0.2 and b 
= 0.4, there will be less of a direct effect on the probability of action selection 
(Equation 5.2) and more reliance on an indirect build up through relearning of the 
value weights (Equation 5.3). 
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Figure 5.15. Plotting the TD error recorded for the goal state 10 runs before and 10 runs after any 
changes shows the differences between the control (b = 0), low dopamine receptor antagonism (b = 
0.2 and 0.4), high dopamine receptor antagonism (b = 1) and extinction (r = 0) at the time of the 
change, and the delayed effects of lower dopamine receptor antagonism compared to higher dopamine 
receptor antagonism. 
 
 
(iv) The Effects of High and Low Dopamine Receptor Antagonism on Values of 
States 
Finally, by looking at the values of just the goal states for 1000 state transitions prior 
to, and following the critical period, the effect of low or high dopamine receptor 
antagonism, or extinction on the values of states in general can be ascertained (with 
the discounting factor, gamma, at 0.9, a preceding state will only achieve 90% of the 
total reward value from the state to its right). It can be seen in Figure 5.16 that high 
dopamine receptor antagonism, with a bias of 1 has the greatest effect on the values 
of states, with a change from a maximum of +1.99 to minimum of -8.31. For lower 
dopamine receptor antagonism, a bias of 0.4 produces the next greatest effect of the 
values of states, with a drop in range from +1.99 to -2.23, and a bias of 0.2 follows, 
with a drop in range from +1.99 to zero.  
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Figure 5.16. Plotting the value of the goal states only (A) 1000 state transitions prior to, and 1000 state 
transitions after the critical period, and (B) ten state transitions prior to, and 50 state transitions after 
the critical period, shows the differences between the control (b = 0), low dopamine receptor 
antagonism (b = 0.4), high dopamine receptor antagonism (b = 1) and extinction (r = 0), and the 
similarities between low dopamine receptor antagonism (b = 0.2) and extinction (r = 0) following the 
changes. 
 
 
A bias of 0.2 gives a most interesting result, which is similar to the drop seen with 
extinction, where all values of states progressively fall to zero, following withdrawal 
of the reward. Extinction arises through the withdrawal of a reward and involves a 
gradual unlearning of the values of states so that no reward is predicted in the future. 
This is achieved through negative TD errors, signalling that things are worse than 
expected, where a proportion of this TD error, subject to the learning rate, is used to 
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reduce the values of states (Equation 5.3). With extinction it takes 523 runs for the 
values of the goal state to steadily fall to zero and then remain at that level, but with a 
bias of 0.2, values first fall to zero after approximately 250 runs, after which time 
they hover between a range of +0.04 and -0.23. The difference between a bias of 0.2 
and extinction in the early stages is seen more clearly in Figure 5.16B. Nevertheless, 
despite the differences between a bias of 0.2 and extinction, reflected in Figure 
5.16B, I have demonstrated in my simulations that a lower dopamine receptor 
antagonism has a similar effect on the values of states as extinction. This is in line 
with the claims of McClure et al.  
 
 
Summary of Results 
 
A. Simulation of Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996): High Dopamine Receptor 
Antagonism  
I replicated the simulations of McClure et al. (2003) and modelled the results of 
animal experiments by Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996) of the effect of dopamine 
receptor antagonism, which severely disrupted the approach (wanting) to a reward in 
a maze. The reduction in running speed in the maze I achieved of almost 80% 
(Figure 5.6) obtained with a bias (b = 1), is comparable to the 75% reduction 
achieved by McClure and colleagues (Figure 5.2b), although, both sets of results are 
slightly higher than the original animal experiments by Ikemoto and Panskepp 
(1996), who achieved around a 60% reduction using cis-flupentixol in the nucleus 
accumbens and about 70% reduction in the ventral tegmental area (Figure 5.1b).  
 
While simulating Ikemoto and Panksepp, I was able to address a number of research 
questions which were not addressed in the original paper. I successfully 
demonstrated both the direct effect of dopamine on action selection, by showing the 
resulting impact of the lower TD error on the sigmoid decision curve; and the 
indirect effect of dopamine, from its role in learning the estimated values that 
underlay the actions, on the update of the values of states in the maze. My 
simulations looked at the exponential decrease in running speed in a maze with 
increasing levels of bias (where b ranged from 1 to 1.55). I also found that it would 
be possible to model dopamine receptor antagonism using the scaling constant, m, in 
Equation 5.2, and showed the effect of increasing values of m on the sigmoid 
decision curve. 
 
B. Simulation of Wise et al. (1978): Low Dopamine Receptor Antagonism 
I also replicated the simulations of McClure and colleagues relating to the animal 
experiments by Wise et al. (1978) using lower doses of dopamine receptor 
antagonism. I had a similar pattern of results to the animal experiments and to the 
simulations of McClure and colleagues, where, unlike with a higher level of 
dopamine receptor antagonism, a change in running speed was not seen immediately 
after drug delivery (modelled by an increase in bias), but emerged through repeated 
exposure, and was less marked, the lower the bias. My results were comparable to 
those of McClure et al., where a bias of 0.4 produced a greater increase in running 
time than a bias of 0.2, which in turn, produced a greater increase than the control, 
with no change in bias and no increase. 
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While I did not obtain the smoother, steadier increase seen in McClure et al., 
investigation of other parameters of the model not addressed in the original paper 
provided evidence for a greater reliance of lower dopamine receptor antagonism on 
the indirect effect on the update of the values of states in the maze, than on the direct 
effect of action selection seen for higher levels of dopamine receptor antagonism. In 
particular, my comparison between the effects of higher and lower dopamine 
receptor antagonism showed that the effects of the lower levels of dopamine 
blockade took a little longer to develop and were not so pronounced as with a high 
level of bias. In addition, I showed how lower levels of dopamine receptor 
antagonism produced smaller, delayed TD errors, which, in turn, amounted to less of 
a reliance on the direct effects of action selection on running speed, and more 
reliance on the indirect build up of the new values for states through relearning of the 
value weights. Finally, I showed that lower dopamine receptor antagonism, 
particularly with a bias of 0.2, resulted in a similar pattern for values of states in the 
maze as extinction, which was in line with the claims of McClure and colleagues, 
and suggested a similar pattern of unlearning. 
 
 
5.2.3 Discussion 
 
My simulations have allowed me to explore the changing parameters of the 
computational substrate for incentive salience by McClure and colleagues, and to 
answer a number of interesting research questions that warranted further 
investigation. I have provided additional evidence of the difference between the high 
and low concentrations of dopamine receptor antagonism in animal studies and given 
an interpretation of the dual function of dopamine as a learning signal and in action 
selection. My simulations provide additional weight to the claims of McClure and 
colleagues that their single model can capture the ideas of dopamine (i) as a reward 
prediction error and (ii) as a purveyor of incentive salience, by uniting psychological 
and formal computational theories and interpreting reward prediction errors as 
incentive salience. 
 
The differences in the patterns of behaviour seen in animal experiments resulting 
from high and low dopamine receptor antagonism, reflected in the timing of the 
changes to running speed, revealed the dual function of dopamine, as a learning 
signal and in the bias of action selection. The same dopamine reward prediction error 
was seen to be acting in two different parts of the model: Direct effects of dopamine 
were seen on action selection (the actor) and indirect effects from its role in learning 
the estimated values that underlay the actions (the critic). The immediate effect of the 
reduction in running speed seen with high dopamine receptor antagonism in Ikemoto 
and Panksepp (1996) was shown to result from both the direct and indirect effects of 
dopamine, while the delayed, progressive effect of low concentrations of dopamine 
receptor antagonism in Wise et al. (1978) arose mainly as a result of the indirect 
effects of dopamine, through the slow unlearning of the value estimates, 
characteristic of the effects of experience-dependent extinction.  
 
Across all of the simulations, an increase in dopamine receptor antagonism, modelled 
by increasing the parameter, b, in Equations 5.2 and 5.3, produced an increase in the 
time taken to traverse a maze, with a corresponding decrease in running speed 
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through the maze. This was an example of a robust effect of a computer simulation 
encompassing animal experiments on Reinforcement Learning Theory. 
 
My simulations for the higher level of dopamine receptor antagonism show a 
reduction in running speed of nearly 80% which corresponds well with the 75% 
reduction achieved by McClure and colleagues. However, both sets of results are 
slightly higher than the original animal experiments by Ikemoto and Panskepp 
(1996), who achieved around a 60% reduction using cis-flupentixol in the nucleus 
accumbens and about 70% reduction in the ventral tegmental area. It is important to 
note that the figures for running speeds are parameter dependent and changes to the 
scaling constant, m, could give a better fit to the experimental data. 
 
In addition, my simulations of low dopamine receptor antagonism did not achieve the 
smoother, steadier increase in running time seen in McClure et al., but this was 
possibly due to my interpretation of the methodology from the journal paper. The 
original article gave no specific instruction on how this was to be modelled and so I 
had to make some assumptions, which are detailed in my Methods Section. However, 
as I am not limited to the space of a journal article, my additional investigations of 
the other parameters of the model not addressed in the original paper all pointed to a 
greater reliance of lower dopamine receptor antagonism on the indirect effect on the 
update of the values of states in the maze, than on the direct effect of action selection 
seen for higher levels of dopamine receptor antagonism, thus demonstrating that my 
model had captured the effects posited by McClure and colleagues. 
 
Furthermore, the success of this method of modelling has allowed me to build upon 
these results and adapt this approach to investigate a new topic of the relationship 
between TD learning and uncertainty coding in dopamine neuron firing, in a novel 
way. This research is detailed in Chapter 6 and an early version has been published 
in the proceedings of XXV111 Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society 
(Appendix III), with two further poster presentations at the International Conference 
on Cognitive and Neural Systems, Boston, Massachusetts, USA, May 17-20, 2006, 
and the International Conference on Schizophrenia Research, Colorado Springs, 
Colorado, March 28 – April 1 2007.  
 
In their concluding remarks, McClure and colleagues referred to a hypothesis for 
incentive salience by Ikemoto and Panksepp (1999), which better accounts for the 
results of Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996) than the original incentive salience 
hypothesis of Berridge and Robinson (1998); where dopamine receptor antagonism 
affects running speed in the maze but not the consumption of the reward. The later 
hypothesis suggests that dopamine may underlie appetitive approach behaviours but 
not consummatory behaviours such as licking. This theory is in line with other areas 
of research that suggest that dopamine in the nucleus accumbens/ventral striatum is 
important for responding to conditioned stimuli and stimuli that are spatially and 
temporally distant (distal) rather than proximal to the organism (e.g., Daw, Niv & 
Dayan 2005; Maffii 1959; Salamone, Cousins & Snyder 1997; Smith, Becker & 
Kapur 2005; Yin, Knowlton & Balleine 2004). These results pose a problem for the 
basic TD framework, which does not distinguish between the two motor actions of 
running and licking, and these ideas are developed further in Chapter 7, where I 
discuss the limitations of TD learning. 
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This computational substrate for incentive salience by McClure and colleagues has 
successfully bridged the gap between conflicting theories of dopamine function, 
uniting formal computational and psychological theories by interpreting expected 
future reward as incentive salience. Uniting TD learning and incentive salience has 
permitted the separation of appetitive and consummatory behaviours that cannot be 
achieved by TD alone.  
 
 
5.3 Chapter Conclusions 
 
The main focus of this thesis, so far, has been on modelling dopamine function using 
TD, and I build upon this further in Chapter 6, with an extended version of the model 
detailed in this chapter in an attempt to answer one of the key questions in the current 
debate over whether or not dopamine encodes uncertainty. The models in Chapters 5 
and 6 are not specific to schizophrenia, the initial focus of this thesis, but they are 
models of the specific firing patterns of dopamine, a possible mechanism in the 
midbrain and cortex for the symptoms and cognitive deficits of schizophrenia 
(Chapter 2.2).  
 
There are drawbacks to using a TD approach and I highlight some of these in 
Chapter 7, where I also introduce the concept of model based learning (Sutton & 
Barto 1998) as an alternative to TD. In particular, I investigate models by Smith, Li, 
Becker & Kapur (2004; 2006) that, like McClure et al. (2003), use the concept of 
incentive salience and expected future reward to account for behaviour in a 
Reinforcement Learning paradigm, but unlike McClure and colleagues these model 
based accounts can provide an explanation for the effects of dopamine manipulation 
on distal rather than proximal reward. 
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Chapter 6  
 
An Analysis of the Relationship between Temporal 
Difference Learning and Uncertainty Coding in a 
Computational Model of Dopaminergic Signaling 
 
 
In Chapter 4, I described the function of dopamine as a reward prediction error in 
animal studies; the role of the basal ganglia in the production of that signal; temporal 
difference (TD) as an effective method of modelling the dopamine reward prediction 
error signal; the Incentive Salience Hypothesis and evidence of the dopamine reward 
prediction error in humans from fMRI studies. Chapter 4 contained the methodology 
behind my simulations in Chapter 5, and, in particular, a model by McClure, Daw 
and Montague (2003) incorporating the Incentive Salience Hypothesis into an Actor-
Critic model of dopamine as a reward prediction error. This model successfully 
simulated the results of animal experiments by Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996), and 
Wise et al. (1978). The former study found that dopamine receptor antagonism in rats 
affected the ability to ascribe incentive salience (want) without affecting the 
motivation for the reward (like). It is believed that dopamine enables reward-seeking 
behaviours and does not encode the pleasure associated with reward; instead it 
assigns incentive salience, which maps ‘liked’ to ‘wanted.’ It is therefore important 
that the ideas of incentive salience be incorporated into future neurocomputational 
models of the role of dopamine. 
 
The work of Wolfram Schultz and colleagues is central to this thesis (Chapter 4.1.2) 
and a paper by Fiorillo, Tobler and Schultz (2003) came to my attention that claimed 
to have found a new role for dopamine, in the coding of uncertainty. This was 
reflected in the sustained activation recorded from dopamine neurons during the 
delay period between presentation of a conditioned stimulus and receipt of a reward 
that appeared to increase with increasing uncertainty. A reply by Niv, Duff and 
Dayan (2005) questioned this claim, and produced a computational model showing 
that the ‘ramping’ effects seen were actually due to due to backpropagating TD 
prediction errors (Chapter 4.3), and not to uncertainty. Fiorillo replied to these 
counter claims (Fiorillo, Tobler & Schultz 2005) but their arguments did not appear 
convincing to me. As I already had a computer program capable of modelling 
dopamine neuron firing, I helped to modify that program to look at the relationship 
between TD learning and uncertainty. It soon became apparent that I could replicate 
the effects highlighted by both Fiorillo and Niv, making it possible to investigate the 
claims of both parties in more detail. 
 
It was necessary for some alterations to be made to the model described in Chapter 
5.1.1. Firstly, the maze only allowed travel in one direction. The unnecessary 
complications of traveling both towards and away from the goal state were avoided, 
making it easier to compare the effects of different probabilities of reward on TD 
error. Secondly, the length of the maze was increased from five to nine states, which 
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were deemed an optimal number for the purposes of this research. Finally, in order to 
model the breaks between maze runs in real rats, it was necessary to insert an 
initialisation/satiety state into the maze, between the goal and the start. This had the 
effect of resetting the value of start State 0 to zero, acting as a ‘resting’ state and 
ensuring that the ‘rat’ was always surprised when starting the maze. Without this 
additional state, the simulated rat learnt the value of the start state, and in effect, 
there was no conditioned stimulus.  
 
My investigations focused on the key to this debate, namely, how frequently 
sustained activation or ramping occurs in individual trials, rather than averaging over 
trials. If there is more sustained activation when probability, p = 0.5 (maximum 
uncertainty) than when p = 0.25 and 0.75, then it could be said that dopamine is 
encoding uncertainty in the delay period as a product of TD. It was also important to 
distinguish between what constitutes sustained activation (Fiorillo et al 2003; 2005) 
and ramping Niv et al. (2005). My efforts resulted in an alternate model supporting 
the claims by Niv et al., published in the proceedings of XXV111 Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Vancouver, Canada, 26-29 July 2006, 
pp 2263-2268, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates (See Appendix IV). In addition, the 
research gave rise to two further poster presentations at the International Conference 
on Cognitive and Neural Systems, Boston, Massachusetts, USA, May 17-20, 2006, 
and the International Conference on Schizophrenia Research, Colorado Springs, 
Colorado, March 28 – April 1 2007.  
 
 
6.1 Abstract 
 
Does dopamine code for uncertainty or is the sustained activation recorded from 
dopamine neurons a result of Temporal Difference (TD) backpropagating errors? An 
answer to this question could result in a better understanding of the nature of 
dopamine signaling, with implications for the psychopathology of cognitive 
disorders, like Schizophrenia, for which dopamine is commonly regarded as having a 
primary role. The key to this debate appears to be whether or not sustained activation 
or ramping occurs during the delay period between presentation of a conditioned 
stimulus and receipt of a reward, and, if so, whether this increases with increasing 
uncertainty. A computer simulation of uncertainty incorporating TD Learning and an 
Actor-Critic architecture successfully modelled a Reinforcement Learning paradigm 
and the resulting sustained activation in the delay period as demonstrated in single 
dopamine neuron recordings. Analysis of single trials in our simulations allowed us 
to make predictions about sustained activation and ramping during the delay period 
in single trials in vivo. This alternate model showed that while both sustained 
activation and ramping are common in single trials, both increased with increasing 
reward probability to a maximum at a probability of 0.9. As there is maximum 
uncertainty at a probability of 0.5, our TD simulations demonstrate that neither 
sustained activation nor ramping during the delay period appear to be encoding 
uncertainty. Our predictions can be tested and verified with behavioural data. 
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6.2 Background 
 
It has been posited that dopamine codes for uncertainty (Fiorillo, Tobler & Schultz, 
2003) as observations of single cell recordings have shown that sustained activity of 
dopamine neurons precedes uncertain rewards. Fiorillo and colleagues recorded the 
activity of dopamine neurons in two primates during a delay paradigm of classical 
conditioning to receive a fixed juice reward, while manipulating the probability of 
receipt of the reward. Two related but distinct parameters of reward were identified 
from the activation produced, after learning had taken place, which were found to 
occur independently within a single population of dopamine neurons: (i) A phasic 
burst of activity, or reward prediction error, at the time of the expected reward that 
increased as reward probability decreased (Figure 6.1A). This was in accordance 
with previous literature, and reinforced the position that midbrain and striatal 
dopamine systems calculate probabilities of future reward in both learning and 
decision making tasks (Montague, Dayan & Sejnowski, 1996; Schultz, Dayan & 
Montague, 1997; Schultz, 1998; Waelti, Dickinson & Schultz, 2001; McClure, Daw 
& Montague, 2003; Montague et al., 2004). (ii) In addition, Fiorillo and colleagues 
identified a new slower, sustained activity above baseline lasting from presentation 
of a conditioned stimulus (CS) to the expected time of a reward, which developed 
with increasing levels of uncertainty (Figure 6.1B and 1C). This was found to be 
related to motivationally relevant stimuli and varied with reward magnitude. 
 
In the presence of uncertainty, the sustained activation began on presentation of a CS 
and increased in strength until a reward was due, at which point the activation ceased 
(Figure 6.1C, where probability = 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75). This activation was greatest 
when uncertainty of reward was at a maximum, i.e., when the reward was received 
on only 50% of occasions and p = 0.5. Sustained activation was also seen at lower 
values of uncertainty, for example, when p was 0.25 and 0.75, but to a lesser extent. 
No sustained activation was seen when the outcome was certain at probabilities of 
either zero or 1, suggesting that the sustained activation coded for uncertainty. Out of 
a total of 188 dopamine neurons they found 29% showed significant increases in 
activity before potential reward at p = 0.5 (3% showed decreases), while only 9% 
showed increases at p = 1. 
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Figure 6.1. Sustained activation of dopamine neurons with uncertainty taken from Fiorillo et al. 
(2003). (A) Rasters and histograms of single cell activity. Rewarded trials only shown at intermediate 
probabilities. (Their Figure 2A) (B) Rasters and histograms of single cell activity. Both rewarded and 
unrewarded trials shown. (Their Figure 3A) (C) Population histograms of B. (Their Figure 3B) 
 
 
It was concluded that the activity of dopamine neurons may carry information about 
two distinct parameters of reward: (i) The phasic response at the expected time of 
reward as a teaching signal for Reinforcement Learning in accordance with the 
principles of Rescorla and Wagner (1972), and (ii) the sustained activation as 
information about uncertainty, facilitating attention, and therefore learning, which is 
more in line with the Pearce-Hall Theory (Pearce & Hall, 1980). 
 
However, the view that the sustained activity encodes uncertainty is controversial as 
Niv, Duff and Dayan (2005) have suggested that the sustained activation, or what 
they term the ramping effect in the delay period, is due to backpropagating Temporal 
Difference (TD) prediction errors, and not to uncertainty. TD Learning (Sutton, 
1988; Sutton & Barto, 1998), a form of Reinforcement Learning, and a time 
dependent variant of the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1980), 
provides an explicit method of modeling and quantifying the dopamine reward 
prediction error (Hollerman & Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al., 1997). Specifically, Niv 
and colleagues claim it is the asymmetric coding of reward prediction errors that 
gives rise to the effects seen in time, over consecutive CS presentations, due to a low 
baseline rate of activity in dopamine neurons. Firing rates corresponding to positive 
prediction errors typically rise to about 270% above baseline, while those for 
negative errors only fall to approximately 55% below baseline (Fiorillo et al. 2003). 
During uncertainty, these asymmetrical positive and negative errors, when summed, 
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will not cancel each other out, as predicted by the TD algorithm, even after extensive 
training periods. The overall effect, as seen in Fiorillo et al., will be of (i) a positive 
response across trials at the expected time of reward, and (ii) a ramping effect from 
presentation of the CS to the expected time of reward, described by Fiorillo and 
colleagues as sustained activation.  
 
Using TD, Niv and colleagues successfully modelled both effects identified by 
Fiorillo et al. (2003) during uncertainty. They explained that the ramping was an 
artifact of the asymmetric coding of reward prediction errors and does not directly 
encode uncertainty. Furthermore, they claimed that the resulting effects arose as a 
result of averaging across multiple trials and were not a within trial phenomenon. 
They also showed that the shape of the ramp depended on the learning rate, and that 
the difference in the steepness of the ramp between delay and trace conditioning 
could be accounted for by the low learning rates associated with trace conditioning, 
resulting in smaller or even negligible ramps.    
 
Fiorillo and colleagues defended their original claim that the sustained activity 
encoded uncertainty about reward (Fiorillo, Tobler & Schultz, 2005), and two of the 
five points they raised were of particular interest to the present study. Firstly, they 
referred to the difficulty in determining what a single trial increase in the delay 
period activity should look like. They specified that it was difficult to equate positive 
spike trains with the positive and negative reward prediction errors generated from 
the TD algorithm, as any spike could represent a backpropagating error, while any 
absence of spikes, a negative error. However, based on averaged firing rates over 
tens of milliseconds, they maintained that firing rate appeared to increase during the 
delay period over single trials and gave two examples in support of their argument. 
Their argument would suggest that if sustained activation or ramping is common in 
single trials, the extent of the validity of TD as a model of dopamine as a reward 
prediction error is called into question as it does not account for this activity. 
However, if such instances in single trials are rare then claims by Fiorillo et al. that 
the sustained activation encodes uncertainty are unfounded.  
 
Secondly, they suggest that according to TD, activity in the last part of the delay 
period in a trial should reflect the reward outcome in the previous trial to that same 
CS. However, they found no evidence in their data of a dependence of neural activity 
on the outcome of the preceding trial. This also calls into question the extent to 
which dopamine firing patterns can be represented by TD. We suggest that this is not 
what is predicted by TD; specifically, it is the history of all preceding trials, and not 
just the activity of the last trial that determines activity. 
 
 
6.3 This Study 
 
The key to this debate appears to be how frequently sustained activation or ramping 
occurs in individual trials. Furthermore, if there is more sustained activation when p 
= 0.5 (maximum uncertainty) than when p = 0.25 and 0.75, then it could be said that 
dopamine is encoding uncertainty in the delay period as a product of TD. It is also 
important to distinguish between what constitutes sustained activation (Fiorillo et al, 
2003; 2005) and ramping (Niv et al., 2005).     
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The aim of this study was to seek answers to the above questions in order to shed 
some light on whether or not dopamine encodes uncertainty. To this end I helped to 
create a novel model of dopamine neuron firing, incorporating TD backpropagating 
errors. Inspired by McClure, Daw and Montague (2003) and an alternative to Niv et 
al. (2005), the model linked the ideas of reward prediction error and incentive 
salience, and captured the following effects seen in single cell recordings of 
reinforcement by Fiorillo and colleagues: (a) The phasic activations at the expected 
time of reward; (b) the sustained increase in activity from the onset of the 
conditioned stimulus until the expected time of reward; and (c) the sustained 
activation increasing with increasing reward magnitude. A successful model would 
enable a single trial analysis; which is the cornerstone of the debate over whether or 
not the sustained activation or the ramping effect, seen in dopamine neuron firing is 
encoding uncertainty. Specifically, if it were possible to build the inaccuracies of 
single cell recordings into a TD model where sustained activation or ramping was 
seen in single trials and was not just an artefact of averaging reward prediction errors 
over trials, there would be evidence for dopamine encoding uncertainty and TD 
would remain a viable model of dopamine neuron firing patterns. Furthermore it 
would be possible to consider the effects of interrupting the sequence of rewarded 
and non rewarded runs or trial history. 
 
 
6.4 Methods 
 
The Maze 
A computer simulation was constructed of a ‘rat’ learning to traverse a one-arm maze 
to receive a reward, using the TD algorithm with Actor-Critic architecture. The maze 
modelled was inspired by McClure, Daw and Montague (2003) linking the ideas of 
reward prediction error and incentive salience, but contained an additional 
initialisation/reset state and only allowed travel in one direction. Figure 6.2 shows a 
typical maze with positions modelled as eight states, starting at State 0 (the CS) and 
progressing through intermediate states to receive a simulated reward in State 7 (the 
reward state). In order to model the breaks between maze runs in real rats, it was 
necessary to insert an initialisation/satiety state (State 8) into the maze, between the 
goal (State 7) and the start (State 0), where the transition between that state and State 
0 remained at zero so that no learning could take place. This had the effect of 
resetting the value of start State 0 to zero, acting as a ‘resting’ state and ensuring that 
the ‘rat’ was always surprised when starting the maze. Without this additional state, 
the simulated rat learnt the value of the start state, and in effect, there was no CS. 
Intermediate states were added and removed, as required to make mazes of different 
lengths. 
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Figure 6.2.  Schematic representation of a maze with eight states (S) plus ‘satiety’ state (S8). A reward 
(r) of 1 can be provided in S7 only. 
  Start 
r = 0
S1        
r = 0
S2 
r = 0
 S3 
r = 0
 S4 
r = 0
S8 
r = 0 
S6        
r = 0
 S7 
r = 1
S5        
r = 0
  
 
The Model 
I implemented and modified an existing computer program written by a member of 
the research team in LISP (Steele 1990), of a maze incorporating the TD algorithm 
with an Actor-Critic architecture (Chapter 4.3); a form of reinforcement TD learning 
where a critic computed a reward prediction error, which was used by the actor to 
choose those actions that led to reward (McClure, Daw & Montague, 2003; 
Montague et al., 2004; Sutton & Barto, 1998). The model incorporated the concept of 
incentive salience as expected future reward, where the dual roles of dopamine: (i) to 
bias action selection towards situations that predict the best reward; and (ii) as a 
learning signal used to update the values of states and so create better estimates of 
future reward, equated with the Incentive Salience Hypothesis and the role of 
dopamine in attributing and using incentive salience.  
 
The program code can be found in Appendix V and is a modification of that used in 
my simulation of a computational substrate for incentive salience in Chapter 5.1.1. 
The original model by McClure, Daw & Montague (2003) is described in detail in 
Chapter 4.2. 
 
 
Simulations 
Uncertainty – Degree of Probability  
The ranges of probabilities used for trials were 0.25, 0.5 (maximum uncertainty), or 
0.75. The δ(t) values were recorded for each state transition, for a single probability 
in each trial. Each trial consisted of 1000 runs through the one-way maze, with a step 
being a transition from one state to the next, and a run being one complete journey 
through the maze, from start to finish. At the beginning of each trial the values of 
each state in the maze (V) were set to zero. Movement to the next state in the maze 
was selected according to the effect of TD learning on different probabilities of 
receiving a reward for each run.  
 
To investigate: 
 (a) The phasic activations at the expected time of reward     
 (b) The sustained increase in activity or ramping effect 
In keeping with the pharmacokinetics of dopamine, namely the asymmetry in coding 
of positive and negative errors, any negative prediction errors were scaled by a factor 
of one sixth, the scaling factor used by Niv et al. (2005), based on data from Fiorillo 
et al. (2003). The scaled δ(t) values were then averaged across 1000 consecutive runs 
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for each state, where γ = 1 [Chapter 5, Equation 5.1, (cf Chapter 4.2.1, Equation 4.4)] 
and α = 0.5 [Chapter 5, Equation 5.3 (cf Chapter 4.2.2, Equation 4.5)], and the 
magnitudes of the scaled values compared. This averaging corresponded to the 
summing of peri-stimulus-time-histograms of activity over different trials and inter-
trial averaging used by Fiorillo et al. (2003).  
 
 (c) Reward Magnitude  
Individual reward magnitudes of 0.5, 1 and 2 were compared at p = 0.5 in different 
trials to see the effect on the sustained activation. 
 
 (d) Single Trial Analysis 
In order to address two of the points raised in Fiorillo et al. (2005), it was possible to 
undertake single trial analysis, by recording the scaled prediction errors, δ(t), for 
each state transition, for several single runs through the maze. One run was 
analogous to the activity of a single neuron in a single trial over time and was simply 
a snapshot of the δ(t) values for each state. Each state was equivalent to a period of 
time, usually represented by a number of bins in spike trains. While the model does 
not represent firing patterns in real time, the juice reward in Fiorillo et al. (2003) was 
delivered after a two second delay, and so each of the nine states in the maze could 
be seen to be representing 0.25 seconds. 
 
 (e) Trial History 
Different series of consecutive runs were examined to see if the activity in the last 
part of the delay period in a trial should always reflect the reward outcome in the 
previous trial to that same CS. The effects of interrupting the sequence of rewarded 
and non rewarded runs in the trial history were investigated. 
 
 
6.5 Results 
 
An Example of Learning 
With a probability of 1 and a maze of eight states plus a ‘satiety’ state, complete 
learning took place over the first thirty runs. On the first run a large prediction error, 
δ(t), was recorded at the expected time of the reward (S7-S8), and as runs 
progressed, this δ(t) was transferred back to the CS (S8-S0). When full learning had 
taken place only the CS elicited a reward prediction error. This effect is 
demonstrated in Figure 6.3, which shows the δ(t) at the expected time of reward 
beginning at 1 and reducing to zero by run 9 at which point the value of the state is 
learnt and the reward fully predicted. The δ(t) at the CS begins at zero and increases 
gradually to 1, from run 10 to run 30. An intermediate state transition S3-S4 is 
included which records the δ(t) backpropagated from the reward state by run 5. The 
error increases until run 8 and then reduces to zero by run 21. 
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Figure 6.3. A demonstration of learning showing the reward prediction error, δ(t), at the expected time 
of reward (R: S7-S8) beginning at 1 and reducing to zero by run 9. The δ(t) at the CS (S8-S0) begins 
at zero and increases gradually to 1, from run 10 to run 30. At this point the value of the state is learnt 
and the reward fully predicted. An intermediate state transition (S3-S4) is included which records the 
δ(t) backpropagated from the reward state by run 5. The error increases until run 8 and then reduces to 
zero by run 21. (p = 1, r = 1). 
δ(
t) 
 
 
As expected, when uncertainty was introduced the CS (S8-S0) was not fully 
predictive of the reward, as in the case of p = 1. With probabilities (p) 0.25, 0.5 and 
0.75 all states, and not just the CS, continued to elicit a reward prediction error. 
Figure 6.4 shows the CS (S8-S0) over 30 runs for the three different probabilities 
plotted on the same graph as p = 1. While the CS at p = 1 reached a δ(t) of 1, the 
others averaged over 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 respectively.  
 
Training was assumed to have occurred to a sufficient level when the CS (S8-S0) 
prediction error, δ(t), averaged 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 for p = 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 
respectively. All the following tests with uncertainty were done post training. 
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Figure 6.4. With uncertainty (p = 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75) the CS is never fully predictive of the reward as 
with p = 1. Actual runs 0-30 for p = 1 and runs 36-65 for p = 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75. 
δ 
(t)
 
 
 
Uncertainty – Degree of Probability 
Eventually, by chance, actions were selected in trials for the entire range of 
probabilities, 0.25, 0.5 or 0.75, and progression was made along the maze towards 
the reward state where the reward (r) of that state, r = 1 was received for the first 
time. Once a reward has been received, learning could begin to take place. This was 
achieved by visiting a state (by chance) and comparing the values of that state with 
the state just visited [Chapter 5, Equation 5.1, (cf Chapter 4.2.1, Equation 4.4)]. The 
TD algorithm ensures that values of states become consistent between states, and if 
there was a difference, i.e., a reward prediction error, then the value of that state was 
updated by α, a fraction of that reward prediction error. On subsequent runs, learning 
occurred as the value of the reward was propagated backwards, updating earlier 
states.  
 
As the probability of obtaining a reward increased, from 25% to 50% to 75%, so did 
the level of phasic activation at the CS (S8-S0) (Figures 6.5 and 6.6), with average 
δ(t) values of 0.25, 0.46 and 0.76 respectively over 1000 runs.  
 
 (a) The phasic activations at the expected time of reward     
Without scaling the δ(t) values recorded for each state transition to compensate for 
the biologically asymmetric coding of positive and negative prediction errors, no 
average positive phasic activation was seen at the expected time of reward (Figure 
6.5, S7-S8). However, after scaling rewarded and unrewarded δ(t) values by a factor 
of one sixth and averaging δ(t) values over consecutive trials, positive phasic 
activation was seen at the expected time of reward of 0.15, 0.21 and 0.15, for 
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probabilities of 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 respectively (Figure 6.6, S7-S8). Positive phasic 
activation was highest for maximum uncertainty (p = 0.5).  
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Figure 6.5. Average δ (t) values, with standard deviation error bars, for rewarded and unrewarded 
runs, before scaling, for each state transition over 1000 runs, when p = 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75, α = 0.5. 
There is no sustained activation or ramping, that is the δ(t) values on all, except the CS state, are zero. 
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Figure 6.6. Average δ(t) values, with standard deviation error bars, for rewarded and unrewarded runs, 
after scaling, for each state transition over 1000 runs, when p = 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75, α = 0.5. Sustained 
activation/ramping is seen which is greatest for maximum uncertainty (p = 0.5).   
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This is contrary to the findings of Fiorillo et al. (2003), who showed that the 
magnitude of reward responses increased as probability decreased. However, their 
Figure 2 (Figure 6.1A) showed rewarded runs only and, after removing all the 
negative δ(t) values, our Figure 6.7 shows comparable results to their Figure 2. So it 
can be said that when rewarded trials only are shown (Fiorillo et al. (2003), their 
Figure 2) the magnitude of the reward responses increased as probability decreased. 
My Figure 6.6 is comparable to their Figure 3 (Figure 6.1B and C) which includes 
both rewarded and unrewarded trials. This highlights the danger of averaging non 
consecutive runs without considering the reward history (see Trial History below). 
 
In conclusion, uncertainty would appear to be coded in the reward averages of 
consecutive rewarded and unrewarded trials. This information becomes finely tuned 
over a period of time and could be used as a training signal by another system, such 
as a working memory buffer, to utilise the information provided in future trials.  
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Figure 6.7.  Average δ(t) values for rewarded runs only, after scaling, for each state transition over 
1000 runs, when p = 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75, α = 0.5. Sustained activation/ramping is seen which increases 
as probability decreases.    
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 (b) The sustained increase in activity  
Figure 6.5 showed that, in the absence of asymmetric scaling, no ramping effect was 
seen from plotting the average δ(t) values obtained for probabilities of 0.25, 0.5 and 
0.75 for each state transition. The symmetrical positive and negative errors 
effectively cancelled each other out, in accordance with the TD algorithm. However, 
when the δ(t) values were scaled by a factor of one sixth to compensate for the 
biological asymmetric coding of positive and negative errors, and averaged across 
consecutive runs, positive δ(t) values were seen that corresponded to the sustained 
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activation and ramping effects reported in Fiorillo et al. (2003) and Niv et al. (2005) 
respectively (Figure 6.6). In accordance with the findings of Fiorillo et al. (Figure 
6.1C), the magnitude of the ramping effect was greater for maximum uncertainty (p 
= 0.5) than for the lower uncertainties of p = 0.25 and p = 0.75, which both had 
similar values.  
 
 
 (c) Reward magnitude  
The value of the reward at p = 0.5 was manipulated in three different trials of 30 
runs, with rewards given of 0.5, 1 and 2. The size of the reward had an effect on the 
range of δ(t) values available for each state. With a larger reward comes a larger 
range of possible δ(t) values, and, accordingly, larger ramping effects (Figure 6.8). 
Therefore, the sustained activation increased with increasing reward magnitude, in 
accordance with Fiorillo et al. (2003). 
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Figure 6.8. Scaled average δ(t) values over 30 runs for reward values of 0.5, 1 and 2, p = 0.5, α = 0.5. 
The sustained activation/ramping increased with increasing reward magnitude. 
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 (d) Single Trial Analysis 
Criteria for sustained activation 
Fiorillo et al. (2003, page 1900) described the apparent coding of uncertainty as ‘…a 
sustained increase in activity that grew from the onset of the conditioned stimulus to 
the expected time of reward,’ where ‘…the peak of the sustained activation occurs at 
the potential time of reward, which corresponds to the moment of greatest 
uncertainty’. The sustained activation was maximal at p = 0.5, less pronounced at p = 
0.25 and 0.75 and absent at p = 0.0 and 1. They provided an example of activity in a 
single dopamine neuron which corresponds to a single trial (Figure 6.9). The 
horizontal dashed line is my guess at where baseline firing could be (not to scale).  
 
 96
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  CS onset   potential reward 
 
Figure 6.9. Activity in a single dopamine neuron taken from Fiorillo et al. (2005). Dotted horizontal 
line shows our guess at baseline firing level. 
 
 
Fiorillo et al. (2005) report that it is difficult to be certain whether or not activity 
increases on single trials and refer therefore to strong and sustained activation within 
single trials. Based on the evidence in Figure 6.9, the present simulations were 
undertaken with three criteria for the sustained activation or ramping effect:  
 Criterion 1 for sustained activation only: Four of the eight possible 
 transition states should have positive reward prediction errors/activations (not 
 including the CS, transition state S8-S0). 
 Criterion 2 for Ramping: The sum of activation for states S5-6, S6-7 and 
 S7-8 should be greater than for states S2-3, S3-4 and S4-5. 
 Criterion 3 for Ramping: The peak of the sustained activation should occur 
 in states S5-6, 6-7 or S7-8; close to the potential time of reward and the 
 moment of greatest uncertainty. 
If all three of the above criteria were satisfied the single trial was deemed to have 
met with the strict criteria for sustained activation/ramping. Criterion 1 alone was 
sufficient to identify sustained activation. 
 
An example of sustained activity/ramping in scaled single trials 
While this research supports the argument by Niv et al. (2005) that the ramping 
effect seen during uncertainty, when averaging across multiple trials, is a result of 
backpropagating TD errors, I show that it is also possible for sustained 
activation/ramping to occur in single trials in accordance with Fiorillo et al. (2005). 
Single trials in our simulations are represented by recording the scaled prediction 
errors, δ(t), for each state transition, for one run through the maze. This run is 
analogous to the activity of a single neuron in a single trial over time and is simply a 
snapshot of the δ(t) values for each state, which may be either positive or negative 
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with respect to baseline firing, depending on the history of previous runs. They are 
directly comparable to Figure 6.9 taken from Fiorillo et al. (2005), where baseline 
firing is defined as zero and corresponds to the dashed horizontal line estimate of 
baseline that has been added to Figure 6.9.  
 
My simulations allow me to predict that sustained activation/ramping may occur 
when several rewarded runs are received in succession. In order to demonstrate the 
methodology I take an extreme case, when p = 0.5 and eight rewarded runs are 
received in succession by chance. Single runs 81 to 92 are shown in Table 6.1 where 
the sequence of rewarded (R) or non rewarded (N) runs is ---NRRRRRRRRNNN, 
where --- represents learning prior to the sequence under scrutiny (---NRNRNN on 
this occasion). It can be seen from Table 6.1 that five of the twelve runs met all three 
of our criteria, satisfying the strict criteria for sustained activation/ramping, while ten 
of the twelve runs met criterion 1 for sustained activation alone. 
 
 
Table 6.1. How a sample of consecutive runs met with the three criteria for sustained 
activation/ramping (actual runs 81-92). When criteria are satisfied the results are in bold. See text for 
definition of criteria and Figure 6.10 for an example of run 83. 
 
Run Number 
(N-non 
rewarded 
R-rewarded) 
Criterion 1 
met for 
Sustained 
Activation? 
Criterion 2 
met for 
Ramping? 
Criterion 3 
met for 
Ramping? 
Strict criteria 
met? 
(criteria 1, 2 
and 3 all 
satisfied)  
81 (N) 2/8 No No No No 
82 (R) 3/8 No Yes Yes No 
83 (R) 4/8 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
84 (R) 5/8 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
85 (R) 6/8 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
86 (R) 5/8 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
87 (R) 7/8 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
88 (R) 8/8 Yes No No No 
89 (R) 8/8 Yes No No No 
90 (N) 7/8 Yes No No No 
91 (N) 6/8 Yes No No No 
92 (N) 5/8 Yes No No No 
 
 
As an example of a ramping trial, run 83 from Table 6.1 is presented graphically in 
Figure 6.10. Run 83 is an example of a single trial that satisfies all three criteria for 
sustained activation/ramping, and thus conforms to our strict criteria. Firstly, four of 
the eight possible states, S2-3, S3-4, S6-7 and S7-8 showed positive reward 
prediction errors/activations (not including the CS: S8-0), satisfying Criterion 1 for 
sustained activation. Criterion 2 for ramping required the activation for states S5-6, 
S6-7 and S7-8 to be greater than for states S2-3, S3-4 and S4-5 and in the case of run 
83 average values were 0.265 and 0.029 respectively. Finally the peak of the 
sustained activation occurred in state S7-8, the reward state, satisfying Criterion 3, 
which required the peak to be in one of states S5-6, 6-7 or S7-8.  
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Figure 6.10. Actual run 83 from Table 6.1. An example of a single trial that satisfies the strict criteria 
for sustained activation/ramping. Criterion 1: Four of the eight possible states showed positive reward 
prediction errors/activation (not including the CS: S8-0). Criterion 2: The activation for states S5-6, 
S6-7 and S7-8 was greater than for states S2-3, S3-4 and S4-5. Criterion 3:  The peak of the sustained 
activation occurred in one of states S5-6, 6-7 or S7-8. 
 
 
Does Dopamine encode Uncertainty? 
I have demonstrated above that positive sustained activation can be seen in single 
trials of dopamine neuron firing at p = 0.5. Evidence of sustained activation/ramping 
was also evident for lower levels of uncertainty, when p = 0.25 and 0.75, and if it can 
be shown that sustained activation/ramping is greater and more frequent in single 
trials when p = 0.5 than for 0.25 and 0.75, as uncertainty increases, then it can be 
said that dopamine is encoding uncertainty, supporting the claims of Fiorillo et al. 
(2003; 2005).  
 
I therefore examined 200 consecutive single trials for different probabilities, where p 
= 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 0.95 and 1, after learning, and applied my criteria to determine 
whether or not sustained activation or ramping effects were seen. Figure 6.11 shows 
the number of states showing positive sustained activation for each of 200 runs or 
single trials with a maximum of 1600 states (200 runs each containing 8 states, not 
including CS); while Figure 6.12 shows the total number of ramps, according to my 
criteria, for each probability out of a maximum of 200 runs or single trials. Figures 
6.11 and 6.12 show the same trend, where both sustained activation and ramping 
increase with increasing reward probability to a maximum at p = 0.9, demonstrating 
that TD error does not appear to be encoding uncertainty in either the sustained 
activation or the ramping effects.  
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Figure 6.11. Number of states for each probability, showing both positive sustained activation and no 
sustained activation, out of a maximum of 1600 (i.e., 200 consecutive runs with eight possible states 
per run). 
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Figure 6.12. Number of runs, out of a maximum of 200, for each probability, showing both ramps and 
no ramps.  
 
It is interesting to note that sustained activation and ramping decrease rapidly at 
around p = 0.95 when probability approaches 1, and disappear at p = 1, when the 
system becomes deterministic and full learning has taken place. In reality a 
probability of 1 is never reached as there will always be an element of uncertainty. 
 100
However, this effect is a direct result of the asymmetric coding of reward prediction 
errors, where we have scaled the negative errors by a factor of one sixth to simulate 
nature’s own bias. A trade-off is seen between the frequency of receiving a reward 
and the magnitude of the surprise when a reward is seen.  Without scaling, symmetry 
would be seen, where sustained activation and ramping would be similar for p = 0.25 
and 0.75 with a maximum for p = 0.5, and dopamine would be encoding for 
uncertainty in the sustained activation/ramping in the delay period. 
 
To conclude, I have addressed one of the points raised in Fiorillo et al. (2005) by 
demonstrating that both sustained activation and ramping are common in single trials 
during uncertainty, where probability is 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9. However, using TD 
my simulations indicate that information about uncertainty is not available in the 
interval between presentation of the CS and receipt of the reward. Contrary to 
Fiorillo et al. (2003; 2005), both the sustained activation and the ramping effects do 
not appear to be coding for uncertainty. However, as concluded in (a) above, 
uncertainty would appear to be coded at the expected time of reward, in the averages 
of consecutive rewarded and unrewarded trials. This information on uncertainty 
builds up over a period of time and is, therefore, of limited use for prediction 
purposes by dopamine neurons, which require a more immediate assessment of 
ongoing reward prediction. This suggests that while TD provides information about 
uncertainty, it is likely to be optimally exploited by a postsynaptic system, possibly a 
working memory buffer that can monitor this information and utilise it in future trials 
in a more efficient manner. 
 
 (e) Trial History 
In support of their original claims that dopamine encodes uncertainty, Fiorillo et al. 
(2005) suggested that if activity during the delay period is due to backpropagating 
error signals that originated on previous trials, then the activity in the last part of the 
delay period of each individual trial should reflect the last reward outcome. 
Specifically, if the preceding trial was rewarded, there should be more activity at the 
end of the delay period, and less activity if it was not rewarded. However, they found 
no evidence of this in their trials and provided an example of a recording showing no 
dependence of neural activity on the outcome of the preceding trial (Figure 6.9).  
 
Figure 6.13 shows a history of rewarded and non-rewarded runs ---RNRNRNNNNN. 
After scaling, large δ(t) values were seen for the first six runs because alternate 
rewards and non-rewards were given, but runs 7-10 were not rewarded and, 
consequently, gradual extinction of the negative prediction error occurred. This 
example allows me to address a second point raised by Fiorillo et al. (2005) by 
showing that it is not always the case that less activity will be seen if a trial is not 
rewarded (and vice versa), as runs 8-10 show an increase in firing (towards baseline) 
following non-rewarded runs. It is necessary, therefore, for more of the history of 
previous runs to be taken into consideration than just the last reward outcome, when 
analysing reward prediction errors. 
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Figure 6.13. Scaled average δ(t) values at expected time of reward (S7-S8) recorded over 10 runs 
when p = 0.5. 
 
 
Referring to the example provided by Fiorillo et al. (2005) shown in figure 6.9, the 
model would predict that the runs preceding the last rewarded trial in Diagram A 
were rewarded, as the last reward produced less activation than previous trials. In 
addition, in spite of possible noise in the data, the effect of no reward on the last trial 
(Diagram B) can be identified as a dip below baseline, just before the time of 
potential reward. This is a very large dip and so the model would predict that several 
rewarded runs preceded that particular non rewarded trial. 
 
 
6.6 Discussion 
 
This study has attempted to answer one of the key questions in the current debate 
over whether or not dopamine encodes uncertainty. Contrary to the claims of Fiorillo 
et al. (2003; 2005), single trial analysis in a simulation of reinforcement learning 
using TD reveals the possibility that dopamine may not encode uncertainty in the 
delay period of midbrain dopamine neurons in the form of either sustained activation 
or ramping. However, it would appear that TD does code for uncertainty, not in the 
inter trial interval, but at the expected time of reward, in the averages of consecutive 
rewarded and unrewarded trials. This information on uncertainty builds up over a 
period of time and occurs in a well learned state and hence, is of limited use for 
prediction purposes by dopamine neurons. Such information is only useful when the 
calculation is made in advance of a response, suggesting that while TD provides 
information about uncertainty, it could better do so to another system, possibly a 
working memory buffer that can monitor this information and utilise it in future trials 
in a more efficient manner. 
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I have produced a simple model that encoded values of states rather than weighted 
neurons and implicitly propagated reward prediction errors backwards in time using 
TD. This novel model successfully captured the following properties of 
dopaminergic activity seen in single cell recordings of reinforcement by Fiorillo et al. 
(2003): (a) the phasic activations at the expected time of reward; (b) the sustained 
increase in activity from the onset of the conditioned stimulus until the expected time 
of reward, during uncertainty; and (c) the sustained activation increasing with 
increasing reward magnitude.  These findings support the claims of Niv et al. (2005) 
that the ramping effect seen in the delay period between presentation of a CS that 
predicts an uncertain reward and the expected time of receipt of that reward was due 
to backpropagating TD errors that arose as a result of averaging across multiple trials 
and was not encoding uncertainty.  
 
What is new about this study is that I have drawn up criteria for sustained activation 
and ramping in single trials which permit analysis of single trials in our simulations. 
While these criteria are subjective, they are relatively liberal, which has allowed us to 
make predictions about sustained activation and ramping during the delay period in 
single trials in vivo. Importantly, these predictions can be tested and verified with 
behavioural data.  
 
I have addressed one of the points raised in Fiorillo et al. (2005) by demonstrating 
that both sustained activation and ramping are common in single trials during 
uncertainty, where reward probability is 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9. However I have 
shown that both effects increase with increasing probability to a maximum of 0.9, 
after which the effects decrease dramatically towards p = 1. Therefore, as neither 
sustained activation nor ramping is greater with maximum uncertainty we cannot 
support the claims by Fiorillo et al. (2003; 2005) that dopamine is encoding 
uncertainty during the delay period between CS and receipt of reward using TD.  
 
In reply to a further point raised by Fiorillo and colleagues, I have demonstrated that 
activity in the last part of the delay period does not always reflect the reward 
outcome that followed the last exposure to that same CS. Specifically; the history of 
consecutive trials should be taken into consideration when analysing reward 
prediction errors and not just the last trial. In the presence of uncertainty, the 
particular course taken through a series of trials is different in each simulation, as it 
depends on the exact order of rewarded and non-rewarded runs, which are delivered 
randomly. It is important that these factors should be taken into consideration when 
interpreting data from peri-stimulus-time-histograms of activity over different trials 
and inter-trial averaging, such as that in Fiorillo et al. (2003).  
 
The importance of taking the succession of trials into account is also evident from 
my results of the phasic activations at the expected time of reward. When averaging 
rewarded runs only the magnitude of the reward responses increased as probability 
decreased, but when averaging both rewarded and non rewarded runs, the magnitude 
of the ramping effect was greatest for maximum uncertainty, at a probability of 0.5.  
 
While the value of this model is in its simplicity and transparency, which permits the 
interpretation and prediction of dopamine firing patterns, the model is parameter 
dependent and discrete, containing a set number of states. In reality neuron firing is 
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noisy and therefore less predictable and a spiking form of this model could contain 
more realistic noise and more closely resemble dopamine neuron firing in vivo. In 
addition, the current model does not allow for more than one CS in any one trial and 
at the present time I am therefore not able to address a further point by Fiorillo et al. 
(2005) concerning a dissociation between the size of the ramp and the sustained 
activation at the estimated time of reward, identified in Tobler, Fiorillo and Schultz 
(2005).  
 
Some evidence suggests that the persistent reward responses of dopamine cells 
during conditioning are only accurately replicated by a TD model with long-lasting 
eligibility traces, such as TD(λ) where λ has non-zero values (Pan, Schmidt, 
Wickens and Hyland 2005). It would be interesting to implement future versions of 
the model using this version of the TD algorithm to see the effect of different 
strengths of eligibility trace. 
 
In addition, there is evidence from experiments involving decision-making in 
macaque monkeys that the activity of dopamine neurons reflects future choice of 
action as early as 122ms after the presentation of the CS (Morris, Nevet, Arkadir, 
Vaadia & Bergman 2006), presenting the possibility that dopamine neurons receive 
information about decision-making from another structure. This has implications for 
this particular model, where the dopamine signal is used to directly select possible 
actions. Furthermore, the results of Morris et al. favour the SARSA (state-action-
reward-state-action) algorithms that assign a separate value (Q value) to each 
possible behavioural choice in every state as a better alternative in decision-making 
than using an actor-critic algorithm. However, the maze in this model only allows 
movement in one direction and there are no decisions other than whether to move to 
the next state or not, so this does not present a problem in these particular 
simulations. 
 
In spite of the above evidence against models that use the dopamine signal to directly 
select possible actions; these simulations have combined the bias of nature towards 
the firing of dopamine neurons above baseline with TD to capture the detailed 
electrophysiological recordings of dopamine neuron firing. This strengthens the 
argument for TD as a valid method of modelling and quantifying the dopamine 
reward prediction error. While I appreciate that TD must be one of many algorithms 
working simultaneously in the brain, I agree with Niv et al. (2005) that the ramping 
signal, both in single trials, and when averaged over multiple trials, is strong 
evidence for the nature of the learning mechanism of a shift in dopamine activity 
from expected time of reward to the CS, using TD. I suggest that it is both reasonable 
and biologically plausible for future models of dopamine to include TD learning. 
This chapter demonstrates the value of computer modelling in that our model has 
generated testable predictions that can be verified with behavioural data. 
 
 
 
6.7 Chapter Conclusions 
 
The simulations detailed in this chapter are an example of science through simulation 
and demonstrate how computational modelling can help to clarify a position by 
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generating testable predictions that can be verified with behavioural data (Chapter 
2.3). The arguments presented strengthen the use of TD as a valid method of 
modelling and quantifying the dopamine reward prediction error. It is therefore both 
reasonable and biologically plausible for future models of dopamine to include TD 
learning.  
 
However, there are certain drawbacks to using a TD approach, which are discussed 
in the next chapter. In Chapter 7, it is my intention to draw attention to those 
limitations and to shift the focus of this thesis back to my longer-term aims of the 
effect of dopamine dysfunction in schizophrenia. In particular, I describe an 
alternative body of research, where it is assumed that an animal builds an explicit 
internal model of its environment during conditioning. I investigate a computational 
model of the function of dopamine in a Reinforcement Learning paradigm, by Smith, 
Li, Becker & Kapur (2006), which, like the models described in Chapters 5 and 6, 
incorporates both dopamine and the Incentive salience Hypothesis. However, unlike 
the models previously described, the model based account also gives an account of the 
tonic firing of dopamine neurons and its effect on the expression of previously 
acquired behaviour. 
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Chapter 7  
 
Limitations of Temporal Difference: Towards a Dual 
Systems Approach 
 
 
The long-term aim of this research is to explore the application of connectionist 
models as a paradigm for schizophrenia, with a view to generating and testing 
theories of the disorder. It is clear that any explanation of the symptoms and 
cognitive deficits associated with schizophrenia should include dopamine 
dysfunction (Chapter 2) and my research so far has led to a thorough investigation of 
TD as an explicit method of modelling and quantifying dopamine as a reward 
prediction error. In Chapter 5 I described and implemented a computational substrate 
for incentive salience by McClure et al. (2003), and in Chapter 6 this model was 
extended to conduct an analysis of the relationship between TD learning and 
uncertainty coding in a computational model of dopaminergic signalling. While the 
focus of this thesis so far has centred on using TD as a model of dopamine function 
in reinforcement learning, it is important to note that there are limitations to using 
TD alone to account for action control in the brain. In this chapter I draw attention to 
those limitations and shift the focus of this thesis back to my longer-term aim of 
implementing a connectionist model of the effect of dopamine dysfunction in 
schizophrenia.  
 
One of the major benefits of using TD is that it utilises minimal computation by 
caching or storing prediction values of estimated future reward or incentive value, 
over successive timesteps. However, this caching of values is also a limitation that 
can manifest itself in the following ways:  
• As TD only stores values of expected future reward or incentive, the basic 
TD model is unable to distinguish between different rewards with a similar 
value that are preceded by an appropriate CS (Smith Li, Becker & Kapur 
2006). In particular, the basic TD model is unable to distinguish between the 
effects of dopamine manipulation on distal rather than proximal rewards (e.g., 
running speed in a maze versus consumption of reward, Chapter 5.3) (Daw, 
Niv & Dayan 2005; Smith et al. 2004; 2006).  
• TD can be brittle as the prediction chains used by TD over successive time-
steps break down when the CS-US relationship is unreliable, such as in the 
complicated 1-2-AX working memory task, which involves maintaining both 
subgoals and higher order goals (O’Reilly, Frank, Hazy & Watz 2007). 
• The simple actor-critic is insensitive to motivational state and fails to take 
into account some of the psychological differences between Pavlovian and 
instrumental conditioning (Dayan & Balleine 2002). 
• Any change in task will have to be relearned explicitly, which will take time. 
In reality, relearning often needs to take place quickly, so current TD models 
do not account for all types of learning (Daw et al. 2005). 
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A model based approach (Sutton & Barto 1998), where it is assumed that an animal 
builds an explicit internal model of its environment during conditioning (Smith, Li, 
Becker & Kapur 2004; 2006), can address some of the problems associated with TD. 
However, model based reinforcement learning carries its own limitations associated 
with searching a large environment and the possible errors incurred as a result of 
using strategies to reduce the search space to manageable proportions. An alternative 
is to combine the benefits of both TD and explicit internal model representations in a 
dual system action control in the brain (e.g., Daw et al 2005; Dayan & Balleine 
2002).  
 
TD learning is often referred to as a model free form of reinforcement learning, but 
in reality it stores a rudimentary model of the environment as a series of states and 
their associated values. However, unlike model based reinforcement learning, TD 
does not represent the underlying cause-effect contingencies of the environment as it 
does not store the consequences of taking an action from each state (Smith et al. 
2006). In addition, there are different degrees of model based learning, ranging from 
basic models which store simple state-action pairs, for example Q-learning (Watkins 
& Dayan 1992), to more sophisticated tree-searches (Daw et al. 2005) that are more 
computationally expensive. When I refer to the distinctions between model free and 
model based reinforcement learning in the remainder of this thesis, I place my 
arguments within the framework of Daw et al. (2005) (Section 7.4), and refer to TD 
as model free, where TD and model based approaches are two opposite extremes in a 
trade-off between computational efficiency and the statistically efficient use of 
experience. However, it should be noted that there is a less clear-cut distinction 
between the two, which are better described as being separated on a continuum 
between model free and model based reinforcement learning.  
 
In the following sections, I elaborate further on the arguments against TD listed above, 
and start by looking at the alternative model based account of dopamine function by 
Smith and colleagues in Section 7.1. Their line of reasoning bears important 
similarities to mine as we both have the long-term goal of a better understanding of 
schizophrenia through the ideas of incentive salience and dopamine dysfunction. 
Section 7.2 contains a brief account of a new algorithm developed by O’Reilly and 
colleagues as an alternative to TD, which is not developed further in this thesis, and in 
Sections 7.3 and 7.4 I look at two models by Dayan and Balleine and Daw et al. that 
combine the benefits of both model free and model based accounts of reinforcement 
learning.  
 
In Section 7.5 I describe a framework by Yin and Knowlton (2006) for the role of the 
basal ganglia in habit formation. Unlike the work in the previous sections, it is not a 
model addressing the limitations of a model free TD approach, but, it gives an 
account of the cortico-basal ganglia networks and the distinction between goal 
directed actions and stimulus response habits, and thus builds upon the argument for 
a dual system of action control in the brain. These five sections have inspired my 
connectionist model with dual weights, which is developed in Chapter 8. 
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7.1 A Model Based Account of Dopamine Function  
 
A series of models have been developed by Smith and colleagues using a model based 
approach, as an alternative to TD, where it is assumed that an animal builds an 
explicit internal model of its environment during conditioning (Smith, Becker & 
Kapur 2005; Smith, Li, Becker & Kapur 2004; 2006). Their latest model extends TD 
to include action at the level of dopamine receptors (Smith Li, Becker & Kapur 2007), 
but here I focus on the model based approach. This body of research is particularly 
interesting to me as the area of interest bears important similarities to some of the work 
detailed in previous chapters: (i) we both have the long term goal of obtaining a better 
understanding of schizophrenia through dopamine dysfunction; (ii) both approaches, 
whether model based or model free, accept the importance of dopamine acting in the 
estimation of future reward and in the generation of a prediction error; (iii) expected 
future reward is interpreted in both models as ‘wanting’ and not ‘liking’ in accordance 
with an incentive salience approach; (iv) Smith and colleagues began with a model 
based account of dopamine function, but aspired to incorporate the benefits of TD into 
future models, while I have begun with a TD model free account of dopamine 
function, but now seek model based amendments in order to overcome the limitations 
of TD described above. 
 
In Section 7.1.1 I look at the earlier model of antipsychotic action in conditioned 
avoidance that distinguishes between the effects of dopamine manipulation on distal 
rather than proximal rewards (Smith et al. 2004). It is a model based account of the 
tonic function of dopamine in the expression of previously acquired behaviour, and 
does not attempt to model the phasic dopamine bursts associated with the learning 
process. Despite the difference in the modelling techniques, this model bears important 
similarities to the computational substrate for incentive salience by McClure, Daw & 
Montague (2003) detailed in Chapter 5 and I compare the different model free and 
model based accounts. A later model of both phasic and tonic dopamine neuron firing 
(Smith et al. 2006) is discussed in Section 7.1.2, which they claim offers a 
parsimonious distinction between phasic and tonic dopamine function and is again 
able to distinguish between the effects of dopamine manipulation (via antipsychotic 
action) on distal rather than proximal rewards in animal studies. In Section 7.1.3 I 
look at how this model based account can relate to understanding psychosis and 
schizophrenia. 
 
 
7.1.1 A Model Based Account of Antipsychotic Action in 
Conditioned Avoidance (Smith, Li, Becker & Kapur 2004) 
Like McClure et al. (2003), detailed in Chapter 5, Smith et al. (2004) modelled the 
effects of antipsychotic drugs on behaviour, but this time using a model based 
account of reinforcement learning on a conditioned avoidance response, or a negative 
reinforcer (Chapter 4.1.1), rather than using model free reinforcement learning on a 
positive reinforcer.  
 
The model could account for two important features seen in animal experiments: (i) 
the effects of dopamine manipulation on the expression of behaviours independently 
of their acquisition; and (ii) it could distinguish between the effects of dopamine 
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manipulation on distal rather than proximal rewards. Both of these effects are 
illustrated in an animal study by Cousins et al. (1996) where, after training, rats 
showed a preference for a larger, but obstructed reward (distal), over a smaller, 
unobstructed reward (proximal). Following dopamine depletion a switch in 
preference was seen from the larger to the smaller reward. This shift from a distal to 
a proximal reward showed the effect of dopamine depletion on previously learned 
behaviour independently of the acquisition process. 
 
The Task 
The scenario modelled was an animal experiment by Maffii (1959) of a rat in a two-
compartment shuttle box that had learned to associate a prior neutral CS, an auditory 
tone, with an aversive unconditioned stimulus or outcome, an electric foot-shock. 
The rat learned to avoid the shock by moving away from the area as soon as the CS 
was presented, rather than just exhibiting escape behaviour when the shock was 
administered. Furthermore, it was shown that, with time, the rat learned to avoid the 
foot-shock area as soon as it entered the cage, before the CS signal, demonstrating 
second order conditioning, where the cage itself became the CS.  
 
A switch in behaviour was seen following dopamine receptor blockade, when the rats 
became less likely to avoid the shock with increasing levels of antipsychotics, and 
more likely to escape in the presence of the shock itself. This was in accordance with 
the hypothesis that blockade of the dopamine D2 receptors by antipsychotics reduced 
the incentive salience and thus the motivation to escape by avoiding (wanting/not 
wanting) (Berridge & Robinson 1998), without affecting the actual escape 
(liking/disliking). 
 
Smith and colleagues demonstrated the accepted finding that low, non-cataleptic 
doses of antipsychotic drugs affected an animal’s ability to perform the avoidance 
response (distal negative reward), but had no effect on the escape response (proximal 
negative reward). The model also accounted for the fact that lower doses of 
antipsychotics were needed to disrupt secondary avoidance conditioning (being put in 
the cage) than for primary avoidance conditioning (the auditory tone), and was able to 
predict dose-dependent effects of antipsychotic drugs on avoidance and escape 
response latencies seen in novel latency data.  
 
The Model 
This model was of the expression of previously acquired behaviour, associated with 
tonic dopamine function and, unlike McClure et al. (2003); no attempt was made to 
model the acquisition process associated with the phasic dopamine function. It was 
assumed that the animal had already formed an explicit internal model of its 
environment through trial and error interactions with the task and that dopamine had 
more of a gating role (Chapter 3.2) for salient information.  
 
The model consisted of states, rewards and transitions, and an early version had five 
states for the animal to occupy, including a state for hearing the tone (CS), a state for 
receiving the shock (US), a safety state (the termination state), and two wait states, 
where the animal did nothing but remain in the same place, representing the delay 
between the onset of the CS and the shock (Figure 7.1). The negative reward, of -1 
representing the shock was delivered in the shock state, and a reward of 0 at the other 
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4 states. Transitions, modulated/gated by dopamine, represented the consequences of 
taking each action.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Representation of the internal model of the environment, built up by trial and error 
interaction. The circles are the possible states, and the arrows denote the consequences of taking an 
action in each state. Each state contains a value for reward (-1 represents the punishment/negative 
reward in the shock state). The arrows represent the transition function, which is modulated (or gated) 
by dopamine (see vertical bars). The wait states are internal states for which there is no external cue, 
and allow the model to represent the delay between CS onset and the shock. The safety state is a 
terminal state at which the trial is ended. Taken from Smith et al. (2004). 
  
 
Attributing values to each state enabled the consequences of taking an action to be 
calculated by hypothetically playing through the options available to the animal. For 
example, for an animal at the CS state, the model could be used to motivate 
behaviour by giving an activation of 1 on presentation of the CS and generating the 
expected future reward of the two options available: (i) run to safety or (ii) do 
nothing. If the rat chooses (i) to run to safety, it is necessary to propagate the 
activation value to the safety state and this value is directly proportional to the 
strength of the transition connection between the CS and safety state, which is 
modulated by dopamine. This would result in a future reward of 0, the result of 
arriving in the terminal safety state. If the rat chooses (ii) to do nothing, it is 
necessary to propagate the activation value through the two wait states pending the 
shock, each also modulated by dopamine. This would result in a future reward of -1, 
the result of waiting for the shock with a negative reward of -1. It is assumed that 
animals are motivated towards reward and away from punishment, and so the option 
to run will be selected over the option to wait. Following an action the change in the 
animal’s environment will be reflected in the model by a change in state.  
 
The model was later adapted to a more generalised form so that choices could be 
made in a similar way from any state in the model by assuming a distinct delay state 
for each second of time between the CS and US and adding probability to the value 
of acting in a state. In order to interpret expected future reward as salient, the CS was 
ignored with increasing probability as the expected future reward associated with 
doing nothing became closer to zero. This resulted in activation only to the shock and 
not in the internal delay states, thus avoiding keeping track of non-salient stimuli. 
 
The effect of antipsychotics, or dopamine blockade, on the choices made was 
modelled by assigning values to the transition connections, simulating the 
modulating action of dopamine (D). If D = 1, there are adequate levels of dopamine 
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available for an optimal assessment to be made. If D = 0, there is no dopamine 
available due to a complete blockade of dopamine receptors, while dopamine values 
between 0 and 1 constitute partial dopamine blockade. The activations of the safety 
and wait states are affected by the activation of the CS multiplied by the probability 
of safety or doing nothing respectively, multiplied by the global availability of 
dopamine. If D = 1, the choice between safety and shock is 0 or -1 and so the choice 
is obvious and therefore the animal is more likely to make a good decision to avoid 
the shock. However, with reduced levels of dopamine, for example D = ½, the choice 
for safety is still 0 (½ × 0), but the choice for shock propagated back through two 
wait states becomes -1/8 (-1 × ½, then -1 × ¼), resulting in a less obvious decision 
and an increased probability of making the bad decision to wait, resulting in a shock. 
If dopamine is depleted, D = 0, the rat will never jump onto the pole to avoid the 
shock (-1 × 0 = 0) and (0 × 0 = 0). 
 
Results 
Using the ideas of dopamine as a measure of incentive salience, it was possible to 
model the qualitative findings of Maffii (1959) that lower doses of antipsychotic 
drugs were needed to disrupt secondary avoidance (being put in the box, the 
environmental cue) than primary avoidance (the auditory stimulus) and in the same 
way lower doses of antipsychotics were needed to disrupt primary avoidance than 
escape only (the shock state) (Figure 7.2). Results are provided for primary, 
secondary and escape responses following increasing doses of the antipsychotic 
(chlorpromazine), as a percentage of the number of responses made without the drug.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 (Left) Number of secondary avoidance, primary avoidance and escape responses under 
increasing doses of antipsychotic as a percentage of the number of responses without the drug from 
Maffii (1959) (Right) Simulated results for increasing values of D (0 to 1). Taken from Smith et al. 
(2004). 
Simulated Dose 
Dopamine BlockadeÆ 
Oral Dose of Chlorpromazine in mg/Kg 
 
The authors stressed that it is the qualitative and not the quantitative performance of 
the model that is of interest as the model does not attempt to address the underlying 
neurochemical processes. This effect was modelled in the internal representation by 
the respective distance of each CS from the shock, and achieved by implementing a 
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larger number of internal delay states, or distance, between the secondary avoidance 
and the shock state, than for the primary avoidance and the shock state. In this 
manner, dopamine blockade, affected the previous allocation of incentive salience to 
the conditioned stimuli, having the greatest effect on stimuli more distal to reward 
(negative reward/punishment). Furthermore, the model was able to predict both the 
increase in latency, and the change in pattern of both avoidance and escape (not 
shown). These predictions were validated by animal models which confirmed the 
dose-dependant effect of four different antipsychotics, haloperidol, chlorpromazine, 
risperidone and clozapine, on peak latency to avoid (want) without affecting escape 
(dislike). 
 
Conclusions 
McClure et al. (2003) and Smith et al. (2004) are two different approaches, one 
model free and the other model based, that used the concepts of incentive salience and 
expected future reward in a computational model to unite psychological and 
pharmacological theories, grounding those psychological theories by providing 
testable predictions which were validated by animal experiments. McClure and 
colleagues modelled the acquisition process in reinforcement learning and linked the 
ideas of incentive salience to reward prediction via TD learning; while Smith and 
colleagues modelled the generation of expected reward on the expression of 
previously acquired behaviours, independently of the acquisition process, linking 
incentive salience to reward prediction via a gating role for dopamine.  
 
In Chapter 5.2.3 I referred to a hypothesis by Ikemoto and Panksepp (1999) that 
suggested that dopamine may underlie appetitive approach behaviours but not 
consummatory behaviours such as licking. This theory is in line with other areas of 
research that suggest that dopamine in the nucleus accumbens/ventral striatum is 
important for responding to conditioned stimuli and stimuli that are spatially and 
temporally distant (distal) rather than proximal to the organism (e.g., Daw, Niv & 
Dayan 2005; Maffii 1959; Salamone, Cousins & Snyder 1997; Smith, Becker & 
Kapur 2005; Yin, Knowlton & Balleine 2004). As already mentioned, these results 
pose a problem for the basic TD framework, which does not distinguish between the 
two motor actions of running and licking. However, as discussed above, the model 
based account was able to distinguish between two different conditioned stimuli: the 
distal environmental box cue and the proximal auditory stimulus cue. Therefore, this 
model based account of tonic dopamine function has been able to demonstrate: (i) 
that dopamine manipulation can affect the expression of behaviours independently of 
their acquisition; and (ii) sensitivity to the relationship between the CS action and the 
US outcome, as it can distinguish between the effects of dopamine manipulation on 
distal rather than proximal rewards. 
 
It is clear that both methods of modelling have something to offer: the model free 
gives an account of the role of dopamine in learning, but is insensitive to the 
difference between proximal and distal rewards; while this model based account is 
sensitive to the relationship between the CS and US, but does not model the learning 
process. Smith et al. conclude that both prediction error hypothesis and the gating 
role of dopamine have a role to play in the future as a combination of the two 
approaches may provide a wider range of behavioural data for both acquisition and 
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expression. In the next section I look at a later model based account by Smith and 
colleagues that also addresses the learning process. 
 
 
7.1.2 A Model Based Account of Phasic and Tonic Dopamine 
Function (Smith, Li, Becker & Kapur 2006) 
Smith et al. (2006) modelled both the phasic dopamine prediction error signal which 
drives learning and the tonic background firing rate of dopamine, which could account 
for the expression of previously acquired behaviours (Parkinson et al. 2002). They 
demonstrated that their model based adaptation could account for dopamine neuron 
firing patterns and associative learning paradigms such as latent inhibition, Kamin 
blocking and overshadowing, as easily as TD. However, this model had the added 
advantages of offering a parsimonious distinction between phasic and tonic dopamine 
function as well as being able to distinguish between the effects of dopamine 
manipulation (via antipsychotic action) on distal rather than proximal rewards in 
animal studies. 
 
Modelling Phasic Dopamine in Reward Learning 
This model based approach assumed that an internal model of the environment was 
created and stored during learning. This involved learning the transitions between 
states and used different representational techniques to TD. Instead of storing values 
of states like TD the model based account stored: (i) the rewarding impact of stimuli, 
the estimated future reward, R; and (ii) transition connections between states, T. 
Together these stored values were used for a systematic search of the environment to 
calculate future rewards (the calculated return) to a pre-specified depth, υ. This 
approach requires a greater computational capacity than the computationally efficient 
TD, which only stores the values of states. The reward values associated with each 
state, R, and the estimate of future reward were speculated to be represented in the 
orbitofrontal cortex and the basolateral amygdala.  
 
Another benefit of this model over TD is that it introduced the concept of surprise, 
which is the degree to which a current state is unpredicted. The dopamine phasic 
response was governed by both surprise and significance (the calculated return), where 
significance corresponded to the estimated future reward and was interpreted as 
corresponding to the degree to which an animal is motivated to achieve reward (avoid 
punishment) based on the expected future reward of a CS. A phasic response was 
given only if both surprise and significance were recorded, that is, if the currently 
active state was not predicted by the previously active state AND if the currently active 
state was rewarding or predicted reward: 
 
DAphasic  =  Surprise × Significance 
 
The resulting prediction error was similar to TD (although TD only operates on 
significance). In the model based approach, future reward is dynamically recalculated 
each time a CS is encountered, giving the motivational value of the CS based on the 
current motivational state of the system, but in TD this value has already been learned 
and is stored, ready for immediate use, so TD depends on the motivational state during 
learning only. As already mentioned, TD is unable to distinguish between different 
reward types of a similar value as no representations of the underlying cause/effect of 
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the CS-stimulus relationship are stored. This is not a problem for a model based 
account, which looks at the action-outcome relationships that are recalculated on every 
stimulus presentation and will find a different US surprising. Furthermore, as the 
model based account separates reward from outcome, it can distinguish between 
different aversive and appetitive CS. For example, if a CS precedes both a negative 
and a positive reward, then the model based approach will predict the phasic response, 
while the positive and negative predictions will cancel each other out in a model free 
TD account. 
 
Modelling Tonic Dopamine in Motivational Processes 
In order to model the tonic role of dopamine Smith and colleagues incorporated an 
aspect of their earlier model (Smith et al. 2004) into the look-ahead process described 
above, where the previously acquired transition strengths were multiplied by a value 
representing tonic dopamine of between zero and one. If Dtonic = 1, there were 
adequate levels of dopamine available for the look-ahead process to proceed. 
However, lower levels of tonic dopamine will affect each new cycle of the look-
ahead process, and will temporarily reduce the future reward or incentive salience of 
a CS, as generation of future reward is dependent on the activity of the states while 
looking-ahead. Here, tonic dopamine in the ventral striatum is acting as an online 
discount factor and reductions in tonic dopamine will have a greater effect on distal 
than for proximal rewards, in a similar manner to that demonstrated in Smith et al. 
(2004). 
 
Conclusions 
This model based account successfully incorporated both phasic and tonic roles of 
dopamine into one model of reward learning and incentive salience. As with the 
earlier model, this model was able to distinguish between the effects of dopamine 
manipulation on distal rather than proximal rewards, but this updated version had the 
advantage of being able to model the learning process as well as modulating the 
expression of behaviours independently of their acquisition. However, the model did 
not address action selection or model dopamine neuron firing below baseline. 
 
It should be noted that there are weaknesses associated with using a model based 
account that occur: (a) as a result of the large search space that arises when 
associating specific actions with specific outcomes, and (b) from the methods used of 
reducing the search space to manageable levels, which give rise to errors as a result 
of the short cuts taken to prevent a combinatorial explosion (Daw et al. 2005). The 
trade-off between using model free and model based accounts is discussed in Section 
7.4.  
 
As well as addressing some of the limitations of TD, the model based accounts of 
Smith and colleagues, described above, have been motivated by the goal of a better 
understanding of schizophrenia, and I develop these arguments further in the next 
section. 
 
 
7.1.3 How Does This Relate to Schizophrenia? 
In view of the correlation between the ability of antipsychotic drugs to block dopamine 
D2 receptors and the effectiveness of those drugs in the treatment of psychosis, it is 
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posited that psychosis results from a dysregulation of the dopamine mesolimbic system 
(Chapter 2.1.3). Conditioned avoidance is a preclinical drug test for antipsychotic 
action and low doses of antipsychotic drugs are known to disrupt avoidance behaviour 
leaving the escape response intact (e.g., Alder & Clink 1957; Cook & Weidley 1957), 
but the avoidance response is restored once the drug wears off (Smith et al. 2004). As 
the drug has an immediate effect on behaviour, the effects are not thought to be due to 
unlearning, which would take time; so it is believed that blockade of the dopamine D2 
receptor is the neurochemical link between conditioned avoidance in rats and 
antipsychotic action in people (Wadenberg et al. 2001; Smith et al. 2004).  
 
With the primary aim of understanding the effect of dopamine dysfunction in 
schizophrenia and, in particular psychosis, Smith et al. (2004; 2006) modelled the 
functional significance of the striatal D2 receptor on behaviour in a conditioned 
avoidance paradigm. Unlike TD, their model based account was able to distinguish 
between the effects of dopamine manipulation on distal rather than proximal rewards 
and identified a tonic role for dopamine in the generation of reward, which was 
independent of the acquisition process.  
 
In their later model of both tonic and phasic dopamine function, Smith et al. (2006) 
claimed that their implementation provided a formal interpretation of a process where 
aberrant phasic dopamine responses could label both internal and external events 
inappropriately as being surprising or significant, leading to delusions and possibly 
hallucinations associated with thought disturbance in schizophrenia, outlined in a 
framework by Kapur (2003) and detailed in Chapter 4.4.1. A clearer understanding of 
the role of dopamine and the best methods of modelling those functions will help in the 
quest for the understanding of schizophrenia and they posit that an aberrant internal 
model of the environment, such as that constructed in a model based approach, may 
provide some of the answers. The action of antipsychotic drugs may protect against the 
formation of the aberrant internal representations by both attenuating aberrant 
incentive salience via phasic dopamine signals, and by dampening the motivational 
efficacy of existing associations via tonic dopamine function (Smith et al. 2006). 
 
 
7.2 The Primary Value and Learned Value Pavlovian 
Learning Algorithm (O’Reilly, Frank, Hazy & Watz 2007) 
 
Randall O’Reilly and colleagues have abandoned the TD algorithm in favour of a 
primary value learned value (PVLV) Pavlovian learning algorithm to understand the 
function of dopamine in reward prediction (O’Reilly, Frank, Hazy & Watz 2007), 
where dopamine signals reward association and not reward prediction. The model 
contains two separate systems, which are further subdivided into excitatory and 
inhibitory subcomponents: (i) the PV is engaged by primary reward and learns to 
expect an unconditioned stimulus, thereby inhibiting the associated dopamine phasic 
burst at the time of receipt of the reward, over time; (ii) while the LV learns about 
stimuli that are reliably associated with primary rewards and drives the dopamine 
phasic burst when the conditioned stimulus is presented. The authors claim that these 
two systems provide a more direct mapping onto the underlying neural substrates than 
TD. In addition these two systems are more robust to variability in the environment as 
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they do not rely on the prediction chains used by TD over successive time-steps, which 
they claim break down when the CS-US relationship is unreliable, such as in the 
complicated 1-2-AX working memory task, which involves maintaining both sub-
goals and higher order goals. This promising avenue of research is in its infancy and a 
considerable amount of work remains to be done before it can compete with TD as the 
most popular computational account of conditioning and dopamine firing.  
 
One of the long-term aims of O’Reilly and colleagues is to model the complex 
interactions between the basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex, where actively maintained 
representations in the prefrontal cortex are dynamically updated/gated by the basal 
ganglia (Chapter 3.2). In an attempt to deconstruct the homunculus and understand the 
mechanisms of control between the two systems, the PVLV algorithm has been 
applied in their Prefrontal Cortex, Basal Ganglia Working Memory (PBWM) model 
(Hazy, Frank & O’Reilly 2006; 2007; O’Reilly & Frank 2006) and has been successful 
in performing a number of tasks including Stroop, AX-CPT, 1-2-AX and the 
Wisconsin Card Test.  
 
The PVLV algorithm was implemented in the PDP++ software package using the 
sophisticated Leabra framework (O’Reilly and Munakata, 2000). An investigation of 
this complex system would be extremely time consuming and is beyond the scope of 
this thesis; although a simplified version of PDP++ was used in Chapter 3.1 for the 
simulation of the speech perception network. However, I will refer briefly again to the 
attempts by O’Reilly and colleagues to deconstruct the homunculus in Chapter 8. In 
the next section I look at an approach to reinforcement learning that combines the 
benefits of model free and model based learning. 
 
 
7.3 Differentiating Between Pavlovian and Instrumental 
Conditioning: Advantage Learning (Dayan & Balleine 
2002) 
 
Dayan and Balleine (2002) evaluated the actor-critic model of the dopamine system 
and claimed that the basic actor-critic model failed to take into account a large 
amount of data from psychological and neurobiological data on motivation. They 
referred to the many psychological differences between Pavlovian and instrumental 
conditioning and suggested a model with separate systems for Pavlovian and 
instrumental learning, with different neural underpinnings. The psychological 
argument for the differences between the two systems is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but for a full review see Berridge and Robinson (1998) and Dickinson and 
Balleine (2002). Dayan and Balleine claimed that action choice and motivation 
separated the two systems: with the Pavlovian system being rigid in action selection, 
but flexible in response to motivation; and the instrumental system giving greater 
flexibility in action selection, but lacking sensitivity to motivational state. They 
equated the hard-wired, stimulus substitution-sensitive route of Pavlovian motivation 
for the control of habits, as acting in line with the classic TD prediction error, via the 
shell and possibly the core of the nucleus accumbens; while they considered that the 
plastic motivational route operated via the amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex. 
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The simple actor-critic is insensitive to motivational state and Dayan and Balleine 
suggested that Q learning (Watkins & Dayan 1992), a variant of TD, can allow for 
choosing different actions, from a selection of actions, according to the current 
motivational state. Their model considered future reward by following a policy, in a 
similar manner to the actor-critic, but instead evaluated actions according to their 
advantages (a quantity of the difference between two long term rewards: a Q value 
relating to the action; and a value averaging over all actions). Each state had a Q 
value and the action chosen was the best action with the highest Q value. This was an 
effective way of making an appropriate action selection from a choice of possible 
actions according to the relevant motivational state, as the better actions were chosen 
as learning progressed. Advantage learning contains the benefits of model free 
learning, but has the added bonus of representing the advantages of moving to a 
state, in a model based manner. This method of learning offers a solution for the 
transition from the selection between many appropriate actions available during 
instrumental conditioning to the single action taken during Pavlovian conditioning.  
 
Advantage learning will not be developed further in this thesis, but in the next 
section I look at a later model by Daw, Niv and Dayan (2005) that continues the 
argument for a dual system approach and demonstrates the advantages of using a 
model that combines both model free and model based reinforcement learning. 
 
 
7.4 Uncertainty-Based Competition between Prefrontal and 
Dorsolateral Striatal Systems for Behavioral Control (Daw, 
Niv & Dayan 2005) 
 
Daw, Niv and Dayan (2005) referred to the competition between multiple systems 
for behavioural choice in the brain, and the problem of arbitration between the 
systems when they disagreed. They suggested a model of dual action choice, where 
the systems operated separately and in parallel, governed by a Bayesian principal of 
arbitration. 
 
In order to illustrate the problem they identified two systems: (i) a habit system 
including reflex responses, associated with the dorsolateral striatum and its afferents, 
and (ii) a system for goal directed (reflective or cognitive action planning) actions, 
associated with prefrontal regions. The assumed dissociation between the two 
systems of control was based on electrophysiological (Jog, et al. 1999; Holland & 
Gallagher 2004; Pasupathy & Miller 2005), fMRI (McClure et al. 2004; O’Doherty 
et al. 2004) and lesion studies, where the values of rewards are re-valuated 
(unexpectedly changed during conditioning), and have a different effect on each 
system (Balleine & Dickinson 1998; Killcross & Coutureau 2003; Yin, Knowlton & 
Balleine 2004).  
 
 
7.4.1 The Trade Off Between Model Free and Model Based 
Reinforcement Learning  
In order to model the two systems, Daw and colleagues claimed that model free 
reinforcement learning, such as TD, lends itself to inflexible stimulus-response 
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actions that take place quickly in a habitual manner, but require extensive relearning; 
while a model based account equates better with flexible, often one shot, goal 
directed actions, which require little relearning. They interpreted a model free TD 
controller and a model based controller, using a tree-search algorithm, as two 
opposite extremes in a trade-off between computational efficiency and the 
statistically efficient use of experience; although as already mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, there is a less clear-cut distinction between the two in 
reality. The benefits and weaknesses of the model free habit system and the model 
based system for goal directed actions are summarised in Table 7.1. The model free 
system is computationally simple (Chapter 4.3), yet suffers from inflexibility. 
Conversely, the model based system, can be expensive in terms of memory and time, 
but is more flexible.  
 
Daw and colleagues claimed that accuracy was the key to arbitration between the two 
systems, which will have different benefits and weaknesses in different situations. 
The system that dominates will depend on inexperience and task complexity versus 
search depth. The Model based system should dominate early in training, and during 
complex tasks, where data is scarce and stored TD values are unreliable; but model 
free systems should dominate during a well learned task, when habits prevail for 
actions more distal from reward. Here, the deeper search is costly and more error 
prone due to the necessity of pruning and exploring a limited set of paths in an effort 
to cut down on the extensive search space in a tree search.  
 
Table 7.1 contrasting the benefits and weaknesses of model free and model based learning 
 
Model Free Habit System Model Based System for Goal Directed 
Actions 
-Computational simplicity 
   
-Greater computational load, but utilises 
  flexible, statistical use of experience 
 
-No cognitive map/search tree 
 
-Builds cognitive map/search tree 
-Quick response 
 
-Expensive timewise 
 
-Cannot distinguish between different 
 motivational outcomes 
 
-Can distinguish between different 
 motivational outcomes 
 
-Inflexible and insensitive to 
 relearning 
-Flexible and sensitive to relearning 
 
-Error prone when learning and during  
 complex tasks 
-Error prone during a well learnt task 
 that relies on habit due to necessary 
 approximations 
 
 
7.4.2 Modelling an Outcome Devaluation Task  
Daw and colleagues claimed that outcome re-valuation, where unexpected shifts in 
circumstances occurred that required immediate changes in behaviour, was the key to 
understanding the workings and neural underpinnings of each system. A typical re-
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valuation experiment (Figure 7.3) involves the following three stages: (i) hungry rats 
are trained to receive food as a reward following a sequence of actions, e.g., a lever 
press (distal action) followed by entry into a food magazine (proximal action); (ii) 
the value of the food is reduced by either pre-feeding or pairing with illness; (iii) the 
rats are reintroduced to the food, without the outcomes in (i) or (ii).  
 
It was predicted that model based and model free systems would have different 
devaluation profiles. The model based habit system of caching values is not 
immediately sensitive to the specific outcome information associated with the 
devaluation, and it will take time for a change in behaviour to occur following 
relearning of the values, while the flexible model based system that is outcome 
sensitive and goal directed, will show an immediate behavioural change.  
 
Figure 7.3 Task representations for a typical animal devaluation experiment used by (a) a model based 
tree-search system and (b) a model free caching system. Taken from Daw et al. (2005). 
 
 
Furthermore, moderately trained lever presses are sensitive to outcome devaluation, 
while extensively trained lever presses are not, suggesting a transition from model 
based to model free systems with extensive training, i.e., after a habit has been 
formed. This transfer is affected by (a) the complexity of action choice, where in 
complex tasks extensively trained actions remain sensitive to outcome devaluation, 
and (b) the proximity of the action to reward, where actions closer to the reward are 
more sensitive to devaluation. 
 
In their framework Daw and colleagues hypothesised that the brain might estimate 
the accuracy for arbitration between the model free and model based systems by 
tracking the relative uncertainty or expected inaccuracy of predictions made by each 
of the two separate systems. They implemented a model with both control systems: a 
TD value-caching system; and a tree-search system capable of chaining together 
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short-tern predictions about the immediate consequences of each action in a 
sequence. Each system produced different and differentially accurate estimates of the 
value function, and was capable of estimating the uncertainty of its action 
predictions. They suggested a Bayesian principle of arbitration according to 
uncertainty, so that the system dominant at any one time was the one giving the 
highest level of accuracy.  
 
As well as operating in parallel, it has also been shown that the two systems are able 
to operate separately. Chemical manipulations in lesion studies have revealed that the 
transfer to a model free caching system can be blocked by dopamine lesions or 
depletions to the striatum (Yin et al. 2004); while devaluation sensitivity, associated 
with model based systems, is eliminated by lesioning a wide range of structures, 
including prefrontal-associated regions of dorsomedial striatum (Yin et al. 2005) and 
orbitofrontal cortex (Izquierdo, Suda & Murray 2004). 
 
 
7.4.3 Results 
Daw and colleagues simulated the action choices in the typical animal devaluation 
experiments described above (Figure 7.3) and demonstrated the different devaluation 
profiles expected for (i) the estimated uncertainties for each system and (ii) the value 
predictions (Figure 7.4). As predicted, the model based system dominated at all times 
during early learning as it always had the advantage of experience (however small) 
of actions and outcomes. As predicted, the only time the model free cache system 
had less uncertainty than the model based system, was for the distal lever press 
action, where the model based system required deeper iteration into the search tree. 
This is reflected in the top graph and the bar chart (gold bars) of Figure 7.4a, where 
model free caching dominated during the later runs and the distal lever press was less 
sensitive to devaluation than the proximal action of magazine entry.  
 
The model also introduced increased task complexity by simulating a task with two 
actions for two outcomes (not shown) and this had the effect of removing the 
dominance of the model free caching system seen with distal reward over time. 
Instead both the uncertainty advantage in early training of the model based tree 
system and sensitivity for devaluation were retained, even for the distal lever press. 
The results of all the simulations confirmed their predictions that the transfer from 
model based to model free learning, seen during extensive or over-training, is 
affected not only by the proximity of action to reward, but also by task complexity. 
Thus, in support of their hypothesis that each of the two systems in the brain 
dominates under the conditions in which they are most accurate, the authors claimed 
that their simulations had reproduced patterns of behaviour seen in animal 
devaluation experiments, which could be explained by the different devaluation 
profiles of model based and model free reinforcement learning systems. 
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Figure 7.4 Simulation of the dual-controller reinforcement learning model in the task of Figure 7.3 (a) 
distal action (lever press); (b) proximal action (magazine entry). The top two graphs show 
uncertainties in the value estimates for different actions according to model free (blue line) and model 
based (gold line), as a function of the number of rewarded training trials. The middle two graphs show 
the value estimates; diamonds indicate the value estimates that would result after reward devaluation 
at various stages of training. Beneath the graphs are bar plots comparing the probability of choosing 
actions before and after their consequences were devalued, normalized to the non-devalued level. Bar 
colour denotes which system controlled the action in a majority of the 250 runs. All data reported are 
means over 250 runs; error bars are negligible. Taken from Daw et al. (2005). 
 
 
7.4.4 Conclusions 
Daw and colleagues successfully modelled controller competition between two 
systems simulating results from animal devaluation experiments. One of the basic 
assumptions of the model by Daw et al., following on from the results of lesion 
studies, was that the model free and model based controllers operated separately via 
the dorsolateral striatum and the prefrontal cortex, respectively. However, the authors 
pointed out that as both the striatum and cortex are innervated by dopamine and the 
two are interconnected via cortical/subcortical circuit loops in the brain (Chapter 
4.3), a better interpretation could be that the two systems are associated with 
interacting dorsolateral and dorsomedial cortostriatal loops, respectively. This would 
involve additional interactions between model based and model free systems. 
Furthermore, there is limited evidence for the neural substrate of the uncertainty-
based arbitration, but the anterior cingulated cortex, associated with monitoring and 
the resolution of response error and conflict is a possible candidate.  
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This was a symbolic solution, and no attempt was made to address how this may be 
implemented in the neurons in the brain. In Chapter 8 I present my connectionist 
approach to modelling the arbitration between two systems of control, which 
attempts to capture the distributed nature of the brain (Chapter 2.3.1). 
 
Another limitation of the model is that Daw et al. were unable to account for the role 
of dopamine in the model based control system. The model based account of the role 
of tonic and phasic dopamine function by Smith et al. (2006), discussed in Section 
7.1, has addressed this issue by modelling a tonic role for dopamine in the generation 
of reward, on the expression of previously acquired behaviour, independent of the 
acquisition process.  
 
In the next section I describe a framework by Yin and Knowlton (2006) for the role 
of the basal ganglia in habit formation. Unlike the work in the previous sections, it is 
not a model addressing the limitations of a model free TD approach; however, it does 
distinguish between the goal directed actions and habit response systems referred to 
by Daw and colleagues, and elaborates further on the neural underpinnings of a dual 
system approach. 
 
 
7.5 A Framework for the Role of the Basal Ganglia in Habit 
Formation (Yin & Knowlton 2006) 
 
Cortico-basal ganglia networks are believed to be the fundamental basis of cerebral 
organisation and Yin & Knowlton (2006) posit three networks as fundamental units 
of function: (i) an associative network: for instrumental conditioning, including 
working memory and goal directed (GD), rewarded actions; (ii) a sensorimotor 
network: a stimulus-response (SR) system, also for instrumental conditioning, but 
this time for habit formation; and (iii) a limbic network, involved in appetitive 
Pavlovian learning. 
 
The associative and sensorimotor networks differentiate between two different types 
of instrumental conditioning in a similar manner to Daw et al. (2005) (Section 7.4); 
the former for GD actions, which are explicit and controlled by consequences (which 
corresponds to the GD system of Daw et al.); and the latter for implicit habit 
formation, which is a simple SR controlled by antecedent stimuli and not guided by 
outcome expectancy (which corresponds to the habit system of Daw et al). In this 
framework Yin and Knowlton posit that the GD system operates via the 
hippocampus and medial temporal lobe, results from minimal training, can be 
applied to new situations, and can even result from a single trial. Alternatively, the 
inflexible SR system activates the dorsal striatum and results from overtraining.  
 
In addition to the distinction between GD actions and SR habits, Yin and Knowlton 
present evidence that suggests that behavioural learning can be mapped onto distinct 
regions of the dorsal striatum. The dorsal striatum has long been associated with 
habit learning but some studies have revealed a functional dissociation between the 
dorsomedial striatum (DMS) and the dorsolateral striatum (DLS) (e.g. Devan & 
White 1999; Joel & Weiner 2000). The DMS/associative striatum/caudate appears to 
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be associated with GD actions, while the DLS/sensorimotor striatum/putamen 
involves SR habits. In addition, the DMS is associated with the formation of long-
term synaptic plasticity using D1 dopamine receptors; while the DLS uses D2 
dopamine receptors and is associated with long-term depression of synaptic 
plasticity.  
 
The roles of the PFC, the thalamus and the dopamine system must also be taken into 
account, and Yin and Knowlton place emphasis on the cortical/subcortical circuit 
loops, specifically the interactions between them (Joel & Weiner 2000) that are 
necessary for transforming actions into habits. The parallel circuit loop networks 
have strong recurrent properties and strong re-entrant projections where dopamine 
neurons project back to the same striatal zones that send them input enabling 
dopamine neurons to signal progressively earlier predictions of reinforcement, as 
seen in actor/critic architectures of temporal difference learning. However, as well as 
closed circuit network loops, there are open striatonigral projections within these 
loops to other nigral regions, which project to other striatal areas, resulting in 
transfers between the networks (Redgrave, Prescott & Gurney 1999). They posit a 
hierarchical organisation of the three networks where Pavlovian learning precedes 
instrumental learning, starting in the limbic network and spreading to the 
sensorimotor network via the associative network. 
 
Yin and Knowlton refer to the shift in behavioural control from GD actions to SR 
habits seen in animal devaluation experiments, described in the previous section and 
posit that during early learning, the GD system dominates using prefrontal and 
parietal association cortices, DMS, associative pallidum and mediodorsal/ventral 
thalamus. This system is not effector specific, that is, performance does not depend 
on the effector (for example, a hand) with which it is originally trained. However, 
when full learning has taken place, a shift is made to the SR system that is more 
effector-specific, involving sensorimotor cortices, DLS, motor pallidum and ventral 
thalamus. Yin and Knowlton explain that the degree of effector-specificity reflects 
the level of functional integration in the hierarchical organisation of cortico-basal 
ganglia networks, where the associative network, which is not effector-specific, has a 
higher level of functional integration, with a wider range of motor programmes 
available for selection in order to reach a goal. Alternatively the effector-specific 
sensorimotor network has a lower level of functional integration. This shift from one 
system to the other is the process modelled in the previous section by Daw et al. 
(2005). 
 
It should be noted that extensive damage to one of the networks could result in 
domination by the other. For example, Yin and Knowlton give an example where 
fMRI studies revealed that patients with Parkinson’s disease, who have difficulty 
with SR, due to depleted dopamine stores in the striatum, are able to compensate by 
using their declarative memory, dependent more on the medial temporal lobe 
(Moody, Booenheimer, Vanek & Knowlton 2004).  
 
Alternatively, positive symptoms in schizophrenia are believed to result from an 
imbalance between cortical and subcortical microcircuits leading to a dysfunction of 
the dopamine system (Carlsson et al. 2001; Abi-Dhargham 2004; Winterer & 
Weinberger 2004). The resulting imbalance may result from an insufficient inhibitory 
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brake system leading to either a hypostimulation in the cortex of D1 receptors and a 
hyperstimulation in the subcortex of D2 receptors (Abi-Dhargham, 2004), or a reduced 
prefrontal dopamine D1/D2 receptor activation ratio, in which D2 receptors dominate, 
which leads primarily to a lower cortical SNR. Normally D1 receptors dominate 
(Winterer & Weinberger, 2004), namely the associative network. In view of the 
framework, the latter example would imply that schizophrenics with D2 receptor 
domination would rely more on the stimulus response system, the sensorimotor 
network, rather than the association network associated with prefrontal cortex. 
 
 
7.6 Chapter Conclusions: Towards a Dual Systems 
Approach 
 
7.6.1 Chapter Conclusions 
In spite of the fact that model free TD reinforcement learning offers a very good 
account of the firing patterns of dopamine neurons (Chapters 5 and 6), it is clear that 
it offers an incomplete picture of the reinforcement learning account of action control 
in the brain for the following reasons: 
• The basic TD model is unable to distinguish between different rewards with a 
similar value that are preceded by an appropriate CS, and between the effects 
of dopamine manipulation on distal rather than proximal rewards (Section 
7.1).  
• TD can be brittle as the prediction chains used by TD over successive time-
steps break down when the CS-US relationship is unreliable (Section 7.2). 
• The simple actor-critic is insensitive to motivational state and fails to take 
into account some of the psychological differences between Pavlovian and 
instrumental conditioning (Section 7.3). 
• Any change in task will have to be relearned explicitly, which will take time. 
In reality, relearning often needs to take place quickly, so current TD models 
do not account for all types of learning (Section 7.4). 
 
Having identified some of the drawbacks of using TD as the only explanation for all 
the behaviours seen during conditioning, the research community is currently seeking 
alternative approaches to compliment and extend the paradigm to account for these 
factors. A model based approach can address some of the problems associated with 
TD, but carries its own limitations (Section 7.4). An alternative is to combine the 
benefits of both model free and model based approaches, which offer different 
benefits and weaknesses in the quest for an understanding of how learning and 
relearning occur in the brain (Section 7.4). 
 
In this chapter I have identified a number of models using algorithms that may be 
described loosely as being either model free or model based approaches. As 
previously mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, there is often a less clear cut 
distinction between them, and in reality they may be placed in a continuum between 
two extremes. The model of McClure et al. (2003) is the closest to being model free, 
although it does store a rudimentary model of the environment as a series of states 
and their associated values. The other models fall under the broad umbrella of being 
model based approaches, where tree search forms the most comprehensive model. 
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The model of Smith et al (2006) performs a tree search to a limited depth, Advantage 
(Dayan & Balleine 2002) and Q Learning (Watkins & Dayan 1992), loosely 
described in Sections 8.3 and 8.4, respectively,  have the least representations of the 
environment of the models discussed in this chapter.  
 
There is currently some debate in the literature over which algorithm better 
represents appetitive choice, which I touched upon in Chapter 6.6 (Morris et al. 
2006; Niv, Daw & Dayan 2006). While the results of Morris et al. favour the SARSA 
algorithms that assign a separate value to each possible behavioural choice in every 
state as a better alternative in decision-making than using an actor-critic algorithm, 
further work is needed to find an improved algorithm that will match the anatomical 
data relating to the dopamine and striatal systems as well as the actor-critic (Niv et 
al. 2006). In the meantime, I leave this debate and instead I develop an alternative 
model, which is capable of incorporating both model free and model based 
approaches. 
 
7.6.2 A Dual Systems Approach 
In this chapter I have detailed several lines of evidence that point toward two systems 
of control operating together, which are summarised in Table 7.2.   
 
Table 7.2. Studies detailed in this section offering a dual system approach. The different systems are 
listed (in bold), together with the possible associated neural substrate (in red). 
 
STUDY SYSTEM 1 SYSTEM 2 
Smith, Li, Becker & 
Kapur (2006) 
(Section 7.1) 
Phasic Dopamine for 
Learning 
Orbitofrontal Cortex, 
Basolateral Amygdala. 
OFCÆStriatalÆOFC Loop 
Tonic Dopamine for 
Acquired Behaviour 
Ventral Striatum (D2 
Receptors) 
O’Reilly & Frank (2006) 
Hazy et al (2006; 2007) – 
PBWM Model 
 (Section 7.2) 
 Prefrontal Cortex 
 (Using PVLV algorithm) 
Basal Ganglia 
 (Using PVLV algorithm) 
Dayan & Balleine (2002) 
(Section 7.3) 
Pavlovian Conditioning 
Nucleus Accumbens 
Instrumental 
Conditioning 
Amygdala and 
Orbitofrontal Cortex 
Daw, Niv & Dayan 
(2005) 
(Section 7.4) 
Habit Response and 
Model Free RL 
Dorsolateral Striatum, 
(Dorsolateral Cortostriatal 
Loop) 
Goal Directed Actions 
and 
Model Based RL 
Prefrontal Cortex, 
(Dorsomedial Cortostriatal 
Loop) 
Yin & Knowlton (2006) 
(Section 7.5) 
Habit Responses 
(Sensorimotor Network) 
Dorsolateral Striatum  
Goal Directed Actions 
(Associative Network) 
Hippocampus, Medial 
Temporal Lobe, 
Dorsomedial Striatum  
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In Section 7.1 I described how Smith et al. (2006) modelled both phasic dopamine in 
the learning process, and tonic dopamine in the expression of previously acquired 
behaviour; and in Section 7.2 I introduced the PVLV algorithm by O’Reilly et al. 
(2007), where the PV system controls performance and learning during primary 
rewards and the LV system learns about conditioned stimuli. I explained how Dayan 
and Balleine (2002) distinguished between modelling Pavlovian and instrumental 
conditioning in Section 7.3, and In Sections 7.4 and 7.5, I described accounts of the 
distinction between two different networks for goal directed actions and stimulus 
response habits by Daw et al. (2005) and Yin and Knowlton (2006). 
 
In Chapter 8 I develop a connectionist model with dual weights which is capable 
potentially of implementing a dual system of control, without the need for an arbiter 
or a homunculus. It is important to note that while the studies in Table 7.2 all posit 
dual systems, they are not necessarily referring to the same systems; although there 
would appear to be considerable overlap between the systems of Daw et al. and Yin 
and Knowlton, who both refer to habit responses and goal directed actions, with 
similar neural underpinnings. It is not the system being modelled that is of prime 
importance, but the fact that the connectionist model can implement a dual system of 
control. 
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Chapter 8 
 
A Connectionist Model of Dual System Control 
 
 
In Chapter 7 I described the limitations of using model free TD to account for a 
reinforcement learning paradigm of action control in the brain, and referred to 
several lines of evidence that pointed to the concept of a dual system of control. In 
this chapter I develop a connectionist model with dual weights which is potentially 
capable of implementing two separate systems of control, without the need for an 
arbiter or homunculus. However, as already mentioned, it is important to note that 
while the studies discussed in Chapter 7 all posit dual systems; they are not 
necessarily referring to the same two systems (Table 7.2). With regard to the 
modelling in this chapter, it is not the system being modelled that is of prime 
importance, but the fact that a connectionist model can implement a dual system of 
control. However, I use the distinction between different networks for goal directed 
actions and stimulus response habits (Yin and Knowlton 2006) that can be modelled 
effectively using model based and model free learning, respectively (Daw et al. 
2005) discussed in Chapter 7, Sections 7.5 and 7.4, respectively, to illustrate the 
workings of the model. 
 
In this chapter I return to the connectionist approach developed in Chapter 3 to 
address the problem of arbitration between two systems of control. The benefits of 
connectionism in addressing biological systems were addressed in Chapter 2 and 
arise from the biologically inspired architecture which distributes knowledge across 
many connections between different layers of neurons. Connectionist models possess 
some of the advantages of the human brain, namely:  
• They are distributed in nature and process information in parallel. 
• They have the ability to learn from experience. 
• They are able to generalise to new situations by applying information from 
past experience. 
• They are fault tolerant and therefore resistant to damage.  
 
Before introducing the model, I discuss in Section 8.1 a fundamental question to be 
addressed by any model incorporating two or more systems of control: the problem 
of arbitration between the different systems. In Section 8.2 I describe the artificial 
neural network model (ANN) by Hinton and Plaut (1987) that inspired the current 
model, originally designed to address the problem of catastrophic forgetting in 
connectionist models. An alternative use for this model is developed in Section 8.3, 
where my aim is to describe how a modified version of the dual weights model could 
be capable of implementing two systems of control, without the need for an arbiter or 
homunculus.  
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8.1 The Problem of Arbitration between Two Systems of 
Control 
 
Two important questions arise from models incorporating more than one system: 
Which system dominates at any one time, and how is the transfer between the two 
systems arbitrated? In this section I refer to three bodies of research that attempt to 
answer this question, and show how my model can also help to address this issue. 
 
Daw et al. (2005) (Chapter 7.4) suggested that the brain might estimate the accuracy 
for arbitration between goal directed and habit response systems by tracking the 
relative uncertainty, or expected inaccuracy of predictions, made by each of the 
systems. They hypothesised that each system dominated under the conditions in 
which they were most accurate. They suggested a Bayesian principle of arbitration 
according to uncertainty, so that the system dominant at any one time was the one 
giving the highest level of accuracy.  
 
Yin and Knowlton (2006) (Chapter 7.5) also referred to the goal directed and habit 
systems for instrumental learning, which were shown to be dissociable, as extensive 
damage to either network could result in domination of the other. However, the two 
systems were also able to interact resulting in transfers between the networks. In 
contrast to Daw et al., they suggested a hierarchical organisation of three networks 
where Pavlovian learning precedes instrumental learning, starting in the limbic 
network, which plays a key role in appetitive Pavlovian learning, and spreading to 
the sensorimotor network associated with a habit response system, via the associative 
network associated with a system for goal directed actions.  
 
In a dual system model of control Daw and colleagues reproduced patterns of 
behaviour seen in animal devaluation experiments, which could be explained by the 
different devaluation profiles of model based and model free reinforcement learning 
systems. However, a limitation of the model was that it assumed that the model free 
and model based controllers operated separately via the dorsolateral striatum and the 
prefrontal cortex, respectively, and did not account for interconnections between the 
two systems. Furthermore, there is limited evidence for the neural substrate of the 
uncertainty-based arbitration.  
 
In Chapter 7.2 I referred to one of the long-term aims of Randall O’Reilly and 
colleagues to model the complex interactions between the basal ganglia and prefrontal 
cortex, where actively maintained representations in the prefrontal cortex are 
dynamically updated/gated by the basal ganglia (Chapter 3.2). Their PBWM model 
(Hazy, Frank & O’Reilly 2006; 2007; O’Reilly & Frank 2006; O’Reilly, Frank, Hazy 
& Watz 2007) attempts to deconstruct the homunculus by modelling the mechanisms 
of control between the two systems. This is a biophysically detailed connectionist 
model incorporating the electrophysiology of a neuron. However, as already 
mentioned this is a complex approach involving a sophisticated software package with 
complicated underlying algorithms.  
 
The connectionist model developed in Section 8.3 is a simple model, with no need 
for sophisticated algorithms or software packages, which suggests a self-organising 
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solution to the question of arbitration between two systems of control. By assuming 
dual weights associated with each neuron (or collection of neurons) in the network, 
this approach offers an online method of arbitration, without the need for an 
arbitrator or homunculus. This model was inspired by a connectionist network by 
Hinton and Plaut (1987), which is described in the next section. 
 
 
8.2 Using Fast Weights to Deblur Old Memories (Hinton & 
Plaut 1987) 
 
Catastrophic forgetting, or interference (McCloskey & Cohen 1989), is a 
fundamental limitation of a multilayer connectionist architecture, where old 
information, held in the weights, is forgotten or overwritten when new information is 
presented (Atkins 2001; Atkins & Murre 1998). This effect is not normally seen in 
the human brain, which typically exhibits sequential learning, where forgetting 
occurs more gradually over time. A major challenge for models of learning is to 
produce a network with the advantages of a distributed system that can accommodate 
sequential learning, without prior learning being disrupted by new input. Various 
solutions to the problem of catastrophic forgetting have been suggested, largely 
either by reducing the amount of overlap between input representations of the new 
patterns to be learned and previously learned patterns so as to effect minimal 
disruption to the network, or by separating new learning from old with dual-net 
architectures (French, 1999). 
 
While the subject of catastrophic forgetting is not explored any further in this thesis, 
of particular interest to the current argument concerning dual control is a 
connectionist model by Hinton & Plaut (1987) who attempted to ‘deblur’ a set of 
previously learned associations, when they had been ‘blurred’ as a result of the 
subsequent learning of a second set of associations. The model was based on the idea 
that changes in synaptic efficacy at a single synapse occur at many different 
timescales, some rapid and some more slowly (Kupferman 1979; Hartzell 1981), and 
can be represented in an ANN by giving each connection several different weights 
that change at different speeds. 
In this ANN each artificial neuron had two weights for each connection that summed 
together to form the total weight on each connection: one set of fast, elastic weights, 
and another set of slow, plastic weights (Figure 8.1). The set of fast weights took on 
values that temporarily cancelled out the adverse effects of new learning on old and 
rehearsing a subset of old information was shown to be sufficient to achieve this. The 
fast weights were the novelty; with a higher learning rate they were quicker to reflect 
change, and constituted the more recent past due to the fact that their weights rapidly 
decayed towards zero by some fraction, h, after each weight change. Essentially the 
fast weights, when significant at times of surprise or novelty, were seen to provide a 
temporary context or associative memory in addition to the knowledge in the slow 
weights. The slow weights were typical of the normal single weights usually seen in 
ANNs; changing slowly and holding the long term knowledge of the network. This 
method exploited the distributed nature of an ANN to recall previously stored 
patterns. 
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Figure 8.1. Each artificial neuron in the ANN of Hinton and Plaut (1987) had two weights for each 
connection, one fast and one slow, that summed together to form the total weight on each connection. 
 
By implementing a dual weight system, Hinton and Plaut demonstrated that an 
additional set of fast weights were temporarily able to cancel out the interference in a 
set of old associations caused in more recent learning and it was possible to quickly 
restore a whole set of old associations by rehearsing on just a subset of them (Figure 
8.2). Other studies have found a similar trajectory of recovery for unlearned items by 
rehearsing on just a few, using a variety of multilayer connectionist models of 
memory (e.g. Atkins 2001; Atkins & Murre 1998; Hinton & Sejnowski 1986a; Plaut 
1996; Hinton & Shallice 1991), but the dual weight model of Hinton and Plaut is of 
particular interest in this thesis because of the interactions seen between the fast and 
slow weights during learning and relearning. 
 
 
0.5 
Sweeps 0-20 
50 retrained (solid); 50 Unretrained (dashed) 
Sweeps 0-20 
10 retrained (solid); 90 Unretrained (dashed) 
0.5 
Figure 8.2 Figure taken from Hinton & Plaut (1987) comparing the errors of both retrained and 
unretrained data for the first 20 sweeps. When the network was retrained on 50% and 10% of the old 
associations (solid lines), it was found that in the early stages of retraining the improvements in the 
associations that were not retrained (dashed line) were nearly as good as the associations that were 
explicitly retrained. 
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Hinton and Plaut suggested that the temporary memory could be used in the 
following ways: 
• Rapid temporary learning: It is even capable of storing a new association in 
one trial. For example, one-shot goal directed learning referred to in Daw et 
al. (2005). 
• Creating temporary bindings between features.  
• Recursive processing: by temporarily storing local variables in the fast 
weights and calling on sub-procedures. The local variables can then be 
restored from this temporary associative memory (McClelland & Kawamoto 
1986). 
• To implement the ‘shortest descent’ learning method i.e., minimising the 
amount of interference caused by new learning. 
 
In the next section I describe my implementation of a similar model to Hinton and 
Plaut using dual weights to investigate the first of these suggested uses: rapid 
temporary learning. 
 
 
8.3 A Connectionist Model of Dual System Control 
 
While Hinton and Plaut originally designed the dual weights model to investigate the 
problem of interference of new information on old, in this Chapter I aim to use a 
modified version of this model to address rapid temporary learning and the problem 
of arbitration between two systems of control. 
 
I posit that the model can be thought of as consisting of two systems that can either 
operate independently or interact: one system for the fast weights, and the other for 
the slow weights. Following this line of reasoning, Hinton and Plaut used the fast 
‘elastic’ weight system to temporarily cancel out the interference in a set of old 
associations caused by more recent learning. The slow ‘plastic’ system was dominant 
when learning had taken place and the whole system was stable, but the fast weights 
came into operation when errors occurred as a result of introducing a change in the 
data set. It is the interaction between the two systems that is of interest in this thesis, 
which may suggest a solution to the problem of arbitration between any two systems 
of control. 
  
The model described in this Chapter could refer to control between any number of 
dual systems, and, as already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is not the 
system being modelled that is of prime importance, but the fact that this 
connectionist model can implement a dual system of control. However, in order to 
illustrate the use of this model I refer to the model encompassing model free and 
model based reinforcement learning by Daw et al. (2005), discussed in Chapter 7.4 
as an example of two systems of control that could be equated by the model, where: 
• Fast weights could equate with the tree-search model based system that is 
capable of flexible, often one shot goal directed actions. 
• Slow weights could equate with the model free TD-like system associated 
with inflexible stimulus response actions that require extensive relearning. 
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A dual weighted system with fast weights to highlight past experience and identify 
context offers a novel approach, with the possibility of combining both goal directed 
and stimulus response systems in one simple model.  
 
As discussed in Section 8.1 this is a simple model, with no need for the sophisticated 
algorithms or software packages used by O’Reilly and colleagues. Like Daw et al. 
(2005) it models two different systems of control, but unlike Daw et al. it allows for 
interactions between the two systems. By assuming dual weights associated with 
each neuron (or collection of neurons) in the network, this approach offers an online 
method of arbitration, without the need for arbitration (Daw et al. 2005) for which 
there is limited neural evidence.  
 
Hinton and Plaut used a large training set of 100 random associations and had a large 
hidden layer of 100 units in the network, resulting in many modifiable connections. 
One unit per association would allow for perfect learning very easily by assigning 
one unit to each of the associations, but this approach would result in a network with 
a limited ability to generalise. This practice was typical of early ANNs, where 
models tended to be over resourced with too many free parameters, and a similar 
situation was encountered with the model of Hoffman and McGlashan (1987) 
described in the discussion of Chapter 3.1.1.  
 
The aim of this research was not just to perform a simple replication of Hinton and 
Plaut, but to constrain the network in order to investigate both the contribution of the 
fast weights, and the interaction between fast and slow weights, in greater detail. In 
accordance with current standard practice when investigating the performance of an 
ANN I sought the lowest number of hidden layer units that would train the network. 
A smaller network than the one used by Hinton and Plaut would still learn the 
associations with minimal error, but a solution would not be reached as readily as a 
network with one hidden unit per association; resulting in the knowledge of the 
network being more widely distributed and a repeatable experiment, with a greater 
ability to generalise. In order to achieve this I performed a pilot study to determine 
the minimum number of hidden units necessary to train the associations in Phase 1. I 
used a smaller data set in Phase 1 than Hinton and Plaut of 20 as opposed to 100 
associations, while the Phase 2 data set contained the same 5 new random 
associations as the original study, and none of the original 20 associations presented 
in Phase 1. The effect of the smaller data set in Phase 1 and of keeping the data set in 
Phase 2 constant will result in a greater amount of perturbation, or disturbance to the 
Phase 1 associations than seen in Hinton and Plaut, i.e., 25% perturbation (5 to 
disrupt 20) in this study, compared to 5% perturbation (5 to disrupt 100) in the 
original study. I was then in a position to investigate the parameters of the model: the 
learning rates and momentum for both the fast and slow weights, as well as the rate 
of decay for the fast weights 
 
Such constraints to the model will allow a detailed investigation of the contribution 
of the fast weights. In addition, it will reveal how the two sets of weights interact in 
the model and under what conditions the interactions occur. If the fast and slow 
weights can be thought of as two separate systems of control capable of operating 
separately and interacting, as suggested at the beginning of this section, then the 
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interaction may provide an insight into how other systems of control may coexist and 
interact, without the need for an explicit arbiter or homunculus. 
 
 
8.3.1 Methods 
 
The Model 
The model was implemented in a version of a standard multilayer backpropagation 
network with momentum (Rumelhart et al. 1986), originally written in C Program by 
Pao (Pao 1989) and modified by a member of the research team to include the 
addition of dual weights, where each artificial neuron in the ANN had two weights 
for each connection that summed together to form the total weight on each 
connection as detailed in Figure 8.1.  
 
The Network Architecture 
The network consisted of 10 outputs, 10 inputs and a hidden layer, in accordance 
with Hinton and Plaut. The network of Hinton and Plaut contained 100 hidden units; 
however, in this study the number of hidden units was reduced to 7 in order to 
constrain the network. This value was determined by a pilot study (see Appendix VI 
A). 
 
Decay Rate for fast Weights 
The fast weights were the novelty: 
• With a higher learning rate they were quicker to reflect change and the more 
recent past.  
• They were also quicker to forget due to the fact that their weights rapidly 
decayed towards zero by some fraction, h, after each weight change. 
• The default rate for the decay was 0.999 where the fast weights decayed at a 
rate of 0.1% with percentage retention of 99.9%, following every weight 
change. Details of the effects of using different rates of decay on learning and 
relearning can be found in Appendix VI C.  
NB The slow weights were typical of the weights usually found in an ANN. Having 
a lower learning rate they were slower to change, and because they did not decay 
(forget), they held the long-term knowledge of the network. 
 
Training and Testing 
As in Hinton and Plaut, the training sets were selected at random (without 
replacement) from a possible set of 210 ten bit binary vectors (1024 possibilities), but 
instead of using values of zero and one, I used 0.1 and 0.9, respectively. Using these 
values for the outputs will allow for better convergence of a network using gradient 
descent methods, where the error feedback is derived from a sigmoid curve that 
never actually reaches zero or 1.  
 
I used a smaller data set in Phase 1 than Hinton and Plaut of 20 as opposed to 100 
associations, while the Phase 2 data set contained the same 5 new random 
associations as the original study, and none of the original 20 associations presented 
in Phase 1. The effect of the smaller data set in Phase 1 and of keeping the data set in 
Phase 2 constant will result in a greater amount of perturbation, or disturbance to the 
Phase 1 associations than seen in Hinton and Plaut, i.e., 25% perturbation (5 to 
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disrupt 20) in this study, compared to 5% perturbation (5 to disrupt 100) in the 
original study.  
 
As in the original study training was carried out in three phases: 
Phase 1: 20 random input vectors were associated with 20 random output vectors. 
Phase 2: Five new random associations were presented to the network without 
rehearsing on the original 20.  
Phase 3 (testing phase): The network was retrained on 10 of the original data (50%) 
and the improvement in performance of the retrained subset was compared to the 10 
associations in Phase 1 that had not been retrained. As in Hinton and Plaut the model 
was able to perform a test on the unretrained associations by plotting the total error 
for all the output units for all the associations, sweep by sweep, and comparing them 
to the total errors on the retrained associations. 
 
Simulations 
I began with a pilot study where I used the slow weights only to find the optimum 
number of hidden layer units that would still train the 20 associations during Phase 1 
in order to constrain the network and maximise generalisation. I also sought 
maximum and minimum learning rates for the slow weights in order to find the 
optimum learning rate parameters for future simulation using both fast and slow 
weights. I was then in a position to investigate the findings of Hinton and Plaut 
(1987) using a constrained version of the original model where fast weights were 
utilised to temporarily capture old learning. However, analysis of the interactions 
between fast and slow weights revealed that the value of decay rate selected for the 
fast weights had important bearings on the transfer of knowledge from fast to slow 
weights and I sought an optimal combination of rates of decay over the three phases 
in order to investigate the contribution of the decay rate parameter. I also 
investigated the contribution of the fast weights by running a series of control 
experiment using only the slow weights.  
 
My investigations into the findings of Hinton and Plaut (1987) using a constrained 
version of the original model where fast weights were utilised to temporarily capture 
old learning are detailed in Appendix VI, together with details of the pilot study, the 
contribution of the decay rate parameter, and the contribution of the fast weights. I 
summarise these results in the next section. 
 
 
8.3.2 Summary of Results Detailed in Appendix VI 
 
Using Fast Weights to Temporarily Capture Old Learning (Appendix VI B) 
Using a constrained dual weighted network with a reduced hidden layer, together 
with a data set that caused a greater amount of perturbation during Phase 2, I was 
able to recreate a result comparable to that of Hinton and Plaut (1987), where an 
improvement was seen in the unretrained associations from Phase 1 when retraining 
on only 50% of the Phase 1 associations during Phase 3 (Figure 8.3). NB error (y-
axis) is the root means square error of difference between the actual response and the 
target response for each neuron, hereafter referred to as error. 
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Figure 8.3 When the constrained network was retrained on 50% of the old associations (solid line) 
during Phase 3, it was found that in the early stages of retraining (first 20 sweeps) there was an 
improvement in the associations that were not retrained (dashed line). 
 
This was not a direct replication of Hinton and Plaut and so there was less of an 
improvement on the 50% unretrained associations than was seen in the original study 
(Figure 8.2). However, my simulations captured the effect identified by Hinton and 
Plaut and I demonstrated that when the network was retrained on a subset of the 
original data it was found that in the early stages of retraining improvements were 
seen in the associations that were not retrained. This was because the knowledge of 
the original associations was distributed over many connections and retraining some 
of the associations pushed back the weights of the others to the point in time before 
the perturbation occurred. The fast weights were able to cancel out the interference in 
a set of old associations caused in more recent learning and it was possible to quickly 
restore a whole set of old associations by rehearsing on just a subset of them. The 
fast weights created a context in which the old associations were present again, 
without permanently interfering with the new associations, as the new knowledge 
was restored when the fast weights decayed back to zero. 
 
The Contribution of the Decay Rate Parameter (Appendix VI C) 
The simulations in this experiment demonstrated that the interaction between the fast 
and slow weights is enabled by the decay rate for the fast weights where the weights 
rapidly decay towards zero by some fraction, h, after each weight change. It was 
clear that tasks with different learning complexities will require different decay rates 
for the fast weights in order for the knowledge of the task to be transferred to the 
slow weights by the time the stopping criterion has been reached. It would appear 
that the decay rate of the fast weights is a critical factor in the interaction between the 
fast and slow weights in this model: A fast decay rate (0.99) is appropriate for tasks 
with a lower complexity that train in a minimal number of sweeps where the 
contribution of the fast weights is minimal, such as in Phase 2 where the network has 
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to learn only 5 new associations; and a slower decay rate (0.999) is more appropriate 
for tasks with a higher complexity that take longer to train and are facilitated by the 
fast weights, such as in Phases 1 and 3. Accordingly the optimal combination for 
decay rates over Phases 1, 2 and 3 was found to be 0.999-0.99-0.999 for this 
particular combination of tasks. 
 
The Contribution of the Fast Weights (Appendix VI D) 
In order to reveal the contribution of the fast weights in a dual weighted system two 
control conditions were implemented, where progression was made through the three 
phases using slow weights only using learning rates of either 0.001 or 0.41, being the 
optimum learning rate values for slow and fast weights determined in the pilot study.  
By comparing the two control conditions to a simulation using fast and slow weights 
with the optimal combination of decay rates of 0.999-0.99-0.999 determined in 
Section B above, it was found that the fast weights in all three phases make a 
substantial contribution to the early stages of learning compared to a network using 
slow weights only. However, while the addition of the fast weights provides rapid 
learning during the initial stages of training, it does so at the expense of the number 
of sweeps, or time taken to complete the task. A dual weighted network is trying to 
converge on a solution using two sets of weights, which is a much harder problem 
than a standard network with a single set of weights. Thus, the price to pay for early 
rapid learning is the time taken for the network to converge on a solution. 
 
As an example of the contribution of the fast weights during the initial stages of 
learning Figure 8.4 shows the effect of plotting the total error across all output units 
and patterns against number of sweeps through the Phase 1 data set for: 
• A dual weighted network:  
  (i)   Fast weights error (green line) 
  (ii)  Slow weights error (pink line)  
  (iii) Overall error of the system (dark blue line)  
• A network with just slow weights:  
  (iv)  Control condition error using learning rate of 0.001 (red line) 
  (v)   Control condition error using learning rate 0.41 (light blue line) 
Similar effects were seen during Phases 2 and 3 (Appendix VI C). 
 
Firstly, with regard to the dual weighted network, it can be seen from Figure 8.4 that 
learning in the early stages is rapid in the fast weights, reflected as a dramatic 
decrease in the fast weights error during the first 5,000 sweeps (green line). 
Learning is much slower initially in the slow weights (pink line), but as the overall 
error (dark blue line) declines with learning and the fast weights decay, knowledge 
is transferred to the slow weights, which is reflected in the error for the slow weights 
that begins to decline more rapidly than in the initial 5,000 sweeps. By around 
20,000 sweeps through the data set the slow weights begin to dominate, as the error 
falls below that of the fast weights. Changes to the slow weights are slow and steady 
as a result of the low learning rate, while changes to the fast weights are larger and 
more volatile as a result of the higher learning rate. The volatility of the fast weights 
is reflected in the overall error.  
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Figure 8.4 An example of the contribution of the fast weights during learning - Phase 1: The errors of 
the fast (green line), slow (pink line) and total weights (dark blue line) for a dual weighted network 
compared to the total weights of two control conditions using slow weights only with learning rates 
of 0.001 (red line) and 0.41 (light blue line). The fast weights make a substantial contribution during 
the early stages of learning. 
 
By comparing the overall error of a dual weighted network (dark blue line) to the two 
control conditions using slow weights only, it can be seen that Control 0.001 (red 
line) is slower to learn during the early stages, while Control 0.41 (light blue line) 
learns almost immediately. A closer inspection of the errors for the fast and slow 
weights in the dual weighted network reveals that it is the fast weights that contribute 
to the enhanced learning during the initial stages using a dual weighted network. 
While the combination of fast and slow weights does not learn as fast as using a 
learning rate of 0.41 alone, such a high training rate often leads to error and will not 
always find a solution for the network, unlike a very slow learning rate, and so the 
combination of fast and slow weights offers an alternative to using an error-prone 
high learning rate only.  
 
Conclusions 
While I have substantiated the claims of Hinton and Plaut, additional analysis of the 
contribution of the fast weights and of the interactions seen between fast and slow 
weights has enabled me to suggest an alternative use of the dual weighted ANN: as a 
dual system of control, capable of addressing the problem of arbitration between two 
systems of control. In addition the fast weights can be seen as a temporary memory 
capable of rapid temporary learning. My arguments are detailed in Section 8.4. 
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8.3.3 Discussion 
 
Using an ANN with both fast and slow weights, it was found that when 50% of a set 
of the Phase 1 associations were retrained, during Phase 3, improvements were seen 
in the other 50% of the Phase 1 associations that were not retrained, during the early 
stages of training. This was in accordance with the findings of Hinton and Plaut 
(1987). 
 
However, this was not a direct replication of Hinton and Plaut as I used a constrained 
model with a reduced hidden layer. I also used a smaller data set in Phase 1 than 
Hinton and Plaut of 20 as opposed to 100 associations, while the Phase 2 data set 
contained the same 5 new random associations as the original study, resulting in a 
greater amount of perturbation, or disturbance to the Phase 1 associations than seen 
in Hinton and Plaut, i.e., 25% perturbation (5 to disrupt 20) in this study, compared 
to 5% perturbation (5 to disrupt 100) in the original study. The results were achieved 
due to rapid learning through the addition of fast weights and, as well as supporting 
the findings of Hinton and Plaut, they provide the following additional analysis: 
• The network was a constrained version of that used by Hinton and Plaut, with 
a reduced hidden layer, where 20 associations were learned using 7 hidden 
units during Phase 1, as opposed to 100 associations using 100 hidden layer 
units. This will result in a more distributed network than Hinton and Plaut, 
who provided enough resources for one hidden unit per association. 
• I also used a smaller data set in Phase 1 than Hinton and Plaut of 20 as 
opposed to 100 associations, while the Phase 2 data set contained the same 5 
new random associations as the original study, and none of the original 20 
associations presented in Phase 1. The effect of the smaller data set in Phase 1 
and of keeping the data set in Phase 2 constant will represent a greater 
amount of perturbation, or disturbance to the Phase 1 associations than seen 
in Hinton and Plaut. 
• This study also provided more control condition analysis than the original 
study which showed the contribution of the fast weights during early 
learning/relearning. However, this was at the expense of the number of 
sweeps, or time taken to complete the task. Thus, the price to pay for early 
rapid learning is the time taken for the network to converge on a solution. 
 
Hinton and Plaut explained that the effects seen were achieved as the knowledge of 
the original associations was distributed over many connections. Retraining on some 
of those associations pushed back the weights to the point in time before the 
disturbance to the weight values occurred, which was due to the learning of the new 
associations in Phase 2. The fast weights were able to cancel out the interference in a 
set of old associations caused in more recent learning and it was possible to quickly 
restore a whole set of old associations by rehearsing on just a subset of them. The 
fast weights created a context in which the old associations were present again, 
without permanently interfering with the new associations, as the new knowledge 
was restored when the fast weights decayed back to zero. 
 
In the next section I detail my arguments for an alternative use for a model with dual 
weights: As a dual system of control, capable of addressing the problem of 
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arbitration between two systems of control, where the fast weights can be seen as a 
temporary memory capable of rapid temporary learning.  
 
  
8.4 The Mechanisms behind the Dual System of Control 
 
Hinton and Plaut used the dual weights model to address the problem of catastrophic 
forgetting in multilayer ANNs. However, I suggest an alternative use for a model 
with fast and slow weights to address the problem of arbitration between two systems 
of control through rapid learning in the fast weights which will allow for more rapid 
changes in the environment than in a standard network with one set of weights. 
 
The knowledge of an ANN is held in the weights, which is analogous to the synapses 
in a biological system, and learning is achieved by changing the strengths of the 
weights in the system. If the response of an output unit is incorrect then the network 
can be changed so that it is more likely to produce the correct response in the future. 
This is achieved by changing the weight of each connection by a proportion of the 
error arising from the difference between the actual and desired output. The 
proportion of change to the weights is determined by the learning rate and the higher 
the learning rate, the greater the amount of change. In the dual weights model both 
fast and slow weights sum together to form the total weight on each connection, and 
as both are affected by the same network error, the knowledge of the system at any 
one time is determined by both sets of weights.  
 
In a well learned situation the body of knowledge normally resides in the slow 
weights in the dual weights model. Here, the error in the system is low and any errors 
in the fast weights quickly decay to zero. As there is no decay rate associated with 
the slow weights the knowledge of the system is maintained within these 
connections. However, when the error in the system is high the fast weights will 
dominate, for example as a result of the presentation of the previously unseen 
associations during Phase 2, or the reintroduction of some of the associations from 
Phase 1 during Phase 3. Here, the higher learning rate of the fast weights will result 
in a larger update to the fast weights than to the slow weights with a lower learning 
rate and a smaller weight update, thus more of the new knowledge will be held in the 
fast weights. The overall effect will be that the fast weights learn the new 
associations more quickly than the slow weights, which are slower to learn and 
effectively hold on to the old associations for longer. The larger the values of the fast 
weights, the longer the fast weights will take to decay, resulting in the temporary 
domination of the fast weights during periods of learning/surprise in the system. 
Thus the fast weights can be seen to be acting as a temporary memory capable of 
rapid temporary learning, such as in the goal directed learning referred to by Daw et 
al. (2005). 
 
As the network continues to learn and errors in the system become lower, the updates 
to the fast weights are lower and the rate of decay of the fast weights begins to 
dominate over this update. The slow weights are gradually adjusting to the new 
associations and an interaction is seen between fast and slow weights as the slow 
weights begin to dominate by holding the knowledge of the system. By the time the 
stopping criterion has been reached and learning is complete, effectively knowledge 
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has been transferred to the slow weights, as the small errors in the fast weights are 
dominated by the tendency of the fast weights to decay towards zero. 
 
 The rate of decay for the fast weights will have an important bearing on the 
temporary domination of the fast weights as it is a critical factor in the interaction 
between the fast and slow weights in the model: the quicker the rate of decay, the 
lower the contribution of the fast weights; while a slower rate of decay will allow the 
fast weights to dominate for a longer period and this is particularly beneficial during 
tasks of a higher complexity requiring a higher number of sweeps (Appendix VI B).  
 
Hinton and Plaut used the fast weights to cancel out the interference in a set of old 
associations caused in more recent learning, where the fast weights created a context 
in which the old associations were present again, without permanently interfering 
with the new associations. However, I suggest a wider application for a dual 
weighted network:  
• In a dual weighted network a set of fast weights will allow for more rapid 
changes in the environment than in a standard network with one set of 
weights, by reacting quickly to new information or change/surprise when the 
error in the system is high. This will provide a temporary overlay of the new 
knowledge to the existing body of knowledge built up and stored in the slow 
weights, and provide time for the new knowledge to be assimilated into the 
old.  
• But in a fully learned situation with minimum error or change/surprise the 
slow weights bearing the existing body of knowledge will dominate as the 
fast weights decay towards zero. 
 
This suggestion has similarities to that of Daw et al. (2005) to explain the different 
devaluation profiles of model based and model free reinforcement learning systems, 
described in Chapter 7.4. Daw and colleagues demonstrated that a model free habit 
system of caching values is not immediately sensitive to the specific outcome 
information associated with the devaluation, and it will take time for a change in 
behaviour to occur following relearning of the values. Alternatively, a flexible model 
based system that is outcome sensitive and goal directed, will show an immediate 
behavioural change.  
 
Accordingly, to illustrate the use of such a dual weights model, I suggest that the fast 
and slow weights could be mapped on to the stimulus response and goal directed 
systems identified by Daw et al. as follows: 
• Fast weights could equate with the tree-search model based system that is 
capable of flexible, often one shot goal directed actions. However, this is at 
the expense of being expensive in terms of memory and time. 
• Slow weights could equate with the model free TD-like system associated 
with inflexible stimulus response actions that require extensive relearning, 
but suffers from inflexibility. 
 
In the functional specialisation of the striatum both Daw et al. (2005) and Yin and 
Knowlton (2006) suggest that goal directed actions are associated with 
cortical/subcortical loops involving dorsomedial striatum; while habit responses 
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involve loops via the dorsolateral striatum. Thus the fast and slow weights could be 
seen to represent areas of the dorsomedial and dorsolateral striatum, respectively. 
 
Daw and colleagues claimed that accuracy was the key to arbitration between the two 
systems, which would have different benefits and weaknesses in different situations. 
The system that dominates will depend on inexperience and task complexity versus 
search depth. The Model based system should dominate early in training, and during 
complex tasks, where data is scarce and stored TD values are unreliable; but model 
free systems should dominate during a well learned task, when habits prevail for 
actions more distal from reward. Here, the deeper search is costly and more error 
prone due to the necessity of pruning and exploring a limited set of paths in an effort 
to cut down on the extensive search space in a tree search. 
 
This is precisely what has been demonstrated using the dual weights model: the fast 
weights dominated when the error in the system was high, early in training and when 
new associations were introduced to the network during Phase 2; while the slow 
weights dominated when the error in the system was low and the task was well learnt 
and more habitual.  
 
Behavioural studies and evidence from fMRI point to two systems of control 
operating from different areas of the striatum (dorsomedial versus dorsolateral) (Daw 
et al. 2005; Yin & Knowlton 2006). However, this dual weighted model has shown 
emergent properties from a single system with dual weights representing two 
subsystems, via fast and slow weights that are contained within the same set of 
neurons. This suggests the possibility of two or more interacting systems 
incorporated into the same neural material, permitting transfers between the two 
systems. 
 
 
8.5 Advantages of the Dual System of Control 
 
While Daw and colleagues successfully modelled controller competition between 
two systems by simulating results from animal devaluation experiments, I identified 
four criticisms of the model, previously detailed in Chapter 7.4.4, namely: (i) the 
model did not account for interactions between the two model free and model based 
controllers; (ii) control between the two systems involved uncertainty-based arbitration 
for which there is limited neural evidence; (iii) this was a symbolic solution, and no 
attempt was made to address how control could be implemented in the neurons in the 
brain; and (iv) they were unable to account for the role of dopamine in the model 
based control system. 
 
The dual weights model attempts to address the first three criticisms of the model by 
Daw and colleagues. Firstly, it allows for an interaction between the two systems via 
the decay rate parameter. Yin and Knowlton (2006) place emphasis on the 
cortical/subcortical circuit loops in the brain and in particular the interactions 
between them necessary for transforming actions into habits. The dual weights model 
could represent the shift in behavioural control from goal directed actions (using fast 
weights) to habit responses (slow weights) seen in animal devaluation experiments 
with overtraining, posited by Yin and Knowlton via the associative network involving 
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dorsomedial striatum to the sensorimotor network involving dorsolateral striatum 
(Chapter 7.5). Common to both loops are the open striatonigral projections to other 
nigral regions, which project to other striatal areas, resulting in transfers between the 
networks (Redgrave, Prescott & Gurney 1999). 
 
Secondly, the self-organising nature of the dual weights model does away with the 
need for the Bayesian arbitrator (Daw et al. 2005) or homunculus (but see Section 
8.6 for future directions and a discussion of the decay rate parameter). Like Yin and 
Knowlton (2006) the dual weights model suggests a hierarchical transfer between 
two systems of control, where the associative network for goal directed actions 
dominates early in learning, with a higher level of functional integration and a wider 
range of motor programmes available for selection in order to reach a goal 
(represented by the fast weights). However, as learning progresses a shift is seen to a 
lower level of functional integration associated with habit formation and the effector-
specific sensorimotor network (represented by the slow weights). 
 
Thirdly it is a biologically inspired connectionist application possessing some of the 
advantages of the human brain and, as a more emergent model of two systems of 
control; it is in a better position to suggest how control may be exerted in the brain. 
Furthermore it does so without need for the sophisticated algorithms or software 
packages of O’Reilly and colleagues (e.g. Chapter 7.2, O’Reilly, Frank, Hazy & Watz 
2007; O’Reilly and Munakata, 2000). 
 
To summarise, a dual weighted system with fast weights to react quickly to 
change/surprise in the environment (this study), capable also of highlighting past 
experience and identifying context (Hinton & Plaut 1987), offers a novel approach 
and may have important implications in addressing how both goal directed and 
stimulus response learning may coexist.  
 
 
8.6 Future Directions 
 
The model in its present form is a very simple ANN with dual weights capable of 
implementing a dual system of control without the need for an arbiter or a 
homunculus, and as such possesses a number of limitations. However, there are 
many potential applications of the model and in this section I outline a possible 
solution to the limitations and give an indication of some of those applications.   
 
The detailed investigations in Section 8.3 and Appendix VI have shown that although 
the model is capable of self arbitration by allowing interactions between the two 
systems (modelled by fast and slow weights) there are three main parameters of the 
model which require special consideration: the learning rates for each of the fast and 
slow weights (coupled with momentum); and the decay rate for the fast weights. 
These parameters have been shown to be task dependent and it will be necessary to 
find optimal values for each of these prior to any detailed investigation pertaining to 
the task, calling into question the self organising ability of the model.  
 
In particular, it was clear that tasks with different learning complexities will require 
different decay rates for the fast weights in order for the knowledge of the task to be 
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transferred to the slow weights by the time the stopping criterion has been reached 
(Appendix VI B). It would appear that the decay rate for the fast weights is a critical 
factor in the interaction between the fast and slow weights in this model:  
• The faster the decay rate, the smaller the temporary window of opportunity 
provided by the fast weights to provide a temporary context or associative 
memory for the recent past (Hinton & Plaut 1987) or provide a temporary 
overlay of new learning, where the fast weights learn the new associations 
more quickly than the slow weights, which are slower to learn and effectively 
hold on to the old associations for longer (this study). A faster rate of decay is 
appropriate for tasks with a lower learning complexity that train in a minimal 
number of sweeps. 
• The slower the decay rate, the longer the temporary window of opportunity 
provided by the fast weights. This is more appropriate for tasks with a higher 
learning complexity that take a long time to train. 
 
Introducing dopamine into future versions of this model may obviate the need to set 
the parameters of the model prior to each task. Other computational models have 
made use of the phasic dopamine burst to gate salient or significant information into 
working memory, for example Braver et al. (1999) (Chapter 3.2) and earlier models 
by O’Reilly and colleagues (Rougier et al. 2005). A phasic dopamine reward 
prediction error, modelled as a TD error, representing significance/surprise (Chapter 
4.2.1, Figure 4.2) could affect the modifiable parameters of the model in the 
following ways: (i) by changing learning rates; (ii) by changing the decay rate for the 
fast weights, or (iii) a combination of (i) and (ii). This could be achieved as follows: 
• A large dopamine phasic burst above baseline firing rate (Figure 4.2A), 
resulting from unexpected surprise/significance, signifying that things are 
better than expected, could: (i) switch to a higher learning rate in order to 
allow for faster learning in the system; (ii) switch to a slower decay rate for 
the fast weights in order to provide a longer temporary window of 
opportunity for the fast weights to bear the new information, giving the 
slower weights the opportunity to assimilate the new information; or  (iii) a 
combination of (i) and (ii). 
• In the absence of surprise/significance, where things are just as expected and 
dopamine is firing at baseline levels (Figure 4.2B), there will be no dopamine 
phasic burst and no new learning. Here the default parameters of the model 
would dominate, namely: low learning rates and a high rate of decay for the 
fast weights. 
However, this explanation currently does not account for when dopamine neurons 
are firing below baseline, such as when an expected reward fails to arrive (Figure 
4.2C).  
 
While the addition of the fast weights provides rapid learning during the initial stages 
of training, it does so at the expense of the number of sweeps, or time taken to 
complete the task (Appendix VI C), so the price to pay for early rapid learning is the 
time taken for the network to converge on a solution. A dual weighted network is 
trying to converge on a solution using two sets of weights and therefore two sets of 
free variables, which is a much harder problem than a standard network with a single 
set of weights and only one set of free variables. A dopamine controlled system will 
allow salient information into the system via the fast weights following a switch to 
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either a higher learning rate, or a slower decay rate, or a combination of the two. This 
will result in a system with two sets of free variables (fast and slow weights) 
sensitive to rapid learning that will take longer to converge on a solution. However, 
non salient information will not produce a phasic dopamine burst and there will be 
no switch of parameters. Here, the fast weights will be close to zero as a result of 
their decay and only one set of free variables will dominate (slow weights), resulting 
in a more efficient system. 
 
Other applications could be to apply the model to some of the other dual systems 
identified in Chapter 7, Table 7.2. In particular, the phasic dopamine neuron firing seen 
in learning (System 1) and the tonic dopamine relating to the expression of previously 
acquired behaviour (System 2) identified by Smith et al. (2006) and described in 
Chapter 7.1. A dual weighted ANN with fast weights representing phasic dopamine 
and slow weights representing tonic dopamine could potentially accommodate both 
systems within one model to address one of the limitations of the basic TD model, 
the inability to distinguish between the effects of dopamine manipulation on distal 
rather than proximal rewards (Daw et al. 2005; Smith et al. 2004; 2006).  
 
In this chapter I have provided a theoretical argument for the implementation of an 
ANN with dual weights. However, in order to demonstrate the value of the model it 
will be necessary to test the theory using psychological tasks of sequential learning that 
will exploit two systems of control. Furthermore, there are clearly many systems of 
control operating in parallel in the brain and future versions of the model could 
accommodate multiple systems by having multiple weights associated with each 
artificial neuron (or set of neurons).  
 
Finally, I would reiterate the limitations of modelling originally addressed in Chapter 
2. The model is informative rather than definitive; qualitative rather than 
quantitative, and as such cannot be predictive. However, the usefulness of this model 
lies in its relative transparency and the ability to suggest what might be reasonable 
lines for research. Therefore I am not claiming that this is actually what happens in 
the brain, but simply showing emergent properties from a single system with dual 
weights representing two subsystems, via fast and slow weights. Further testing will 
determine the limitations of a dual weighted system of control. 
 
 
8.7 Chapter Conclusions 
 
Hinton & Plaut (1987) originally devised a dual weighted model for the purpose of 
addressing catastrophic forgetting, using a set of fast weights to cancel out the 
interference in a set of old associations caused in more recent learning, where the fast 
weights created a context in which the old associations were present again without 
permanently interfering with the new associations. While I have substantiated the 
claims of Hinton and Plaut using a constrained version of the model and a greater 
degree of perturbation to the old associations (Appendix VI B), an analysis of the 
contribution of the fast weights (Appendix VI D) and of the interaction between fast 
and slow weights (Appendix VI C) has allowed me to suggest an alternative use for a 
dual weighted ANN (Section 8.4).  
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I posit that the model can be thought of as consisting of two systems that can either 
operate independently or interact: one system for the fast weights, and the other for 
the slow weights. I have shown that the fast weights are capable of rapid temporary 
learning, acting as a temporary memory. Furthermore, an ANN with two sets of 
weights associated with each artificial neuron can act as a dual system of control and 
is capable of addressing the problem of arbitration between two systems of control.  
 
In a dual weighted network a set of fast weights will allow for more rapid changes in 
the environment than in a standard network with one set of weights, by reacting 
quickly to new information or change/surprise when the error in the system is high. 
This will provide a temporary overlay of the new knowledge to the existing body of 
knowledge built up and stored in the slow weights, and provide time for the new 
knowledge to be assimilated into the old. But in a fully learned situation with 
minimum error or change/surprise the slow weights bearing the existing body of 
knowledge will dominate as the fast weights decay towards zero. 
 
In order to illustrate the potential usefulness of the model I described a similar model 
by Daw et al. (2005), who referred to the competition between multiple systems for 
behavioural choice in the brain, and the problem of arbitration between the systems 
when they disagreed. They suggested a model of dual action choice, where the 
systems operated separately and in parallel, governed by a Bayesian principal of 
arbitration and used model based and model free reinforcement learning to represent 
two systems of control in the brain: goal directed actions and stimulus responses, 
respectively (Chapter 7.4). In this chapter I have suggested that the current dual 
weights model could map onto the stimulus response and goal directed systems 
identified by Daw et al. as follows: 
• Fast weights could equate with the tree-search model based system that is 
capable of flexible, often one shot goal directed actions. However, this is at 
the expense of being expensive in terms of memory and time. 
• Slow weights could equate with the model free TD-like system associated 
with inflexible stimulus response actions that require extensive relearning, 
but suffers from inflexibility. 
 
While Daw and colleagues successfully modelled controller competition between 
two systems by simulating results from animal devaluation experiments, I identified 
four criticisms of the model (Chapter 7.4.4) three of which could be addressed by the 
dual weighted ANN (Section 8.5):  
• The model by Daw and colleagues did not account for interactions between 
the two model free and model based controllers. The dual weights model could 
represent the shift in behavioural control from goal directed actions (using 
fast weights) to habit responses (slow weights) seen in animal devaluation 
experiments with overtraining, posited by Yin and Knowlton (2006) via the 
associative network involving dorsomedial striatum to the sensorimotor 
network involving dorsolateral striatum (Chapter 7.5). 
• The self-organising nature of the dual weights model does away with the 
need for the Bayesian arbitrator (Daw et al. 2005) or homunculus for which 
there is limited neural evidence. Like Yin and Knowlton (2006) the dual 
weights model suggests a hierarchical transfer between two systems of 
control, where the associative network for goal directed actions dominates 
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early in learning (represented by the fast weights), but as learning progresses 
a shift is seen to habit formation and the sensorimotor network (represented 
by the slow weights). 
• Daw and colleagues offered a symbolic solution to the problem of arbitration 
and no attempt was made to address how control could be implemented in the 
neurons in the brain. However, the dual weighted ANN is a biologically 
inspired connectionist application and, as a more emergent model of two 
systems of control; it is in a better position to suggest how control may be 
exerted in the brain.  
 
To summarise, a dual weighted system with fast weights to react quickly to 
change/surprise in the environment (this study), capable also of highlighting past 
experience and identifying context (Hinton & Plaut 1987), offers a novel approach 
with the afore-mentioned advantages over an existing model of control by Daw et al. 
It produces emergent properties from a single system with dual weights representing 
two subsystems, via fast and slow weights that are contained within the same set of 
neurons and suggests the possibility of two or more interacting systems incorporated 
into the same neural material. Future improvements to the model, suggested in 
Section 8.6 may have important implications in addressing how both goal directed 
and stimulus response learning may coexist. Furthermore it does so without need for 
the sophisticated algorithms or software packages of O’Reilly and colleagues (e.g. 
O’Reilly, Frank, Hazy & Watz 2007; O’Reilly and Munakata, 2000). 
 
This chapter is the last in a series of chapters exploring computational modelling of 
the neural systems involved in schizophrenia. In the final chapter of this thesis I will 
draw together all of the conclusions reached from the modelling experienced in this 
and previous chapters in an attempt to reach an answer to the longer term aims of this 
research, namely: How can computational models of the neural systems involved in 
schizophrenia help to improve our understanding of the symptoms and cognitive 
deficits associated with the disorder? 
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 
In this thesis I have sought to improve our understanding of the neural systems 
involved in schizophrenia by suggesting possible avenues for future computational 
modelling in an attempt to make sense of the vast number of studies relating to the 
symptoms and cognitive deficits associated with this disorder. Modelling in this 
thesis has comprised of three major themes. I started by looking at abnormalities in 
the microscopic brain structure, possibly due to excessive synaptic pruning during 
adolescence. However, it was hard to ignore the considerable evidence for dopamine 
dysfunction, and the focus of the thesis narrowed to the neurochemistry of the brain 
and modelling dopamine as a reward prediction error using TD. Finally, taking a 
wider perspective, I looked at the interactions between cortical and subcortical brain 
areas, connected by cortico-basal ganglia circuit loops.  
 
In this final chapter I will summarise my contributions to the research area (Section 
9.1), and in Section 9.2 I will draw together all of the conclusions from the modelling 
experienced in previous chapters in an attempt to reach an answer to the longer term 
aims of this research, namely: How can computational models of the neural systems 
involved in schizophrenia help to improve our understanding of the symptoms and 
cognitive deficits associated with the disorder? Finally in Section 9.3 I will suggest 
possible avenues for future research. 
 
 
9.1 Summary of Contributions 
 
9.1.1 Modelling Contributions 
 
This research has culminated in the production of five models that provide useful 
clarification in this difficult field: 
 
Model 1 - Simulation of a Speech Perception Neural Network (Chapter 3.1) 
Inspired by Hoffman & McGlashan (1997) I implemented a speech perception 
network which aimed to test the hypothesis that schizophrenia was associated with 
reduced cortico-cortical connectivity and therefore may arise from excessive synaptic 
pruning during adolescence. However, I identified problems with the methodology of 
this early experiment which may explain why I was unable to replicate their findings: 
• The training set used was very small compared to the size of the network. It is 
possible that Hoffman had a non repeatable experiment, and it is probably the 
case that Hoffman’s original experiment had some flaws and was under-
constrained.  
• No mention was made in the original paper of replication in order to seek a 
number of solutions to the problem. A statistical analysis would have 
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strengthened their argument, providing robustness and validity to their 
findings. 
 
I decided to abandon this modelling technique, and as I began to look at other 
connectionist models, other questions began to arise that were not addressed by the 
Hoffman and McGlashan model: 
• Their model focused on connectivity in the frontal lobes, but subsequent 
connectivity models pointed to reduced parahippocampal connectivity in the 
temporal lobes as an explanation of schizophrenia-like episodic memory 
deficits (Talamini et al. 2005).  
• They only modelled the end point of the neurodevelopmental process and not 
the formation and progression, which is thought to be pre-programmed and to 
begin in early life.  
• No mention was made of the considerable evidence of dysfunction of the 
dopamine system and associated areas, such as the basal ganglia.  
• While they addressed one of the symptoms, hallucinations, they ignored other 
symptoms and cognitive deficits and therefore a degree of biological 
plausibility.  
 
Model 2 - Simulation of the AX-Continuous Performance Task (Chapter 3.2) 
I implemented a simplified feed forward connectionist implementation that was able 
to learn the AX-CPT, which could have been developed further to include the gating 
system included in Braver et al. (1999). However, although the model made a 
valuable contribution to schizophrenia research at that time, like with Hoffman & 
McGlashan, the model appeared to have major shortcomings for use in current 
schizophrenia research: 
• The model focused on the direct dopamine pathway from the ventral 
tegmental area, which delivers a homogeneous signal to prefrontal cortex, 
and did not include the basal ganglia and the cortico-basal ganglia circuit 
loops, which may be paramount in a model addressing both the symptoms 
and cognitive deficits of schizophrenia. The indirect pathway, via the basal 
ganglia is better equipped to address the fundamental issue of selective 
updating, where higher order goals are actively maintained, while updating 
lower order sub-goals (Cohen et al. 2002).  
• As the AX-CPT task used does not apply uniquely to schizophrenia, I 
question the validity of such models as an explanation of schizophrenia. 
 
Model 3 - An Investigation of the Effects of Dopamine Receptor Antagonism on 
 Running Speed in a Maze (Chapter 5) 
My version of the Computational Substrate for Incentive Salience, uniting 
psychological and formal computational theories, and interpreting expected future 
reward as incentive salience, has provided additional weight to the claims of 
McClure et al. (2003) that this single model can capture the ideas of dopamine: 
• As a reward prediction error: Using TD and an actor-critic architecture. 
• As a purveyor of incentive salience: The effect of dopamine receptor 
antagonism, modelled as a constant decrease in the TD error signal, resulted 
in slower running speeds in the maze, severely disrupting the approach 
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(wanting), providing a similar pattern of results to the original animal 
experiment by Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996). 
 
The differences in the patterns of behaviour seen in my simulations of animal 
experiments resulting from high (Ikemoto and Panksepp 1996) and low (Wise et al. 
1978) dopamine receptor antagonism, reflected in the timing of the changes to 
running speed, revealed the dual function of dopamine:  
• As a learning signal.  
• In the bias of action selection.  
 
The same dopamine reward prediction error was seen to be acting in two different 
parts of the model:  
• Indirect effects of dopamine were seen from its role in learning the estimated 
values that underlay the actions (the critic).  
• Direct effects of dopamine were seen on action selection (the actor). 
 
An analysis of the difference between high and low dopamine receptor antagonism 
revealed: 
• The immediate effect of the reduction in running speed seen with high 
dopamine receptor antagonism in Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996) was shown 
to result from both the direct and indirect effects of dopamine. 
• The delayed, progressive effect of low concentrations of dopamine receptor 
antagonism in Wise et al. (1978) arose mainly as a result of the indirect 
effects of dopamine, through the slow unlearning of the value estimates, 
characteristic of the effects of experience-dependent extinction.  
 
By exploring the changing parameters of the model I have been able to answer a 
number of interesting research questions that warranted further investigation: 
 High dopamine receptor antagonism (Ikemoto and Panksepp (1996)  
• The research in this thesis has demonstrated the direct effect of dopamine on 
action selection, by showing the resulting impact of the lower TD error on the 
sigmoid decision curve. 
• The research in this thesis has demonstrated the indirect effect of dopamine, 
from its role in learning the estimated values that underlay the actions, on the 
update of the values of states in the maze.  
• My simulations found an exponential decrease in running speed in a maze 
with increasing levels of bias.  
• As well as modelling dopamine receptor antagonism using the bias, b, in 
Equation 5.2, I demonstrated that a similar effect could be produced by 
increasing the scaling constant, m, in the same equation. I showed the effect 
of increasing values of m on the sigmoid decision curve. 
 
 Low dopamine receptor antagonism (Wise et al. 1978)  
• The simulations in this thesis captured the delayed, progressive effect seen 
with low concentrations of antagonists that emerged through repeated 
exposure. My comparison between the effects of higher and lower dopamine 
receptor antagonism showed that the effects of the lower levels of dopamine 
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blockade took longer to develop and were not so pronounced as with a high 
level of bias.  
• Evidence from simulations in this thesis has shown a greater reliance of lower 
dopamine receptor antagonism on the indirect effect on the update of the 
values of states in the maze, than on the direct effect of action selection seen 
for higher levels of dopamine receptor antagonism. 
• Lower levels of dopamine receptor antagonism produced smaller, delayed TD 
errors, which, in turn, amounted to less of a reliance on the direct effects of 
action selection on running speed, and more reliance on the indirect build up 
of the new values for states through relearning of the value weights.  
• Lower dopamine receptor antagonism resulted in a similar pattern for values 
of states in the maze as extinction, which was in line with the claims of 
McClure and colleagues, and suggested a similar pattern of unlearning. 
 
Model 4 - An Analysis of the Relationship between Temporal Difference 
 Learning and Uncertainty Coding in a Computational Model of 
 Dopaminergic Signalling: (Chapter 6) 
The TD model developed in Chapter 5 was extended to address the ongoing debate 
as to whether or not dopamine encodes uncertainty in the delay period between 
presentation of a conditioned stimulus and receipt of a reward, as demonstrated by 
sustained activation seen in single dopamine neuron recordings (Fiorillo et al. 2003).  
 
By introducing uncertainty and scaling the negative TD errors by a factor of one 
sixth in order to compensate for the asymmetric coding scaling of dopamine neuron 
firing, the novel use of this model captured the following effects recorded by Fiorillo 
and colleagues, and demonstrated in the simulations of Niv et al (2005):  
• The phasic activations at the expected time of reward. 
• The sustained increase in activity from the onset of the conditioned stimulus 
until the expected time of reward. 
• The sustained activation increasing with increasing reward magnitude. 
 
What was new about this study is that I determined criteria for sustained activation 
(Fiorillo et al 2003; 2005) and ramping (Niv et al. 2005) that distinguished between 
the conflicting terminologies, which permitted analysis of single trials in my 
simulations. Single trial analysis has allowed me to address the following two points 
raised by Fiorillo et al. (2005) in response to the criticisms of Niv et al. (2005) of 
their original paper: 
• In the simulations both sustained activation and ramping were common in 
single trials during uncertainty, but as neither sustained activation nor 
ramping was greater with maximum uncertainty the simulations did not 
support the claims by Fiorillo et al. (2003; 2005) that dopamine is encoding 
uncertainty during the delay period between CS and receipt of reward. 
• It was demonstrated that activity in the last part of the delay period does not 
always reflect the reward outcome that followed the last exposure to that 
same CS. Specifically; the history of consecutive trials should be taken into 
consideration when analysing reward prediction errors and not just the last 
trial. In the presence of uncertainty, the particular course taken through a 
series of trials is different in each simulation, as it depends on the exact order 
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of rewarded and non-rewarded runs, which are delivered randomly. It is 
important that these factors should be taken into consideration when 
interpreting data from peri-stimulus-time-histograms of activity over different 
trials and inter-trial averaging, such as that in Fiorillo et al. (2003). 
 
My simulations supported the claims of Niv et al. (2005) and provided predictions in 
an ongoing debate over whether or not dopamine encodes uncertainty that could be 
verified by experimental data. Capturing such detailed physiological recordings in an 
alternative model to Niv et al. strengthens the use of TD as a valid method of 
modelling and quantifying the dopamine reward prediction error. 
 
To date this model has resulted in the following disseminations: 
• Abstract published in proceedings of International Conference on 
Schizophrenia Research, Colorado Springs, Colorado, March 28 – April 1 
2007. 
• A Model of Dopamine and Uncertainty Using Temporal Difference. Six page 
paper published in the proceedings of XXV111 Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society, Vancouver, Canada. 2006b. 
• Poster presented at the 10th International Conference on Cognitive and 
Neural Systems, Boston, Massachusetts, USA, May 17-20, 2006.  
 
Model 5 – A Connectionist Model of Dual System Control: (Chapter 8) 
Based on a model by Hinton and Plaut (1987), originally designed to address the 
problem of catastrophic forgetting in multilayer ANNs, I suggested an alternative use 
for a model with both fast and slow weights to address the problem of arbitration 
between two systems of control through rapid learning in the fast weights:  
• In a dual weighted network a set of fast weights allowed for more rapid 
changes in the environment than in a standard network with one set of 
weights, by reacting quickly to new information or change/surprise when the 
error in the system was high. This provided a temporary overlay of the new 
knowledge to the existing body of knowledge built up and stored in the slow 
weights, and provided time for the new knowledge to be assimilated into the 
old.  
 - The fast weights dominated when the error in the system was high, 
 early in training and when new associations were introduced to the 
 network. 
• But in a fully learned situation with minimum error or change/surprise the 
slow weights bearing the existing body of knowledge dominated as the fast 
weights decayed towards zero.  
  - The slow weights dominated when the error in the system was low 
  and the task was well learnt and more habitual.  
   
In order to illustrate the potential of this dual weighted network I referred to the 
distinction between different networks for goal directed actions and stimulus 
response habits (Yin and Knowlton 2006) that can be modelled effectively using 
model based and model free learning, respectively (Daw et al. 2005): 
• Fast weights could equate with the tree-search model based system that is 
capable of flexible, often one shot goal directed actions. However, this is at 
the cost of being expensive in terms of memory and time. 
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o Associated with cortico-basal ganglia circuit loops involving 
dorsomedial striatum. 
• Slow weights could equate with the model free TD-like system associated 
with inflexible stimulus response actions that require extensive relearning, 
but suffers from inflexibility. 
o Associated with cortico-basal ganglia circuit loops involving 
dorsolateral striatum.  
 
This model has several advantages over the existing model of arbitration between 
two controllers by Daw et al. (2005): 
• It allows for interactions between the two controllers. 
• The self-organising nature of the dual weights model does away with the 
need for the Bayesian arbitrator or homunculus.  
• As a biologically inspired connectionist application and an emergent model 
of two systems of control, it is in a better position to suggest how control may 
be exerted in the brain than a purely symbolic model.  
• It is a simple, relatively transparent model that can offer insights into methods 
of arbitration between two systems without need for sophisticated algorithms 
or software packages. 
 
Modelling these two systems associated with different cortical-subcortical loops 
offers the potential of incorporating both the symptoms and cognitive deficits 
associated with schizophrenia by taking into account the interactions between 
midbrain/striatum and cortical areas. 
 
 
9.1.2 Other Contributions  
 
The first part of the literature review in Chapter 2 contained a detailed account of the 
motivation behind this thesis: 
• It provided a basic description of schizophrenia, how it manifests itself in the 
human body and its biological underpinnings.  
• I outlined the difficulties in finding the ultimate cause of the disorder. 
• I explained the advantages of using computational modelling for this purpose; 
in particular, a biologically inspired connectionist approach. 
 
Chapter 4 contained the second part of the literature review. Having justified 
switching to a new line of reasoning involving the dopamine system, I looked at a 
body of research inspired by the physiological recordings of dopamine neurons on 
alert monkeys, by Wolfram Schultz and colleagues who showed that information 
about rewarding stimuli was encoded in dopaminergic activity. This included:  
• Dopamine as a reward prediction error signal.  
• TD incorporating an actor-critic architecture as an effective method of 
modelling the dopamine reward prediction error signal. 
• The role of the basal ganglia as a contextual processor. 
•  The Incentive Salience Hypothesis. 
• Evidence of the dopamine reward prediction error in humans from fMRI 
studies. 
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Disseminations arising from this line of reasoning include: 
• How Do Computational Models of the Role of Dopamine as a Reward 
Prediction Error Map on to Current Dopamine Theories of Schizophrenia? 
Six page paper published in the proceedings of XXV111 Annual Conference 
of the Cognitive Science Society, Vancouver, Canada. 2006a. (See Appendix 
II). 
• Abstract published in proceedings of The International Conference on 
Schizophrenia Research, Davos, Switzerland, February 2006. 
• Abstract published in the proceedings of the XXV11 Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society, Stresa, Italy, 21-23 July 2005. 
 
The sections in Chapter 4 provided the methodology behind a model by McClure et 
al. (2003) that incorporated the Incentive Salience Hypothesis into an Actor-Critic 
model of dopamine as a reward prediction error. In Chapter 5 I described and 
implemented a simulation of the Computational Substrate for Incentive Salience by 
McClure et al. and this model was expanded to look at the relationship between TD 
learning and uncertainty coding in Chapter 6.  
 
Chapter 7 marked another change in the direction of modelling and contained the 
third part of the literature reviews. Here I began to widen the focus of this thesis, 
which had narrowed down to TD in Chapters 4 to 6, back to my longer-term aim of 
improving the understanding of the neural systems involved in schizophrenia; taking 
into account a wider perspective of the interactions between cortical and subcortical 
brain areas, connected by cortico-basal ganglia circuit loops.  
 
In chapter 7 I drew attention to the limitations of using TD alone to account for 
action control in the brain:  
• The basic TD model is unable to distinguish between different rewards with a 
similar value that are preceded by an appropriate CS (Smith et al. 2006). In 
particular it is unable to distinguish between the effects of dopamine 
manipulation on distal rather than proximal rewards (Daw et al. 2005; Smith 
et al. 2004; 2006).  
• TD can be brittle as the prediction chains used by TD over successive time-
steps break down when the CS-US relationship is unreliable, such as in the 
complicated 1-2-AX working memory task, which involves maintaining both 
subgoals and higher order goals (O’Reilly et al. 2007). 
• The simple actor-critic is insensitive to motivational state and fails to take 
into account some of the psychological differences between Pavlovian and 
instrumental conditioning (Dayan & Balleine 2002). 
• In TD any change in task will have to be relearned explicitly, which will take 
time. In reality, relearning often needs to take place quickly, so current TD 
models do not account for all types of learning (Daw et al. 2005). 
 
As well as offering alternatives to TD, I noticed that all four studies pointed towards 
two systems of control operating together (Table 7.2). In particular, Daw et al. 
referred to the competition between multiple systems for behavioural choice in the 
brain, and the problem of arbitration between the systems when they disagreed. They 
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suggested a model of dual action choice, where the systems operated separately and 
in parallel, governed by a Bayesian principal of arbitration. My alternate 
connectionist model of dual system control is detailed in Chapter 8. 
 
  
9.2 Conclusions 
 
In this thesis I have explored a variety of computational models to seek an answer to 
the question: How can computational models of the neural systems involved in 
schizophrenia help to improve our understanding of the symptoms and cognitive 
deficits associated with the disorder? In this section I draw together the results from 
all my simulations in order to specifically address that question. 
 
Models 1 and 2 
The speech perception network (Hoffman & McGlashan 1987) and the learning and 
gating model (Braver et al. 1999) detailed in Chapter 3 were designed specifically to 
address either, one of the symptoms, or one of the cognitive deficits of the disorder. 
However, following a detailed exploration of those models, I discovered that their 
power of explanation was limited. Nevertheless, the flaws of these models pointed to 
a new line of reasoning to account for the symptoms and cognitive deficits of 
schizophrenia which included dopamine dysfunction and the neuroscience of the 
cortico-basal ganglia circuit loops, on which the remainder of this thesis rested. 
 
Models 3 and 4 
While the TD models detailed in Chapters 5 and 6 were not specific to schizophrenia, 
they were models of the specific firing patterns of dopamine, a possible mechanism 
in the midbrain and cortex for the symptoms and cognitive deficits of schizophrenia. 
These computational models have suggested how dopamine firing patterns may 
transfer to behaviour, and attempt to answer some of the questions that are difficult 
to address using conventional methods. In particular, an answer to the question of 
whether or not dopamine is encoding uncertainty could result in a better 
understanding of the nature of dopamine signaling, with implications for the 
psychopathology of cognitive disorders, like schizophrenia, for which dopamine is 
commonly regarded as having a primary role. 
 
The Computational Substrate for Incentive Salience by McClure et al. (2003) 
successfully united psychological and formal computational theories by interpreting 
expected future reward as incentive salience. This approach saw dopamine receptor 
antagonism, characteristic of the effects of antipsychotic drugs, as the inhibition of 
the ability to initiate actions necessary for gaining rewards. According to Kapur 
(2003) aberrant phasic dopamine responses could lead to delusions and possibly 
hallucinations associated with thought disturbance in schizophrenia (Chapter 4.4.1). 
The action of antipsychotic drugs may protect against the formation of the aberrant 
internal representations by attenuating aberrant incentive salience via phasic dopamine 
signals. A clearer understanding of the role of dopamine and the best methods of 
modelling those functions will help in the quest for the understanding of schizophrenia. 
 
Much of the research into schizophrenia has been, and is still, centered on the robust 
finding that there is a remarkable correlation between the efficacy of antipsychotic 
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drugs in treating psychosis and the ability of those drugs to block the dopamine D2 
receptors. However, while it is posited that psychosis results from a dysregulation of 
the dopamine mesolimbic system (Weinberger 1987; Grace 1991; Kapur & Mamo 
2003), there is still little evidence to support this hypothesis. Computational modelling 
can help to support this position by simulating biological data, thus providing an 
insight into the underlying mechanisms.  
 
My version of the Computational Substrate for Incentive Salience by McClure et al. 
(2003), using TD, captured the differences in the patterns of behaviour seen in two 
animal experiments resulting from high and low dopamine receptor antagonism, 
revealing the dual function of dopamine, as a learning signal and in the bias of action 
selection. In addition, this model was modified to simulate the detailed 
electrophysiological recordings of dopamine neuron firing by Fiorillo et al (2003; 
2005), strengthening the argument for TD as a valid method of modelling and 
quantifying the dopamine reward prediction error. The simulations detailed in these 
two chapters are examples of science through simulation and my model of 
uncertainty demonstrates how computational modelling can help to clarify a position 
by generating testable predictions that can be verified with behavioural data. 
 
While I appreciate that TD must be one of many algorithms working simultaneously 
in the brain, I agree with Niv et al. (2005) that the ramping signal, both in single 
trials, and when averaged over multiple trials, is strong evidence for the nature of the 
learning mechanism of a shift in dopamine activity from the expected time of reward 
to the CS, using TD. I suggest that it is both reasonable and biologically plausible for 
future models of dopamine to include TD learning. However, in spite of the fact that 
TD offers a very good account of the firing patterns of dopamine neurons, it is clear 
from the studies detailed in Chapter 7 that it offers an incomplete picture of the 
reinforcement learning account of action control in the brain. 
 
Model 5 
My ANN containing dual weights developed in Chapter 8 demonstrated how two 
systems of control in the brain may coexist and interact. This dual weighted model 
has shown emergent properties from a single system with dual weights representing 
two subsystems, via fast and slow weights that are contained within the same set of 
neurons. This suggests the possibility of two or more interacting systems 
incorporated into the same neural material, permitting transfers between the two 
systems. 
 
In order to illustrate the potential of this model I suggested how stimulus-response 
habits (associated with incentive salience and the striatum) and goal directed actions 
(associated with working memory and the prefrontal cortex) may relate together in 
different cortico-basal ganglia circuit loops; and how these two circuits may interact. 
Both working memory and incentive salience feature in the expression of cognitive 
deficits and symptoms of schizophrenia, respectively. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is likely that symptoms and deficits arise from 
different brain areas and this adds to the general difficulty of finding the cause or 
causes of schizophrenia. Modelling cortical-subcortical loops offers the potential of 
incorporating both the symptoms and cognitive deficits associated with 
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schizophrenia by taking into account the interactions between midbrain/striatum and 
cortical areas. Future improvements to the dual weights model, suggested in Chapter 
8.6 and discussed further in Section 9.3 may have important implications in 
addressing how both goal directed and stimulus response learning may coexist and 
how a dysfunction of these systems could underlie disorders such as schizophrenia. It 
may be possible to explain one in terms of the other, or it may be that the two cannot 
be equated.  
 
Final Thoughts 
I reiterate the limitations of modelling originally addressed in Chapter 2 that the 
models in this thesis are informative rather than definitive; qualitative rather than 
quantitative, and as such cannot be predictive. However, the usefulness of these 
models lie in their relative transparency and the ability to suggest what might be 
reasonable lines for research. Therefore, I am not claiming that the brain is actually 
working in the same way as the algorithms underlying these models, but simply 
suggesting how these processes can be modelled and what might occur. Such 
computational insights can be used to generate quantitative findings, providing 
avenues for further empirical study or treatment strategies, and may contribute to 
biological theory. 
 
Schizophrenia has a varied evidence base with different methodologies and 
applications, ranging from pharmacological and neurophysiological studies to brain 
imaging. Ultimately the results from all these studies should be integrated to form a 
cohesive whole for an understanding of the disorder. However, we are still far from 
reaching this point and cognitive modelling will continue to try to unite biological 
and psychological theories in an attempt to answer the challenging question of 
whether or not there is a simple mechanism on which higher level cognition can be 
built. 
 
 
9.3 Future Directions 
 
Model 4 - An Analysis of the Relationship between Temporal Difference 
Learning and Uncertainty Coding in a Computational Model of Dopaminergic 
Signalling: (Chapter 6) 
 
• The current model is parameter dependent and discrete, containing a set 
number of states. In reality neuron firing is noisy and therefore less 
predictable and a spiking form of this model could contain more realistic 
noise and more closely resemble dopamine neuron firing in vivo.  
 
• The current model only allows for one CS in any one trial. Future versions 
could provide multiple CS, allowing me to address a further point by Fiorillo 
et al. (2005) concerning a dissociation between the size of the ramp and the 
sustained activation at the estimated time of reward, identified in Tobler, 
Fiorillo and Schultz (2005).  
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• Apart from modelling uncertainty in the receipt of reward, a modified version 
of this model could be used to look at an alternative, under researched form 
of uncertainty: the uncertainty in the timing of our own intrinsic internal 
clocks. 
 
• Some evidence suggests that the persistent reward responses of dopamine 
cells during conditioning are only accurately replicated by a TD model with 
long-lasting eligibility traces, such as TD(λ) (Pan et al. 2005). It would be 
interesting to implement the model using this version of the TD algorithm to 
see the effect of different strengths of eligibility trace. 
 
 
Model 5 – A Connectionist Model of Dual System Control: (Chapter 8) 
 
• Introducing dopamine driven learning into future versions of the model will 
enhance biological plausibility and may obviate the need to set the parameters 
of the model prior to each task. A phasic dopamine reward prediction error, 
modelled as a TD error, representing significance/surprise could affect the 
modifiable parameters of the model in the following ways:  
  - By changing learning rates. 
  - By changing the decay rate for the fast weights. 
  - A combination of the above. 
 
• Other applications could be to apply the model to some of the other dual 
systems identified in Chapter 7, Table 7.2. In particular, modelling the phasic 
dopamine neuron firing seen in learning and the tonic dopamine relating to the 
expression of previously acquired behaviour could potentially address one of 
the limitations of the basic TD model; the inability to distinguish between the 
effects of dopamine manipulation on distal rather than proximal rewards 
(Daw et al. 2005; Smith et al. 2004; 2006).  
 
• I have provided a theoretical argument for the implementation of an ANN with 
dual weights. However, in order to demonstrate the value of the model it will 
be necessary to test the theory using psychological tasks, possibly of sequential 
learning, that will exploit two systems of control. It will then be possible to 
explore how a dysfunction of these systems could influence the two routes to 
action.  
 
 Ideally, the task should involve learning using a supervised data set, where the 
 difference between the actual and target output can be backpropagated through 
 the network. In addition, in order to demonstrate flexible cognitive control and 
 broad training experience there should be subtasks. Rougier et al. (2005) 
 provided an interesting sequential learning task bearing these characteristics 
 that could be adapted to test this model. 
 
• There are clearly many systems of control operating in parallel in the brain and 
future versions of the model could accommodate multiple systems by having 
multiple weights associated with each artificial neuron (or set of neurons). 
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Appendix I 
 
Chapter 4.3.3.1 An Example of the Learning Process 
 
 
Appendix I contain raw data from the simulation detailed in Chapter 4.3.3.1 for runs 
1-3, 15-16 and 27-29 through the maze in Figure 4.6. The data is for actual moves 
taken and does not include considerations of moves not made, which are an artefact 
of the model. The information includes: (i) the state from which the move is made; 
(ii) the state moved to (iii) the TD error, δ(t); (iv) the values, V(st), for each state in 
the maze; and (iii) a brief explanation of how progression through the maze occurs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moved 
from 
state to  δ(t) 
V(st) 
S1 
V(st) 
S2 
V(st) 
S3 
V(st) 
S4 
V(st) 
S5 
 
V(st) 
S6 
V(st) 
S7 
V(st) 
S8 
V(st) 
S0 
Reward 
 Run 1 
0  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    
     0
0
Rat in a one way maze, beginning in S0 
and thinking ahead of possible move to 
next state S1. Moves are made by chance 
according to a sigmoid decision curve, P = 
(1 + e 
     
     
     
     
–m (δ(t) – b) )-1, where moves are more 
likely when δ(t) is high. Moves are 
eventually made to subsequent states. 
     
Has moved to S7 and is thinking ahead of 
move to S8 where there is a reward of 1, 
but has not yet encountered reward 
δ(t) = rt + γV(st + 1) – V(st) 
= 0 + 0 – 0 = 0 
R1 GIVEN 
 
 
7 8 1   
Have moved to reward state S8 and is 
considering move to next state 0. Only gets 
positive δ(t) when reward is received 
δ(t) = rt + γV(st + 1) – V(st) 
= 1 + 0 – 0 = 1 
 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
Consider move to S0 
No positive δ(t), δ(t) = rt + γV(st + 1) – V(st) 
( 0 + 0 – 0 = 0 ) V(st) is updated only when 
actual move made away from reward state. 
V(si) Å V(si) + α δ(t) (alpha = 0.5) 
Update is 0 + (0.5 x 1) = 0.5 
 
 Run 2  
0  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
V(st) remains stored 
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Moved 
from to δ(t) 
V(st) 
S1 
V(st) 
S2 
V(st) 
S3 
V(st) 
S4 
V(st) 
S5 
 
V(st) 
S6 
V(st) 
S7 
V(st) 
S8 
V(st) 
S0 
Reward 
3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
4 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
5 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
V(st) remains stored 
6 7 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
Have moved to S7 and is thinking ahead of 
move to S8 where there is a reward of 1. 
Has encountered reward before, the effect 
of which is stored in V(st) as 0.5.  
δ(t) = rt + γV(st + 1) – V(st) 
0 + 0.5 – 0 = 0.5 
R1 GIVEN 
7 8 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 0
Have moved to reward state S8 and is 
considering move to next state 0. Reward 
of 1 is received a second time in S8, which 
is reflected in a positive δ(t) 
δ(t) = rt + γV(st + 1) – V(st) 
1 + 0 – 0.5 = 0.5 
Additionally, V(st) of S7 is updated once 
the rat has moved away from that state 
V(si) Å V(si) + α δ(t) 
Update is 0 + (0.5 x 0.5) = 0.25 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.75 0
V(st) of S8 is updated when rat moves 
away from that state 
V(si) Å V(si) + α δ(t) 
Update is 0.5 + (0.5 x 0.5) = 0.75 
Run 3  
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.75 0
1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.75 0
2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.75 0
3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.75 0
4 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.75 0
5 6 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.75 0
V(st) remains stored. 
Effects of δ(t) and V(st) are seen earlier in 
transition from S5 to S6 and in S6, 
respectively 
R1 GIVEN  6 7 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.12 0.25 0.75 0
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Moved 
from to δ(t) 
V(st) 
S1 
V(st) 
S2 
V(st) 
S3 
V(st) 
S4 
V(st) 
S5 
 
V(st) 
S6 
V(st) 
S7 
V(st) 
S8 
V(st) 
S0 
Reward 
7 8 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0.12 0.5 0.75 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.12 0.5 0.87 0
 
RUNS 4-14 
Run 15 
0 1 0.21 0.4 0.6 0.79 0.91 0.97 0.99 1 1 0
1 2 0.18 0.5 0.6 0.79 0.91 0.97 0.99 1 1 0
2 3 0.12 0.5 0.7 0.79 0.91 0.97 0.99 1 1 0
3 4 0.06 0.5 0.7 0.85 0.91 0.97 0.99 1 1 0
4 5 0.02 0.5 0.7 0.85 0.94 0.97 0.99 1 1 0
5 6 0.01 0.5 0.7 0.85 0.94 0.98 0.99 1 1 0
6 7 0 .5 0.7 85 .94 .98 1 1 1 0
7 8 0 .5 0.7 85 .94 .98 1 1 1 0
1 1 1
0 1 .2 .5 0.7 85 .94 .98 1 1 1 0
1 2 15 .6 0.7 85 .94 .98 1 1 1 0
2 3 09 .6 .77 85 .94 .98 1 1 1 0
3 4 04 .6 .77 89 .94 .98 1 1 1 0
4 5 01 .6 .77 89 .96 .98 1 1 1 0
5 6 0 .6 .77 89 .96 .99 1 1 1 0
6 7 0 .6 .77 89 .96 .99 1 1 1 0
7 8 0 .6 .77 89 .96 .99 1 1 1 0
8 0 .6 .6 .77 89 .96 .99 1 1 1 0
0 1 01 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 2 0 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
2 3 0 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
3 4 0 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
4 5 0 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
5 6 0 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
   0  0. 0 0  
   0  0. 0 0  
8 0 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.85 0.94 0.98  0
By run 15 δ(t) is at a maximum of 0.5 at 
state transition S8-S0, where it is already 
the dominant CS. 
The V(st) for each state is rising and states 
S6, S7 and S8 have already achieved a 
maximum V(st) of 1.  
R1 GIVEN  
Run 16 
  0  0  0. 0 0  
  0.  0  0. 0 0  
  0.  0  0 0. 0 0  
  0.  0  0 0. 0 0  
  0.  0  0 0. 0 0  
   0  0 0. 0 0  
 
R1 GIVEN     0  0 0. 0 0  
   0  0 0. 0 0  
  0  0  0 0. 0 0  
 
RUNS 17-26 
Run 27 
  0.  0.   
   0.   
   0.   
   0.   
   0.   
   0.   
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9 0
7 8 0 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
8 0 99 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 01 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 2 0 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
2 3 0 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
3 4 0 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
4 5 0 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
5 6 0 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
6 7 0 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
7 8 0 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
8 0 99 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
2 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
3 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
4 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
5 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
6 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
7 8 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Moved 
from to 
6
δ(t) 
7
V(st) 
S1 
0
V(st) 
S2 
9
V(st) 
S3 
1
V(st) 
S4 
1
V(st) 
S5 
1
 
V(st) 
S6 
1
V(st) 
S7 
1
V(st) 
S8 
1
V(st) 
S0 
1
Reward 
   0.   R1 GIVEN  
   0.   
  0.  0.   
Run 28 
  0.  0.   
   0.   
   0.   
   0.   
   0.   
   0.   
 
   0.   R1 GIVEN  
   0.   
  0.  0.   
 
Run 29 
   0.   
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
8 0 1   0
By run 29 complete learning has taken 
place: 
δ(t) in state transition S8-S0 = 1 and has 
become the CS. 
While V(st) for each state is 1 (except for 
reset state S0). 
 
R1 GIVEN  
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Abstract 
A review of the current dopamine theories of schizophrenia reveals a likely imbalance between cortical and 
subcortical microcircuits due to an insufficient inhibitory brake, leading to a disruption of the dopamine system and 
the classic positive psychotic symptoms, negative symptoms and cognitive deficits associated with the disorder. 
Recent computational models have modelled the role of dopamine as a reward prediction error, using Temporal 
Difference and have successfully shown how these symptoms could arise from a disturbance to the dopamine 
system. We review these models in the light of dopamine theories of schizophrenia and highlight some of the major 
points that should be addressed by future computational models.  
 
Keywords: Dopamine; Schizophrenia; Neurocomputational Modelling; Salience; Temporal Difference. 
 
Theories of the role of dopamine over the last five years tend to converge on the idea that 
dopamine encodes a reward prediction error (RPE) of the discrepancy between actual and 
expected future reward. This discrepancy is used to drive learning towards actions which 
are necessary for survival in the real world (Schultz, 1998), and it is likely that disruption 
to this system gives rise to an abnormality in information processing by dopamine and 
some of the symptoms currently associated with schizophrenia, particularly psychosis and 
deficits in working memory. Temporal Difference Learning (Sutton, 1988; Sutton & 
Barto, 1998), a form of Reinforcement Learning Theory, provides an explicit method of 
modelling and quantifying the Reward Prediction, or Temporal Difference (TD), error 
(Schultz, Dayan & Montague, 1997; Hollerman & Schultz, 1998) and can be used as a 
valid computational implementation of the RPE for neural network simulations. While 
dopamine should not be viewed in isolation, but seen to be working in concert with other 
neurotransmitters, such as glutamate and GABA (Abi-Dhargham, 2004; Carlsson, Waters, 
Holm-Waters, Tedroff, Nilsson & Carlsson, 2001; Winterer & Weinberger, 2004), there 
are still attributes and deficiencies that can be strongly linked to dopamine activity.  
    The role of dopamine, and the possible location and nature of the dysfunction, presented 
in theories of schizophrenia by Carlsson et al, (2001); Kapur, (2003); Abi-Dhargham, 
(2004) and Winterer & Weinberger, (2004), are discussed in the first section on dopamine 
theories of schizophrenia below. The second section relates specifically to computational 
models, particularly existing connectionist models of dopamine as a reward prediction, or 
TD error, including evidence that the RPE model of dopamine activity applies to humans 
as well as primates. The biological plausibility of existing neural network models by 
Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, (1992); Braver Barch & Cohen, (1999); Suri & Schultz, 
(1999); Rougier, Noelle, Braver, Cohen & O’Reilly, (2005) and O’Reilly & Frank, (2006) 
are then discussed in the light of the afore-mentioned dopamine theories of schizophrenia. 
Finally, we conclude with four major questions arising from recent dopamine theories of 
schizophrenia that remain to be addressed by current computational models. 
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Dopamine Theories of Schizophrenia 
Role of Dopamine 
It is generally agreed that dopamine enables the ability to focus on task relevant 
information. Current theories of the effects of dopamine on behaviour focus on the role of 
dopamine as a neuromodulator in Reinforcement Learning, where organisms learn to 
organise their behaviour under the influence of goals, and expected future reward is 
believed to drive action selection, as seen during conditioning. Neurophysiological 
recordings of single dopamine neurons in primates have identified a reward prediction 
error signal of the discrepancy between actual and expected future reward (Schultz et al., 
1997; Hollerman & Schultz, 1998). In conditioning, before learning, this phasic burst of 
dopamine occurs at the time an unexpected reward is encountered. As trials progress and 
learning continues, the reward becomes more and more predictable and the phasic burst 
effectively moves backwards towards the time the conditioned stimulus (CS) occurs. 
Eventually, when full learning has taken place, the CS will elicit the same phasic response 
previously associated with the unexpected reward.  
    In particular, evidence suggests that the dopamine system may mediate the Incentive 
Salience of rewards, modulating their motivational value, which is dissociable from 
hedonia and reward learning (Berridge & Robinson, 1998). The modern Incentive 
Salience Theory distinguishes ‘wanting’ from ‘liking,’ and the dopamine system is 
regarded as that which calculates the ‘want’ rather than the ‘act’ parts of instrumental 
behaviour. Kapur’s framework of psychosis builds on this hypothesis, and sees the role of 
dopamine as mediating the salience of both internal and environmental representations.  
    Abi-Dhargham refers to the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia and uses 
neuroimaging techniques such as SPECT and PET to monitor changes in synaptic 
dopamine levels. Using data from electrophysiological techniques on a smaller timescale, 
Winterer & Weinberger are more explicit and refer to the apparent ability of dopamine to 
optimise the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of local cortical microcircuits.  
    Carlsson et al. take a wider view and see dopamine as one of many possible 
dysfunctional neurotransmitters affected in the brain in schizophrenia. Pharmacological 
evidence suggests small differences in the fragile balance between multi-neurotransmitters 
at various points in local cortical microcircuits leads to many of both the positive and 
negative symptoms associated with the disorder. They posit that although there may be an 
elevated baseline release of dopamine in schizophrenia, it is possibly secondary to 
hypoglutamatergia. 
Where is the Dysfunction? 
One of the few biological disturbances that have been identified in schizophrenic patients 
is an impaired dopamine system, which traditionally has been of an increase in dopamine 
signaling in the striatum, leading to psychosis (Winterer & Weinberger, 2004). The 
Dopamine Hypothesis of Schizophrenia arose as a result of two major findings: (i) 
Exposure to dopamine receptor agonists, such as amphetamine, induces psychosis, and (ii) 
antipsychotic drugs provide an antipsychotic effect by blocking dopamine receptors (Abi-
Dhargham, 2004). Current views still posit deficits due to an increase in dopamine; 
however it is the site of the excess that is controversial. Kapur refers to a general excess, 
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while Abi-Dhargham refers to the traditional cortical/subcortical imbalance, with an 
excess in the subcortex and a deficit in the cortex. Winterer & Weinberger, on the other 
hand, suggest that it may be the cortical and not striatal microcircuits that give rise to 
abnormal dopamine signaling. Carlsson et al. also refer to possible cortical steering of 
subcortical systems, but by glutamate action. However, all agree that it is the resulting 
imbalance that leads to the problem and, overall, current opinion would imply that it is the 
imbalance in the dopamine circuits between cortical and striatal brain regions that leads to 
the dysfunction, while the actual point of the dysfunction remains controversial. Indeed it 
may be that disruption at different points in the circuits may lead to different symptoms or 
cognitive deficits and computational modelling may help us to answer these questions. 
    Carlsson et al. refer to a secondary general elevated baseline release of dopamine in 
schizophrenia, possibly due to a primary disturbance in cortical glutamate/GABA 
mediated steering of monoamine subcortical systems, (including dopamine). There is a 
direct glutamate pathway which acts as an accelerator and an indirect glutamate pathway 
that activates GABA and is an effective brake on the activity of monoamines. It is the 
balance between accelerator and brake that maintains stability and glutamatergic failure in 
the cerebral cortex may lead to negative symptoms, while glutamatergic failure in the 
basal ganglia would favour positive symptoms. These result from dysregulation of the 
dopamine system. 
    Abi-Dhargham and Winterer & Weinberger also refer to such an insufficient inhibitory 
brake as the possible nature of the dysfunction. Abi-Dhargham refers to a hypostimulation 
in the cortex of D1 receptors which causes a deficit in working memory, and a 
hyperstimulation in the subcortex of D2 receptors which leads to psychotic symptoms, as a 
result of the reduced cortical brake. Winterer & Weinberger refer principally to a reduced 
prefrontal dopamine D1/D2 receptor activation ratio which leads to a lower cortical SNR. 
They posit that normally it is the D1 receptors that dominate, but in schizophrenia D2 
receptors dominate, and as a result of the primary disturbance, secondary effects will occur 
subcortically in the striatum leading to contextually inappropriate, inflexible and bizarre 
behavioural routines. 
    All these theories seem to point to an imbalance in the dopamine system between the 
cortical and subcortical areas, due to an insufficient inhibitory brake system, with negative 
symptoms occurring as a result of disturbance to the cortex and positive symptoms as a 
disturbance to subcortical areas. 
What is the Dysfunction? 
Kapur posits that psychosis is a state of aberrant salience, where excess levels of dopamine 
are no longer stimulus-linked and context-driven. Delusions (paranoia, aliens interfering 
with one’s brain), and hallucinations (hearing voices), may arise then as a result of the 
individual attempting to provide their own explanations for experiences which come out of 
the blue and are imbued with high importance. This is in keeping with an earlier theory of 
schizophrenia by Maher (1988) that patients make normal attributions, or reasoned 
normally to abnormal experiences, i.e., subcortical abnormality with normal cortical 
function. It is known that patients with schizophrenia suffer from a wide-spread cognitive 
dysfunction that affects memory, executive functioning and attention (Bilder et al., 2000; 
McKenna, 1997). However, there seems to be a dissociation between the psychotic 
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experiences (delusions, hallucinations) and cognitive dysfunction. The latter occur well in 
advance of onset symptoms, and the trajectory of symptom recovery is not matched by 
cognitive recovery (Harvey, Koren, Reichenberg & Bowie, 2005). Traditional cognitive 
models of schizophrenia based on cognitive dysfunction in memory/attention/executive 
dysfunction have poor face validity when used to explain the spontaneous experiences 
(delusions/hallucinations) which are bizarre, or strange, since these are unrelated to past 
experience and stored memories (Simpson, Done, Valeé-Tourangeau , 2002). 
   The recent developments in understanding the role of dopamine in salience allocation do 
permit the formulation of cognitive neuroscience models which can integrate both 
Maher’s theory with the known cognitive dysfunctions in schizophrenia. Computing the 
salience of stimuli (both external and internal, such as thoughts/ideas) is probably 
achieved by midbrain/ventral striatal dopamine systems rather than cortical ones 
(O’Doherty Dayan, Schultz, Deichmann, Friston & Dolan, 2004). This is the ‘critic’ in 
models of the dopamine system in the basal ganglia (Montague, Hyman & Cohen, 2004; 
Sutton & Barto, 1998). In schizophrenia we posit that within the critic, the signal (winner) 
is distinguished from the noise (losers). This signal is then transmitted to other systems 
(e.g., ‘actor’ in dorsal striatum), or cortical systems, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) responsible for various attributional, memory, executive and attentional 
processes (Durstewitz, Kelc & Gunturkun, 1999). Thus stimuli, or experienced episodes, 
which are unimportant, can be imbued with a high degree of salience by the critic in the 
ventral striatum/midbrain. This provides the spontaneous experience imbued with 
importance.  High variance in the level of background dopamine activity would also mean 
that these experiences occur from time to time, but not all of the time.  Dopamine 
abnormalities in DLPFC would not only account for the neuropsychological deficits found 
in schizophrenia but they could also integrate the abnormal experiences into dysfunctional 
attributional, executive and memory systems.  We can crudely equate these dual roles as 
being due to dopamine abnormalities in the midbrain/striatum and cortex respectively, as 
outlined previously in the theories of Abi-Dhargham (2004) and Winterer and Weinberger 
(2005). As described previously, the interaction between these different levels means that 
they cannot operate independently, but in consort. This permits a more tractable model of 
the psychology of schizophrenia, i.e. a model of both symptoms and classical cognitive 
abnormalities.  
Antipsychotics 
The action of antipsychotic drugs can help further understand what is going wrong with 
the dopamine system. Kapur proposes that antipsychotics dampen ‘aberrant saliences’ by 
blocking excess dopamine, leading to an attenuation of motivational salience of ideas and 
perceptions.  In this way antipsychotics remove the degree to which symptoms occupy the 
mind, but not the core content of the symptom.  They simply provide a neurochemical 
balance where dopamine levels return to normal, new aberrant saliences are less likely to 
form and existing ones are more likely to stop.  It is only in the weeks to come that an 
individual may work through and resolve their delusions in their own time.  In this way 
the delusions and hallucinations may be deconstructed, but this is not always the case as 
some patients are never able to resolve their symptoms psychologically. 
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    Abi-Dhargham does not refer to antipsychotic action, but Winterer & Weinberger 
deviate from the traditional view of antipsychotic action on D2 receptors in the striatum 
and, using evidence from imaging studies, suggest that antipsychotics may exert actions 
instead through D2 receptor blockade in the cortex. Carlsson et al. refer to the adverse 
effects of classic antipsychotics which lead to hypodopaminergia in patients in remission 
from their positive symptoms that cause failure of the reward system leading to dsyphoria 
and anhedonia; and negative effects, such as catatonia and cognitive deficits. They have 
developed both partial dopamine-receptor agonists, and antagonists, that act on D2 
receptors, stabilising the elevated dopamine levels without causing hypodopaminergia. 
However, they do not refer to the exact site of those receptors. 
    Both Carlsson et al. and Winterer & Weinberger focus on D2 receptor blockade as 
means of resolving the dopamine imbalance which leads to psychotic symptoms, but the 
exact site of impact remains unclear. 
Interim Conclusions 
Dopamine provides a RPE signal of the discrepancy between actual and expected future 
reward and it would appear to be an imbalance between cortical and subcortical 
microcircuits that leads to a dysfunction of the dopamine system. However, the actual 
point of the dysfunction remains controversial. Recently it has been suggested that it may 
be cortical microcircuits that give rise to abnormal dopamine signaling, with secondary 
downstream subcortical deficits, instead of the traditional view of a primary subcortical 
disturbance (Winterer & Weinberger, 2004).  
    It is generally agreed that the resulting imbalance may result from an insufficient 
inhibitory brake system leading to either a hypostimulation in the cortex of D1 receptors 
and a hyperstimulation in the subcortex of D2 receptors (Abi-Dhargham, 2004), or a 
reduced prefrontal dopamine D1/D2 receptor activation ratio, in which D2 receptors 
dominate, which leads primarily to a lower cortical SNR (Winterer & Weinberger, 2004). 
D2 receptor blockade would appear to be important in restoring the cortical/subcortical 
imbalance (Carlsson et al., 2001; Winterer & Weinberger, 2004). 
    Furthermore, positive psychotic symptoms arise from either a primary subcortical 
hyperstimulation of dopamine receptors (Abi-Dhargham, 2004), or secondary effects of 
either reduced cortical SNR on subcortical systems (Winterer & Weinberger, 2004), or 
cortical gluatamate/GABA steering of subcortical systems (Carlsson et al., 2001). 
Negative symptoms and working memory deficits are thought to result from either 
hypostimulation of D1 receptors (Abi-Dhargham, 2004) or reduced prefrontal dopamine 
D1/D2 receptor activation ratio with D2 receptors dominating (Winterer & Weinberger, 
2004).  
Computational Models of Dopamine as a Reward Prediction/Temporal Difference 
Error Signal 
Several computational models of the role of dopamine as a RPE have incorporated 
Temporal Difference (TD) Learning (Sutton, 1988), a form of Reinforcement Learning 
Theory, which provides an explicit method of modelling and quantifying the Reward 
Prediction error (Schultz et al, 1997; Hollerman & Schultz, 1998; Montague et al., 2004). 
Specifically, it provides a mathematical interpretation of how dopamine is thought to 
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mediate reward-processing and reward-dependent learning, thus optimising behaviour in 
an environment. A  class of TD models, known as actor-critic models (Sutton & Barto, 
1998), have been adapted so that expected future reward is equivalent to incentive salience 
(McClure, Daw & Montague, 2003; Montague et al., 2004). Here, the error signal 
generated is used in two ways: (i) The ‘critic’ - as a prediction error or learning signal used 
to create better estimates of future reward. (ii) The ‘actor’ - to bias action selection 
towards situations that predict the best reward.  
    It is possible that the same RPE is signaled from dopamine neurons in both the ventral 
tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra (SN). The signal is used in two ways 
depending on the route it takes, with the projections from VTA to ventral striatum as the 
‘critic’ in TD models, associated with reward and motivation, and projections from SN to 
dorsal striatum as the ‘actor’, associated with motor control (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Daw, 
Niv & Dayan, 2005). The dopamine pathways are arranged in cortical/subcortical circuit 
loops involving prefrontal cortex (Alexander et al., 1985), and it is in the cortical areas that 
dopamine dysfunction is believed to have an effect on working memory. 
    It has also been suggested that TD Learning can help with the dynamic choice of action 
selection to obtain natural rewards required for survival. As well as assisting in the 
learning process, it has been suggested that the dopamine signal can be used in decision-
making, when full learning has taken place, to bias the choice of actions that lead to better 
rewards in another actor/critic model by Schultz et al., (1997). When full learning has 
taken place the RPE will be zero and fluctuations above and below that point will provide 
important ongoing evaluations in the environment of salience which can be assessed 
quickly according to whether the fluctuations represent potential actions that are better or 
worse than expected. In this way an instant comparison can be made between well-learnt 
possibilities; all that is required is a simple behaviour strategy, to choose those actions 
associated with increased dopaminergic activity and incentive salience, and avoid those of 
low salience where dopaminergic activity is decreased. In this way, a damaged dopamine 
system could explain why adults become slow to do things that they used to do so easily. 
Their ability to make these instant comparisons or to maintain context would become 
impaired, and lead to some of the cognitive deficits associated with schizophrenia, such as 
poor performance in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) or the 1-2-AX Test, where 
it is important to maintain context.  
    TD models have proved to be very successful in many behavioural tasks and are used 
extensively in robotics to enable learning and reacting to an environment. However, while 
they are often more efficient than other reinforcement learning algorithms (Suri & Schultz, 
1999), complications may arise when unpredictable events occur, which break the learning 
chains constructed through prediction (O’Reilly & Frank, 2006), and this has led to some 
researchers who have previously used TD, seeking alternative combinations of algorithms 
as learning mechanism (Hazy, Frank & O’Reilly, In Press).  
Evidence for Role of Dopamine as a Reward Prediction Error/Temporal Difference 
Signal 
Functional imaging techniques have provided evidence that the RPE model of dopamine 
activity applies to human reward learning, and not just to primates, as seen in 
neurophysiological recordings by Schultz and colleagues mentioned above. Transient 
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learning-related changes associated with the ‘critic’ have been identified in the brains of 
humans subjected to classical conditioning procedures, in the ventral striatum (putamen) 
(McClure, Berns & Montague, 2003; O’Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley & Dolan, 
2003). While O’Doherty et al, (2004) showed that activity in the dorsal striatum is 
associated with the ‘actor’ only, as no activity was seen in this area unless an action was 
required.  
    In addition, activation patterns consistent with predictions from a TD model of learning 
have also been recorded in the orbital frontal cortex (O’Doherty et al., 2003). Furthermore, 
Seymour et al. (2004) have used fMRI to show that neural activity in the ventral striatum 
and the anterior insula corresponds to the signals for sequential learning predicted by TD 
models, in humans in higher-order learning. 
How Do Existing Computational Models Compare with the Cortical/Subcortical 
Debate of Theories for Schizophrenia?  
The early connectionist model by Cohen & Servan-Schreiber (1992) and some 
biophysically detailed neural network models (Brunel & Wang, 2001; Durstewitz et al., 
1999; Durstewitz, Seamans & Sejnowski, 2000) have modelled dopamine as a 
neuromodulator crucial for optimising the SNR thought to enhance working memory. This 
model is limited as it simulates only the DLPFC circuits, but not the critic in striatum and 
midbrain. Other models have incorporated Reinforcement Learning methods and modelled 
dopamine as a RPE signal, which can be effectively modelled using TD Learning (Braver 
et al., 1999; Suri & Schultz, 1999; Rougier et al., 2005).  
    As previously mentioned, it is believed that the actual point of dysfunction in 
subcortical/cortical microcircuits remains controversial. Cohen and colleagues have 
modelled working memory deficits, simulating the continuous performance test (CPT) 
(Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Braver et al., 1999), with the latter model, a more 
powerful and complete theory of the mechanism of cognitive control, incorporating both 
TD learning and gating functions for dopamine, where dopamine was seen as a unitary 
function which enabled an organism to predict and respond appropriately to events that led 
to reward. In this later model schizophrenia was seen as an impaired ability to internally 
represent, maintain and update context relating to working memory from increased noise 
in the dopamine system, focusing particularly on the prefrontal cortex. The model 
suggested that reduced phasic activity, i.e., reduced update to active memory, led to 
perservatory behaviour; while increased phasic activity, i.e., increased update, led to poor 
interference control, and therefore distractibility. Additionally, increased tonic (or longer-
term background) activity led to delay related decay of active memory, and therefore 
maintenance deficits. Both perseverations and distractibility are known disturbances to the 
prefrontal cortex and are typical symptoms of Schizophrenia, along with poor 
maintenance control. Perseveratory behaviour occurs when a patient becomes preoccupied 
with a task and is unable to change strategy or appropriately update goal representations, 
while distractibility is the inability to concentrate or focus on the task at hand. This model 
posits that both perseverations and distractibility are due to impairments in phasic 
dopaminergic activity which affect working memory. However, the model is of two very 
different systems in the brain doing different jobs and possibly coding for two different 
things; salience in the midbrain and how it possibly affects working memory in the 
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prefrontal cortex. It is important, therefore, to investigate how these behaviours relate to 
each other and it is this interaction that will be explored in the current research. 
    The increased noise could be due to an imbalance between cortical and subcortical 
structures due to the insufficient inhibitory brake system on the dopamine system. 
However, the model has a simple architecture with no hidden layers and modules 
containing between one and four neurons. The simple task is hard-wired and it is not a 
cognitive model. 
    Using a more sophisticated architecture, a neural network model by Suri & Schultz 
(1999) specifically modelled Wolfram Schultz’s work on the response of dopamine 
neurons in the striatum to reward-related stimuli using a ‘critic’, which computed and sent 
a TD error to an ‘actor’, which governed behaviour. The model did not refer explicitly to 
the prefrontal cortex, but showed that a reinforcement signal without RPE led to 
perseverations, and sustained reductions of reinforcement signal led to a loss of learned 
behaviour as seen in Parkinson’s disease and lesioned animals. 
    O’Reilly and colleagues have produced a range of biophysically detailed cognitive 
connectionist models using O’Reilly and Munakata’s Leabra algorithm, which combines 
error-driven and Hebbian learning with k-Winners-Take-All inhibitory competition 
(O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000).  These models are capable of implementing the learning 
and gating ideas of Braver et al. (1999) mentioned above, incorporating a brake and 
accelerator system. A model of dynamic DA modulation in the basal ganglia by Frank 
(2005) separates out the roles of the D1 and D2 receptors applicable to Parkinson’s 
disease, without using TD. The XT model (Rougier et al., 2005) uses an adaptive gating 
mechanism, based on an adaptive critic unit, driven by TD Learning and relates 
specifically to how the biological mechanisms of the prefrontal cortex support flexible 
cognitive control. Dorsal Lateral Prefrontal Cortex lesions were simulated by removing 
units and asymmetric training, resulting in perseverations in prefrontal cortex, as seen in 
the WCST and Stroop tasks. However, in this and all previous models, it was necessary 
for the dynamic gating of the basal ganglia to be hard-wired. The Prefrontal Basal Ganglia 
Working Memory model of learning (O’Reilly & Frank, 2006) incorporates the dynamic 
interactions between the prefrontal cortex and the basal ganglia in working memory, and 
in doing so, abandons the use of TD in favour of an alternate associative Pavlovian 
mechanism. Here dopamine signals reward association and not reward prediction. Instead 
of using TD prediction chains over successive time-steps, which they claim break down 
when modelling complicated tasks such as the 1-2-AX task, the new algorithm uses the 
Rescorla-Wagner/Delta-rule algorithm trained by the unconditioned stimulus for the 
current time-step. However, this model is of learning and has not been used to model 
dysfunction so far. 
Conclusions 
The following important questions arising from recent dopamine theories of schizophrenia 
that remain to be addressed by current computational models:  
    1. Is it the cortical microcircuits that give rise to abnormal dopamine signaling with 
secondary downstream subcortical deficits (Winterer & Weinberger, 2004) or the 
traditional view of a primary subcortical disturbance? 
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    2. For the most part connectionist models to date do not differentiate between D1 and 
D2 dopamine receptors, or locate the point(s) of dysfunction in the local microcircuits that 
give rise to a possible cortical/subcortical imbalance. They do not distinguish between the 
theories of Abi-Dhargham and Winterer & Weinberger, of either: (i) A hypostimulation in 
the cortex of D1 receptors and a hyperstimulation  in the  subcortex of D2 receptors 
(Abi-Dhargham, 2004), or (ii) A reduced prefrontal dopamine D1/D2 receptor activation 
ratio, in which D2 receptors dominate, leading primarily to a lower cortical SNR 
(Winterer & Weinberger, 2004). 
    3. Do positive psychotic symptoms arise from either: (i) A primary subcortical 
hyperstimulation of dopamine receptors (Abi-Dhargham, 2004)? Or (ii) Secondary effects 
of either reduced cortical SNR on subcortical systems (Winterer & Weinberger, 2004) or 
cortical gluatamate/GABA steering of subcortical systems (Carlsson et al., 2001)?  
    4. Do negative symptoms and working memory deficits result from either: (i) 
Hypostimulation of D1 receptors (Abi-Dhargham, 2004)? Or (ii) Reduced prefrontal 
dopamine D1/D2 receptor activation ratio with D2 receptors dominating (Winterer & 
Weinberger, 2004)? 
    Furthermore, while enormous progress has been made regarding flexible, self-
organising cognitive control, without the need for a homunculus (Rougier et al., 2005; 
O’Reilly & Frank, 2006), it remains to be seen whether it is prudent to abandon TD 
Learning, which has been shown to be an effective model of RPE (see above), or whether 
the problems in the break down of chaining can be overcome by some other means. 
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Appendix III 
 
Lisp Code for Simulation of McClure, Daw & Montague (2003) 
(Chapter 5) 
 
;set discount factor at 0.9 
 (defvar *gamma* 0.9) 
 
;this function generates the possible moves that the agent may take 
(defun possible-move (state-transitions current-state) 
   (let ((possible-next-states (nth current-state state-transitions))) 
     (nth (random (length possible-next-states)) possible-next-states))) 
 
;updates the value of a state following a move and outputs delta 
(defun move-and-update (current-state state-transitions rewards Vs gamma bias m alpha &optional (attempts 0)) 
   (let* ((possible-next-state (possible-move state-transitions current-state)) 
          (delta (+ (nth current-state rewards) (* gamma (nth possible-next-state Vs)) (* -1 (nth current-state Vs)))) 
          (prob (sigma delta m bias))) 
     (cond ((> prob (random 1.0)) 
            (format t "~,2f " delta) 
            (incf (nth current-state Vs) (* alpha (- delta bias))) (list possible-next-state   
 (incf attempts))) 
           (T (move-and-update current-state state-transitions rewards Vs gamma bias m alpha (+ 1 attempts)))))) 
 
;this function initiates a selected number of state transitions through the maze and outputs the current state, the 
;values of states and the total number of timesteps. 
(defun go-all  (state state-transitions rewards Vs gamma number-of-steps &key (bias 0) (m 1) (alpha 0.5) &aux 
(total 0) state-and-number) 
   (dotimes (i number-of-steps) 
     (setf state-and-number (move-and-update state state-transitions rewards Vs gamma bias m alpha)) 
     (setf state (car state-and-number)) 
     (incf total (cadr state-and-number)) 
     (format t " ~d  ~{~,2f ~}  ~d ~%" state Vs total)) 
   (format t "~%~%Total states examined ~d" total)) 
 
;defines sigmoid function 
(defun sigma (delta m bias) 
   (/ 1 (+ 1 (exp (* -1 m  (- delta bias)))))) 
 
;initializes parameters 
(setf *McClure-Maze* '((1) (0 2) (1 3) (2 4) (0))) 
(setf *McClure-rewards* '( 0 0 0 0 1)) 
(setf *McClure-Vs* '( 0 0 0 0 0)) 
 
;starts program 
(go-all 0 *McClure-Maze* *McClure-rewards* *McClure-Vs* *gamma* (input number of state transitions, 
default: 1000) (input m, default: 5) (input bias, default: 0))  
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Appendix IV 
 
A Model of Dopamine and Uncertainty Using Temporal Difference 
(Chapter 6)  
(Thurnham, Done, Davey & Frank 2006b) 
 
 
Paper published in the proceedings of XXV111 Annual Conference of the Cognitive 
Science Society, Vancouver, Canada, 26-29 July 2006, pp 2263-2268, Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates  
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A Model of Dopamine and Uncertainty Using Temporal Difference 
 
Angela J. Thurnham* (a.j.thurnham@herts.ac.uk), D. John Done** 
(d.j.done@herts.ac.uk),  
Neil Davey* (n.davey@herts.ac.uk), Ray J. Frank* (r.j.frank@herts.ac.uk)  
School of Computer Science,* School of Psychology, **University of Hertfordshire,  
College Lane, Hatfield, Hertfordshire. AL10 9AB United Kingdom 
 
Abstract 
Does dopamine code for uncertainty (Fiorillo, Tobler & Schultz, 2003; 2005) or is the sustained activation 
recorded from dopamine neurons a result of Temporal Difference (TD) backpropagating errors (Niv, Duff & 
Dayan, 2005)? An answer to this question could result in a better understanding of the nature of dopamine 
signaling, with implications for cognitive disorders, like Schizophrenia. A computer simulation of 
uncertainty incorporating TD Learning successfully modelled a Reinforcement Learning paradigm and the 
detailed effects demonstrated in single dopamine neuron recordings by Fiorillo et al. This alternate model 
provides further evidence that the sustained increase seen in dopamine firing, during uncertainty, is a result 
of averaging firing from dopamine neurons across trials, and is not normally found within individual trials, 
supporting the claims of Niv and colleagues.  
Keywords: Dopamine; Uncertainty; Single Cell Recordings; Temporal Difference; Computer Simulation. 
 
Dopamine and Uncertainty 
Current theories of the effects of dopamine on behaviour focus on the role of 
dopamine in Reinforcement Learning, where organisms learn to organise their 
behaviour under the influence of goals, and expected future reward is believed to 
drive action selection (McClure, Daw & Montague, 2003; Montague, Dayan & 
Sejnowski, 1996; Schultz, Dayan & Montague, 1997; Suri & Schultz, 1999). Single 
cell recordings of dopamine neurons have identified a phasic dopamine burst of 
activity which is posited to be a reward prediction error (Schultz, 1998; Waelti, 
Dickinson & Schultz, 2001) and Temporal Difference (TD) Learning (Sutton, 1988; 
Sutton & Barto, 1998), a form of Reinforcement Learning, provides an explicit 
method of modelling and quantifying this error (Hollerman & Schultz, 1998; Schultz 
et al., 1997). It is likely that disruption to the dopamine system gives rise to an 
abnormality in information processing by dopamine and some of the symptoms 
currently associated with schizophrenia, particularly psychosis and deficits in 
working memory. 
    It has been posited that dopamine also codes for uncertainty (Fiorillo, Tobler & 
Schultz, 2003), as under conditions of maximum uncertainty, observations of single 
cell recordings have shown a sustained increase in activity from presentation of a 
conditioned stimulus (CS) to the expected time of a reward. They recorded the 
activity of neurons in two primates, identified as dopamine neurons from their 
electrophysiological characteristics, during a delay paradigm of classical 
conditioning to receive a fixed juice reward, while manipulating the probability of 
receipt of the reward. Two related but distinct parameters of reward were identified 
from the activation produced, after learning had taken place: (i) A phasic burst of 
activity, or reward prediction error, at the time of the expected reward, whose 
magnitude increased as probability decreased; and (ii) a new slower, sustained 
activity, above baseline, related to motivationally relevant stimuli, which developed 
with increasing levels of uncertainty, and varied with reward magnitude. Both effects 
were found to occur independently within a single population of dopamine neurons. 
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Figure 1: Sustained activation of dopamine neurons with uncertainty taken from 
Fiorillo et al. (2003) (A) Rasters and histograms of single cell activity (B) Population 
histograms 
    With uncertainty, the sustained activation began on presentation of a CS and 
increased in strength until a reward was due, at which point the activation ceased 
(Figure 1B, where P = 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75). This activation was greatest when 
uncertainty of reward was at a maximum, i.e., when the reward was received on only 
50% of occasions and probability (p) was 0.5. Sustained activation was also seen at 
lower values of uncertainty, when probability was 25% and 75%, but to a lesser 
extent. No sustained activation was seen when probability was certain at either zero 
or 1, suggesting that the sustained activation coded for uncertainty. 
    However, this view is controversial as Niv, Duff and Dayan, (2005) have 
suggested that the sustained activation, or ‘ramping’ effect in the delay period, is due 
to backpropagating TD prediction errors, and not to uncertainty. Specifically, they 
suggest that it is the asymmetric coding of those prediction errors that give rise to the 
effects seen in time, over consecutive CS presentations, due to a low baseline rate of 
activity in dopamine neurons. Firing rates of positive prediction errors typically rise 
to about 270% above baseline, while negative errors only fall to approximately 55% 
below baseline (Fiorillo et al. 2003). During uncertainty, these asymmetrical positive 
and negative errors, when summed, will not cancel each other out, as predicted by 
the TD algorithm, even after extensive training periods. The overall effect, as seen in 
Fiorillo et al., will be of (i) a positive response across trials at the expected time of 
reward, and (ii) a ‘ramping’ effect from presentation of the CS to the expected time 
of reward, described by Fiorillo and colleagues as sustained activation. The resulting 
effects arise as a result of averaging across multiple trials and are not a within trial 
phenomena. 
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    Using TD, Niv and colleagues successfully modelled both effects identified by 
Fiorillo et al. (2003) during uncertainty. They also showed that the shape of the ramp 
depended on the learning rate, and that the difference in the steepness of the ramp 
between delay and trace conditioning could be accounted for by the low learning 
rates associated with trace conditioning, resulting in a smaller or even negligible 
ramp.     
    In reply to Niv et al., Fiorillo and colleagues defend their original claim that 
dopamine encodes uncertainty about reward (Fiorillo, Tobler & Schultz, 2005). 
Three of the five points raised are of particular interest to this study. Firstly, they 
give two examples as evidence of sustained activation within single trials, which is 
contrary to the postulations of Niv et al., and secondly, they suggest that activity in 
the last part of the delay period should reflect the activity of the preceding trial. 
Finally, they suggest that other ways of using TD to model dopamine as a TD error 
are more biologically plausible than backpropagating TD errors. It is important, 
therefore, to look at a range of models in order to understand the limitations of using 
the TD algorithm to model the role of dopamine. 
     In the present study a simulation of a ‘rat’ in a one-armed maze was used to 
investigate the claims of Fiorillo and colleagues, using an alternative TD model to 
Niv et al. The maze modelled was similar to that used by McClure et al. (2003) 
linking the ideas of reward prediction error and incentive salience, but contained an 
additional ‘satiety’ state and only allowed travel in one direction. The aim of this 
investigation was to use TD learning to model the following effects seen in dopamine 
neuron firing by Fiorillo and colleagues: (a) The phasic activation at the expected 
time of reward that increased as probability decreased; (b) the sustained increase in 
activity from the onset of the CS until the expected time of reward, during 
uncertainty, posited either as uncertainty, or as backpropagating TD prediction 
errors; and (c) the sustained activation increasing with increasing reward magnitude. 
In addition, in the discussion an attempt is made to address three of the points raised 
by Fiorillo et al. (2005) in response to Niv et al. (2005). 
Method 
Temporal Difference 
The maze incorporated an ‘actor-critic’ architecture (McClure et al., 2003; 
Montague, Hyman & Cohen, 2004; Sutton & Barto, 1998), a form of reinforcement 
TD learning where an ‘adaptive critic’ computes a reward prediction error, which is 
used by the ‘actor’ to choose those actions that lead to reward. 
 
The Critic The TD algorithm is designed to learn an estimate of a value function V*, 
representing expected total future reward, from any state, s, (Equation 1), where t 
represents time and subsequent time steps t = 1, t = 2 etc; E is the expected value and 
r represents the value of the reward. γ is a discounting parameter between 0 and 1 
and has the effect of reducing previous estimates of reward exponentially with time, 
so that a reward of yesterday is not worth as much as a reward of today. Equation 2 is 
Equation 1 in a recursive form that can be used in the learning process. 
 
V*(st) = E[rt + γ rt + 1 + γ2 rt + 2 + γ3 rt + 3 + …] [Eqn 1] 
 
V*(st) = E[rt + γV*(st + 1)]                              [Eqn 2] 
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    TD prediction error is a measure of the inconsistency for estimates of value at 
successive time steps. The error, δ(t), is derived by rearranging Equation 2 into 
Equation 3, which is a measure of the relationship between two successive states and 
the current reward. This will give estimates, V, of the value function V*. The 
dopamine prediction error signal, δ(t), takes into account the current reward, plus the 
next prediction multiplied by the discounting parameter γ, minus the current 
prediction. It is the error δ(t) that is equivalent to the dopamine reward prediction 
error, or learning signal, to create better estimates of future reward.  
  
δ(t) = rt + γV(st + 1) - V(st)     [Eqn 3] 
 
The Actor An extension to the TD model has been made to include a role for 
dopamine in biasing action selection using the same prediction error signal, δ(t), to 
teach a system to take the best actions, namely those that are followed by rewards 
(McClure et al., 2003; Montague et al., 1996). The way an action is selected is that 
the actor randomly chooses a possible action, and the anticipated δ(t) is calculated 
using Equation 3. The probability of taking this action is then calculated from this 
δ(t) value using the softmax function in Equation 4 (where m and b are parameters of 
the softmax curve), which calculates the probability of that action occurring from the 
anticipated δ(t) value. If no action is selected, time is increased by one step and 
another random action is considered. 
 
P (of taking action) = (1 + e –m (δ(t) - b) )-1 [Eqn 4] 
 
    Actions are generated with a probability of selection based on the predicted values 
of their successor states, preferring those actions that give a high burst of dopamine, 
or TD error signal. There is a greater probability of remaining at the same state and 
not making a move when the error signal is low as all states become increasingly 
probable.  
    Learning takes place in the model according to Equation 5, where α is a learning 
rate parameter.     
 
V(si) Å V(si) + α δ(t) [Eqn 5] 
 
The Maze 
A computer simulation was constructed of a ‘rat’ learning to traverse a one-arm maze 
to receive a reward, using the TD algorithm with an ‘actor-critic’ architecture. Figure 
2 shows a maze with positions modelled as five states, starting at State 0 (the CS) 
and progressing through intermediate states to receive a simulated reward in State 4 
(the reward state). In order to model the breaks between maze runs in real rats, it was 
necessary to insert a ‘satiety’ state (State 5) into the maze, between the goal (State 4) 
and the start (State 0), where the transition between that state and State 0 remained at 
zero so that no learning could take place. This had the effect of resetting the value of 
start State 0 to zero, acting as a ‘resting’ state and ensuring that the ‘rat’ was always 
surprised when starting the maze. Without this additional state, the simulated rat 
learnt the value of the start state, and in effect, there was no CS. Intermediate states 
were added and removed, as required to make mazes of different lengths. 
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  Start 
  r = 0 
State 1 
  r = 0 
State 2 
  r = 0  
State 3 
  r = 0 
State 5 
 r = 0 
 v = 0 
State 4 
  r = 1 
 
Figure 2:  Maze with five states plus ‘satiety’ state 
Simulations 
Uncertainty – Degree of Probability The ranges of probabilities used for trials were 
0.25, 0.5 (maximum uncertainty), or 0.75. The δ(t) values were recorded for each 
state transition, for a single probability in each trial. Each trial consisted of 1000 
steps through a one-way maze with eight states plus a ‘satiety’ state, with a step 
being a transition from one state to the next, and a run being one complete journey 
through the maze, from start to finish. At the beginning of each trial the values of 
each state in the maze (V) were set to zero. Movement to the next state in the maze 
was selected according to the effect of TD learning on different probabilities of 
receiving a reward for each run.  
    In keeping with the biology of dopamine, namely the asymmetry in coding of 
positive and negative errors, any negative prediction errors were scaled by a factor of 
one sixth, the scaling factor used by Niv et al. (2005). The scaled δ(t) values were 
then averaged across fifty consecutive runs for each state, where γ = 0.98, and the 
magnitudes of the scaled values compared. This averaging corresponded to the 
summing of peri-stimulus-time-histograms (PSTH) of activity over different trials 
and inter-trial averaging used by Fiorillo et al. (2003). 
     
Reward Magnitude Individual reward magnitudes of 0.5, 1 and 2 were compared in 
different trials to see the effect on the sustained activation. 
An Example of Learning 
 
 
-0.2
0.2
0.6
1 
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
runs
δ(
t)
CS: S8-
S0 
S3-S4 R: S7-
S8
Figure 3: Delta values for each state transition over first thirty runs, p = 1, r = 1 
 
With a probability of 1 and a maze of eight states plus a ‘satiety’ state, complete 
learning took place over the first thirty runs (γ = 1). On the first run a large prediction 
error, δ(t), was recorded at the expected time of the reward (S7-S8), and as runs 
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progressed, this δ(t) was transferred back to the CS (S8-S0). When full learning had 
taken place only the CS elicited a reward prediction error. This effect is 
demonstrated in Figure 3, which shows the δ(t) at the expected time of reward 
beginning at 1 and reducing to zero by run 9 at which point the value of the state is 
learnt and the reward fully predicted. The δ(t) at the CS begins at zero and increases 
gradually to 1, from run 10 to run 30. An intermediate state transition S3-S4 is 
included which records the δ(t) backpropagated from the reward state by run 5. The 
error increases until run 8 and then reduces to zero by run 21. 
    All the following tests with uncertainty were done post training. 
Results 
Uncertainty – Degree of Probability 
 selected in trials for the entire range of 
story of previous 
eased, from 25% to 50% to 75%, so 
(a) The phasic activations at the expected time of reward    Without scaling the 
 the average scaled δ(t) values across trials with probabilities of 
Eventually, by chance, actions were
probabilities (p), 0.25, 0.5 or 0.75, and the ‘rat’ progressed along the maze towards 
the reward state receiving the reward (r) of that state, r = 1. On subsequent runs, 
learning occurred as the value of the reward was propagated backwards, updating 
earlier states using a proportion of the prediction error signal, δ(t).  
    The patterns of data obtained show that it is necessary for the hi
runs to be taken into consideration when analysing reward prediction errors and not 
just the last trial. Accordingly, consecutive runs should be selected for averaging in 
order to preserve the backward chaining effect of the TD algorithm. The TD 
algorithm uses rewards obtained in the past to make predictions about future 
expected reward, affecting the values of all the states in the maze, which are 
continually being updated as the rat progresses along the maze. With uncertainty, the 
particular course a rat takes on a particular trial is novel in each trial, as it depends on 
the exact order of rewarded and non-rewarded runs, which are delivered randomly by 
the computer program. The δ(t) values are then propagated backwards, in order, from 
later states to earlier states, as time progresses. 
    As the probability of obtaining a reward incr
did the level of phasic activation at the CS (S8-S0) (Table 1, Figure 5), with average 
δ(t) values of 0.23, 0.57 and 0.70 respectively.  
 
δ(t) values recorded for each state transition to compensate for the biologically 
asymmetric coding of positive and negative prediction errors, no average positive 
phasic activation was seen at the expected time of reward (Figure 4 S7-S8). 
However, after scaling δ(t) values by a factor of one sixth and averaging δ(t) values 
over consecutive trials, positive phasic activation was seen at the expected time of 
reward (Figure 5).  
     When comparing
0.25, 0.5 and 0.75, similar averaged, scaled δ(t) values were recorded of 0.16, 0.16 
and 0.14 respectively. However, if averages were taken over rewarded trials only, as 
suggested in Figure 2A in Fiorillo et al. (2003), δ(t) values would be positive at the 
expected time of reward as all negative values would be removed. In addition, there 
would be less non-rewarded runs to be removed at higher probabilities, resulting in 
the phasic activation varying monotonically with reward probability. There would 
also be less of an effect on the phasic activation seen at the CS as the effect of reward 
would take longer to reach that state. As suggested above, difficulties arise when the 
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backpropagating chain of reward prediction errors is broken and runs are taken out of 
context of the trial history.  
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state transitions
δ(
t)
0.25 0.5 0.75
Figure 4: Average δ(t) values, before scaling, for each state transition over 50 runs, 
Figure 5: Average δ(t) values, after scaling, for each state transition over 50 runs, 
 
  In conclusion, phasic activations were seen at the expected time of reward, in 
Figure 4 shows that no ‘ramping’ effect is 
when p = 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75, α = 0.9 
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when p = 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75, α = 0.9    
  
accordance with the findings of Fiorillo et al., when δ(t) values were scaled to 
compensate for the asymmetric coding. However, unless rewarded only trials were 
averaged, the phasic activation did not vary monotonically with reward probability. 
 
 (b) The sustained increase in activity 
seen from plotting the average δ(t) values obtained for probabilities of 0.25, 0.5 and 
0.75 for each state transition. Here the symmetrical positive and negative errors 
effectively cancel each other out, in accordance with the TD algorithm. However, 
when the δ(t) values were scaled by a factor of one sixth to compensate for the 
biological asymmetric coding of positive and negative errors, and averaged across 
consecutive runs, positive δ(t) values were seen that corresponded to the sustained 
activation and ‘ramping’ effects reported in Fiorillo et al. (2003) and Niv et al. 
(2005) respectively (Figure 5). The magnitude of the ramping effect is marginally 
greater for maximum probability, p = 0.5 than for the lower probabilities of p = 0.25 
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and p = 0.75, in accordance with the findings of Fiorillo et al. However, the 
difference seen between the two trials with probabilities of 0.25 and 0.75, which are 
comparable levels of uncertainty, could be accounted for by the different reward 
history for each. This difference should be negligible if more trials were taken into 
account. 
 
(c) Reward Magnitude The value of the reward was manipulated across different 
δ(t) values over 30 runs for reward values of 0.5, 1 and 2, p 
A simulation of reinforcement learni  an ‘actor-critic’ architecture of 
05) raised 
trials, with rewards given of 0.5, 1 and 2. The size of the reward had an effect on the 
range of δ(t) values available for each state. With a larger reward comes a larger 
range of possible δ(t) values, and, accordingly, larger ‘ramping’ effects (Figure 6). 
Therefore, the sustained activation increased with increasing reward magnitude, in 
accordance with Fiorillo et al. (2003). 
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Figure 6: Scaled average 
= 0.5, α = 0.5  
Discussion 
ng, incorporating
TD learning, successfully modelled the following properties of dopamine 
demonstrated by Fiorillo et al. (2003): (a) The phasic activations at the expected time 
of reward; (b) the sustained increase in activity from the onset of the conditioned 
stimulus until the expected time of reward, during uncertainty; and (c) the sustained 
activation increasing with increasing reward magnitude.  This supports the argument 
by Niv et al. (2005) that the ramping effect seen during uncertainty is a result of 
backpropagating TD errors and not a within-trial encoding of uncertainty. 
    In response to the claims of Niv and colleagues, Fiorillo et al. (20
several points in support of their original argument, three of which are relevant to 
this study. Firstly, they refer to the difficulty of determining whether or not activity 
increases on single trials as Niv et al. (2005) did not specify what a single trial 
increase in delay-period activity should look like. In our simulations, Figure 7 is an 
example of a single trial (or a single run in this simulation), and is represented by 
recording the scaled prediction errors, δ(t), for each state transition, for one run 
through the maze. This run is analogous to the activity of a single neuron in a single 
trial over time and is simply a snapshot of the δ(t) values for each state, which may 
be either positive or negative with respect to baseline firing, depending on the history 
of previous runs. 
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    The single run in Figure 7 is taken from actual run 6 in Figure 8 and represents 
non-rewarded run N preceded by ….RNRNR, where R is a rewarded run. The 
preceding RNR can be clearly identified in the δ(t) values seen for state transitions 
S4-S5, S5-S6 and S6-S7 respectively, but the results of earlier runs are harder to 
make out further back in time, as the TD algorithm ensures rewards or non-rewards 
in the past are not worth as much as those of the present.  
    Examination of many single runs through the maze did not reveal a ramping 
effect. Fiorillo et al. (2005) provided two examples of possible sustained activation 
in single trials, but these effects could have occurred quite by chance due to the order 
of rewarded and non-rewarded trials, as explained above, and not necessarily be 
examples of uncertainty. Indeed, if this within trial ramping effect were a regular 
occurrence then there would be many examples of single trials in support of the 
uncertainty hypothesis.  
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Figure 7: An example of a single trial: 
Scaled δ(t) values for a single run, p = 0.5, r = 1 
 
    Secondly, Fiorillo and colleagues claimed that if activity during the delay period is 
due to backpropagating error signals that originated on previous trials, then the 
activity in the last part of the delay period of each individual trial should reflect the 
last reward outcome. Specifically, they suggest that if the preceding trial was 
rewarded, there should be more activity at the end of the delay period, and less 
activity if it was not rewarded, but they found no dependence of neural activity on 
the outcome of preceding trials. 
    Our results show that it is necessary for more of the history of previous runs to be 
taken into consideration than just the last reward outcome, when analysing reward 
prediction errors. For example, Figure 8 shows a history of rewarded and non-
rewarded runs RNRNRNNNNN. After scaling, large δ(t) values were seen for runs 
1-6 because alternate rewards and non-rewards were given, but runs 7-10 were not 
rewarded and, consequently, gradual extinction of the negative prediction error 
occurred. This example shows that it is not always the case that less activity will be 
seen if a trial is not rewarded (and vice versa), as runs 8-10 show an increase in firing 
(towards baseline) following non-rewarded runs.  
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Figure 8: Scaled average δ(t) values at expected time of reward (S7-S8) recorded 
over 10 runs, p = 0.5, r = 1  
 
    Finally, Fiorillo et al. (2005) raise the argument that other TD models of dopamine 
are more biologically plausible than backpropagating TD errors, for example Suri & 
Schultz (1999), and it is important, therefore, to look at a range of models in order to 
understand the limitations of using the TD algorithm to model the role of dopamine. 
However, our work has shown that the predictions of Niv et al. (2005) are robust in 
the sense that they transfer to another type of model, albeit still using the same TD 
algorithm.  
Conclusion 
This alternate TD model to Niv et al. (2005) has effectively simulated conditioning 
in a Reinforcement Learning paradigm and successfully modelled the effects 
demonstrated in single dopamine neuron recordings, suggested to be coding for 
uncertainty, by Fiorillo et al. (2003). In addition, we have demonstrated what a single 
trial in TD Learning might look like and provide further evidence that ramping of the 
reward prediction error, δ(t), is not normally found within a trial of a single 
dopamine firing, but instead arises from averaging across trials. 
    Our simulations add further weight to the criticisms of Niv et al. that the effects 
demonstrated by Fiorillo and colleagues are due to backpropagating TD errors, and 
not a within-trial encoding of uncertainty. We support the claims by Niv et al. (2005) 
that the ramping signal is the best evidence yet for the nature of the learning 
mechanism of a shift in dopamine activity from expected time of reward to the CS. 
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Appendix V 
 
Lisp Code for an Analysis of the Relationship between Temporal 
Difference Learning and Uncertainty Coding in a Computational 
Model of Dopaminergic Signaling (Chapter 6) 
 
;set discount factor at 1 
(defvar *gamma* 1) 
 
;this function generates the possible moves that the agent may take 
(defun possible-move (state-transitions current-state) 
   (let ((possible-next-states (nth current-state state-transitions))) 
     (nth (random (length possible-next-states)) possible-next-states))) 
 
; updates the values of a state following a move (unless state 8, the reset state) and ;outputs current state, possible 
next state, delta and values of  states 
 (defun move-and-update (current-state state-transitions rewards Vs gamma bias m alpha reward-probability) 
   (do* ((possible-next-state (possible-move state-transitions current-state)(possible-move state-transitions   
  current-state))  
         (reward (get-reward current-state rewards reward-probability)) 
         (delta (+ reward (* gamma (nth possible-next-state Vs))(* -1 (nth  current-state Vs))) 
                  (+ reward (* gamma (nth possible-next-state Vs)) (* -1 (nth  current-state Vs)))) 
         (prob (sigma delta m bias))) 
         ((> prob (random 1.0)) 
         (format t "~%~d ~d ~,2f ~{ ~,2f~}" current-state possible-next-state delta Vs) 
         (unless (=  current-state 8) (setf (nth current-state Vs)(+ (nth current-state Vs)(* alpha (- delta  
  bias)))))possible-next-state) 
      
;this function initiates a selected number of state transitions through the maze  
 (defun go-all (state state-transitions rewards Vs gamma bias m alpha reward-probability number-of-steps) 
   (dotimes (i number-of-steps) 
      (setf state (move-and-update state state-transitions rewards Vs gamma bias m alpha reward-probability)))) 
 
;defines sigmoid function 
 (defun sigma (delta m bias) 
   (/ 1 (+ 1 (exp (* -1 m  (- delta bias)))))) 
 
;outputs whether run is rewarded or not 
(defun get-reward (state rewards reward-probability &aux result) 
   (setf result (if (< (random 1.0) reward-probability) (nth state rewards) 0)) 
   (when (= (nth state rewards) 1) (format t " ~d" result)) result) 
 
;initializes parameters 
 (progn 
   (setf *McClure-Maze* '((1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (0))) 
   (setf *McClure-Vs* '( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 )) 
   (setf *McClure-rewards* '( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 )) 
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Appendix VI 
 
A Connectionist Model of Dual System Control 
(Chapter 8) 
 
 
Section A 
Pilot Study: Using Slow Weights Only 
 
The slow weights in this ANN are typical of the weights seen in standard 
backpropagation ANNs and are thus capable of learning the data sets presented 
during Phases 1 and 2 on their own. What makes this ANN different from other 
ANNs capable of learning this task (e.g. Atkins 2001; Atkins & Murre 1998; Hinton 
& Sejnowski 1986; Plaut 1996; Hinton & Shallice 1991) is the addition of the fast 
weights. In order to ascertain the contribution of the fast weights, it was necessary 
first to train the network using only one set of weights to find the optimum 
parameters of the model, before introducing the fast weights.  This was achieved by 
setting the learning rate and momentum of the fast weights to zero; although it was 
necessary to set the decay rate for the fast weights to a value of 0.999 in order that 
any random starting weights resulting from initialisation of the network should 
quickly decay. 
 
To find the optimum number of hidden layer units 
The hidden layer in Hinton and Plaut contained 100 units, one for each of the 100 
associations in the Phase 1 data set, and training was easily achieved with only 1300 
sweeps through the data set. As already mentioned, in accordance with current 
standard practice when investigating the performance of an ANN, I sought the lowest 
number of hidden layer units that would train the 20 associations in my Phase 1 data 
set. A smaller network will take longer to learn the associations to a minimal error, 
but will have a greater ability to generalise. This was achieved by starting with a 
localist network with 20 hidden units, one for each of the 20 associations like Hinton 
and Plaut, and then by training on fewer and fewer hidden units until I found the least 
number of units that would train to the stopping criterion where all 200 units were 
correct to within an error of 0.1. 
 
Using ten different networks with ten different initialisation points, the minimum 
number of hidden layer units necessary for training to occur to the strict stopping 
criterion was found to be 7, using a low learning rate of 0.005 and a momentum of 
0.9. The best of the ten networks trained in a minimum of 22,197 sweeps through the 
data set, giving rise to a total error of 0.013 across all of the output units and 
associations for the slow weights. 
 
To find the optimum values of learning rates for fast and slow weights 
With the optimum number of 7 hidden units established, it was necessary to seek 
optimum learning rate values for each of the fast and slow weights. This would be 
achieved by finding the maximum and minimum learning rates that would train the 
20 associations in Phase 1, with 7 hidden layer units, using just the slow weights. 
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This was harder to achieve, but as I was interested in the interaction between fast and 
slow weights and strict convergence was not an important aspect of this 
investigation, I decided to relax the stopping criterion slightly for all the other 
experiments by accepting 199 of the possible 200 units being correct to within an 
error of 0.1. This allowed for one of the units to be incorrect. 
 
Having looked at a range of learning rates from various different initialisation points 
of the network I found an optimum range of 0.001 to 0.41. These were the two rates I 
would be using to investigate the contribution of the fast weights in the remaining 
experiments. 
 
Stopping Criteria 
Hinton and Plaut did not give details of their training criteria only that they trained 
on the associations until perfect learning had occurred. In the pilot study I initially 
decided on a strict stopping criterion for training, where 200 of the possible 200 units 
(10 output units multiplied by 20 associations) for the Phase 1 associations were each 
correct to within an error of 0.1. (NB error is the root means square error of 
difference between the actual response and the target response for each neuron, 
hereafter referred to as error). However, as I was interested in the interaction between 
fast and slow weights and strict convergence was not an important aspect of this 
investigation, I decided to relax the stopping criterion slightly for all the other 
experiments by accepting 199 of the possible 200 units for the Phase 1 associations 
being correct to within an error of 0.1. This allowed for one of the units to be 
incorrect. Accordingly, the stopping criteria for Phases 2 and 3 with different 
numbers of associations would be 49 out of 50 units correct (10 output units 
multiplied by 5 associations) and 99 out of 100 units correct (10 output units 
multiplied by 10 associations), respectively. 
 
In all simulations the network was trained ten times, using ten different initialisation 
points for starting weights in order to provide average results and to show 
generalisation of the network. However, some of the figures in the following sections 
are for one simulation only in order to demonstrate the typical interaction between 
fast and slow weights seen across all simulations. The simulation chosen was from 
an initialisation point that converged easily on a solution and was typical of a number 
of other simulations from different initialisation points that produced similar results. 
 
 
 
Section B 
Using Fast Weights to Temporarily Capture Old Learning 
 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the findings of Hinton and Plaut 
(1987) using a constrained version of the original model, to demonstrate that an 
additional set of fast weights is able to temporarily cancel out the interference in a set 
of old associations caused in more recent learning by rehearsing on just a subset of 
them.  
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METHODS 
 
With the optimum network configuration of 7 hidden units and learning rate values 
of 0.001 and 0.41 for the slow and fast weights, respectively, training and testing 
were carried out in the following three phases: 
Phase 1: The network was trained on 20 associations to a stopping criterion where 
only one of the 200 units (10 output units multiplied by 20 associations) were 
allowed to show an error of over 0.1. The weights were then frozen before Phase 2 
commenced.  
Phase 2: Training resumed on five new random associations presented to the 
network without rehearsing on the original 200 until the same stopping criterion had 
been met as in Phase 1. The weights were frozen, once again, before Phase 3 
commenced.  
Phase 3 (testing phase): Training resumed on a subset of the original data, 10 out of 
the 20 original associations from Phase 1, and the improvement in performance of 
the retrained 10 was compared to a test made on the unretrained 10 associations from 
Phase 1. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Results are shown for a typical simulation from one of ten different networks to 
show both the contribution of the fast weights and the interaction between fast and 
slow weights. It should be noted that while the results are comparable to Hinton and 
Plaut, they are not intended to be a direct replication of the original study and result 
from a constrained network using a data set with a greater amount of perturbation to 
the old associations during Phase 2. 
 
Phase 1 
The network learned the 20 associations to the stopping criterion in 83,001 sweeps, 
giving rise to a total error of 0.016 across all the output nodes for all of the 
associations. It should be noted that the number of sweeps in this constrained 
simulation are much higher than those seen during Phase 1 of the original study, 
reflecting the higher ratio of hidden layer units to associations, and hence the more 
distributed representation of the knowledge in this model rather than the more 
localist representation of Hinton and Plaut. 
 
Plotting the total error across all output units and patterns against number of sweeps 
through the Phase 1 data set for (i) the fast weights, (ii) the slow weights and (iii) the 
total error of the system, shows the contribution of each of the fast and slow weights 
during learning. Figure B.1 shows the errors for the first 60,000 sweeps from which 
it can be seen that learning in the early stages is rapid in the fast weights, reflected as 
a dramatic decrease in the fast weights error during the first 5,000 sweeps (green 
line). Learning is much slower initially in the slow weights (pink line), but as the 
overall error (dark blue line) declines with learning and the fast weights decay, 
knowledge is transferred to the slow weights, which is reflected in the error for the 
slow weights that begins to decline more rapidly than in the initial 5,000 sweeps. By 
around 20,000 sweeps through the data set the slow weights begin to dominate, as 
the error falls below that of the fast weights. Changes to the slow weights are slow 
and steady as a result of the low learning rate, while changes to the fast weights are 
 201
larger and more volatile as a result of the higher learning rate. The volatility of the 
fast weights is reflected in the overall error.  
 
It is important to note at this stage for interpreting Figure B.1 and all further figures 
in this appendix that the figures show the root means squared error (abbreviated to 
error on the graph) for fast weights (fast wts error: green line), slow weights (slow 
wts error: pink line) and both sets of weights (overall error: blue line) of the system, 
over successive sweeps through the data sets. The overall error of the system should 
not be confused with the total weights of the system, where fast and slow weights 
sum together to give the total weights. Changes to fast and slow weights are derived 
from the same error in the system, but each will give different individual errors due 
to the differences in the respective learning rates, which will not sum to give the total 
error. The fast and slow weights are both free variables that can operate together to 
give many different solutions to a problem, unlike using slow weights only with a 
single solution.  
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Figure B.1 During Phase 1 learning takes place initially in the fast weights (green line), but as the 
error declines the slow weights begin to dominate (pink line). Changes to the slow weights are slow 
and steady as a result of the low learning rate, while changes to the fast weights are larger and more 
volatile as a result of the higher learning rate. The volatility of the fast weights is reflected in the total 
weights error. 
 
Phase 2 
By continuing training on a set of 5 previously unseen associations only, the stopping 
criterion is reached in a further 21,001 sweeps (Figure B.2), giving rise to a total 
error of 0.028 across all the output nodes for all of the associations for the slow 
weights. When the new associations are initially presented the error in the system is 
high and the fast weights (green line) dominate during this period for the first 200 or 
so sweeps through the training set. As the error in the system reduces and the fast 
weights decay, knowledge of the new training set begins to be transferred to the slow 
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weights (pink line) in a similar manner to that seen during Phase 1. There is a good 
interaction between fast and slow weights as the slow weights begin to take over 
from the fast weights by around 16,000 sweeps. However, it should be noted that, 
although the stopping criterion has been met by 20,000 sweeps, there has been 
insufficient time for the knowledge to be completely transferred to the slow weights 
and the fast weights continue to contribute to the knowledge in the entire network. I 
conclude from this that the decay for the fast weights, arbitrarily set at 0.999, is too 
slow for the less complex task in Phase 2. This aspect of the decay rate is 
investigated further in Section C. 
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Figure B.2 During Phase 2 the fast weights (green line) become dominant for the first 200 or so 
sweeps through the new data set. However, as the error in the system declines with training and the 
fast weights decay, knowledge begins to be transferred from the fast weights to the slow weights (pink 
line). NB this is a sub-optimal simulation as the decay rate is too slow for the complexity of this task 
and there has been insufficient time for the knowledge to be transferred to the slow weights. 
 
Phase 3 
Training resumed on only 10 out of 20 of the original associations from Phase 1 and 
none of the associations from Phase 2. It took 446 sweeps through the Phase 3 data 
set to reach the stopping criterion producing a minimum error of 0.082 across all the 
output nodes for all of the associations for the slow weights. Figure B.3 shows the 
first 200 sweeps through the Phase 3 data set, where, once again, the error in the 
system is high as a result of reintroducing the previously learned associations, and 
the fast weights dominate during the initial stages. As in Phase 2 it would appear that 
the decay rate of 0.999 for the fast weights was too slow for the task complexity 
during Phase 3 as there was no interaction between the fast (green line) and slow 
(pink line) weights and insufficient time for the knowledge to be transferred to the 
slow weights (See Section C).  
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Figure B.3. During Phase 3 the fast weights dominate for the first 50 sweeps. 
 
Phase 3 Testing 
This was the testing phase of the experiment in Hinton and Plaut, where the point of 
interest was the first 20 sweeps through the Phase 3 data set and the effect of the 
initial training of the 10 retrained associations on the 10 unretrained associations. As 
well as keeping track of the retrained associations the model was also able to perform 
a test on the unretrained associations. However, this was not a direct replication of 
Hinton and Plaut as I used a constrained model with a reduced hidden layer. I also 
used a smaller data set in Phase 1 than Hinton and Plaut of 20 as opposed to 100 
associations, while the Phase 2 data set contained the same 5 new random 
associations as the original study, resulting in a greater amount of perturbation, or 
disturbance to the Phase 1 associations than seen in Hinton and Plaut, i.e., 25% 
perturbation (5 to disrupt 20) in this study, compared to 5% perturbation (5 to disrupt 
100) in the original study.  
By plotting the total errors of both the retrained and the unretrained associations over 
the first 20 sweeps through the Phase 3 data set, it was possible to recreate a result 
comparable to that of Hinton and Plaut (1987). Figure B.4 is a typical example of one 
of the ten networks I used to capture this effect and demonstrates that the constrained 
model was working correctly. By using a constrained network with a greater amount 
of perturbation during Phase 2 there was less of an improvement on the 50% 
unretrained associations than was seen in the original study. However, my 
simulations have captured the effect identified by Hinton and Plaut and I have 
demonstrated that when the network was retrained on a subset of the original data it 
was found that in the early stages of retraining improvements were seen in the 
associations that were not retrained. This was because the knowledge of the original 
associations was distributed over many connections and retraining some of the 
associations pushed back the weights of the others to the point in time before the 
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perturbation occurred. The fast weights were able to cancel out the interference in a 
set of old associations caused in more recent learning and it was possible to quickly 
restore a whole set of old associations by rehearsing on just a subset of them. The 
fast weights created a context in which the old associations were present again, 
without permanently interfering with the new associations, as the new knowledge 
was restored when the fast weights decayed back to zero. 
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Figure B.4 Phase 3: A. Figure taken from Hinton & Plaut (1987) comparing the errors of both 
retrained and unretrained data for the first 20 sweeps. B. When the present network was retrained on 
50% of the old associations (solid line) during Phase 3, it was found that in the early stages of 
retraining (first 20 sweeps) there was an improvement in the associations that were not retrained 
(dashed line). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Having established that my constrained model was performing correctly, by 
reproducing the effect identified by Hinton and Plaut, I was now in a position to 
investigate the parameters of the dual weights model.  
 
The decay rate of 0.999 used in the above simulations, where the fast weights 
decayed at a rate of 0.1% with percentage retention of 99.9%, was suitable for the 
task complexity during Phase 1. However, it was clear that tasks with different 
learning complexities will require different decay rates for the fast weights in order 
for the knowledge of the task to be transferred to the slow weights by the time the 
stopping criterion has been reached. It would appear that the decay rate of the fast 
weights is a critical factor in the interaction between the fast and slow weights in this 
model, and before investigating this interaction in greater detail it will be necessary 
to investigate the contribution of the decay rate parameter for the fast weights and 
find the best possible combination of decay rates for the fast weights over Phases 1, 2 
and 3.  
 
The contributions of the decay rate parameter and the fast weights can be found in 
Sections C and D, respectively.  
 
 
Section C 
The Contribution of the Decay Rate Parameter 
 
The results of the previous experiment revealed that a decay rate of 0.999 for the fast 
weights following every weight change was sufficient for the task complexity during 
Phase 1, as by the time the stopping criterion had been reached most of the 
knowledge of the system had been transferred to the slow weights. This provided a 
good interaction between the fast and slow weights during that phase. However, the 
task in Phase 2 was of a lower complexity and the stopping criterion was reached 
more quickly, requiring a lower number of sweeps through the data set. Therefore, it 
will be necessary to implement a higher rate of decay for the fast weights for Phase 2 
in order for knowledge to be transferred to the slow weights by the time the stopping 
criterion is reached. A similar problem was seen for the task in Phase 3, although this 
did not present any difficulties for the current experiment as Phase 3 was a testing 
phase where the period of interest was the first twenty sweeps through the Phase 3 
data set. 
 
The aim of this experiment was to find the optimum combination of fast weight 
decay rates for the three phases for the network detailed in the previous experiment, 
and thus the best interactions between fast and slow weights, for each phase.  
 
METHODS 
 
In this experiment I looked at three rates of decay for the fast weights; the slowest 
being 0.999, where 99.9% of the knowledge in the system held across all the weights 
is retained in each sweep through the data set, and the fastest being 0.99, where only 
99% of knowledge is retained. Table C.1 shows the percentage decay and percentage 
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retention of the three different rates. These three rates were deemed sufficient for the 
purposes of this experiment, which was to demonstrate the effect of different rates of 
decay on the fast weights. 
 
Table C.1 showing percentage decay and percentage retention for different rates of decay following 
every weight change. 
Decay Rate Percentage Decay Percentage Retention 
0.999 0.1 99.9 
0.995 0.5 99.5 
0.99 1 99 
 
Using the optimal decay rate of 0.999 for Phase 1, already established, comparisons 
were made between fast weight decay rates of 0.99, 0.995 and 0.999 for Phases 2 and 
3 in six simulations, according to the combinations in Table C.2 in the Results 
section, to find the optimum combination of decay rates for the fast weights for the 
three phases. The following criteria will give the best interactions between fast and 
slow weights: 
 
Criteria for Phases 1 and 2 Learning:   
1. An initial reduction should be seen in the error for the fast weights, which should 
decay before the stopping criterion has been met. 
  
2. Initially the error for the slow weights should be high and this should gradually 
reduce over the course of the task to approach the total weights error by the time the 
stopping criterion has been reached. 
  
3. An interaction should be seen between the errors of the fast and slow weights, 
where a crossover occurs as the knowledge is transferred from the fast to the slow 
weights. 
 
Criterion for task 3: 
Only part of Criterion 1 above is relevant in this scenario, where an initial reduction 
should be seen in the error for the fast weights. Criteria 2 and 3 above do not apply 
here as the aim of Phase 3 in Experiment 1 is to regain temporary access to old 
information in the fast weights and not to relearn the old information in the slow 
weights. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The numbers of sweeps taken for each phase in each of the six simulations are 
recorded in Table C.2. On average over a number of different trials it should be 
expected that the faster decay rate of 0.99 would require the highest number of 
sweeps to compensate for the weight decay, as more of the information in the system 
is forgotten than with the slower decay rates of 0.995 and 0.999. Similarly, the 
slowest decay rate of 0.999 should require the least amount of sweeps. While, this 
pattern was not always reflected in these individual results (e.g. Simulation 2, Phase 
3), it should be mentioned that the program is a stochastic process that would only 
make such predictions on average and not in specific cases.  
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Table C.2 showing number of sweeps taken to fulfil relevant stopping criteria for 6 simulations using 
fast and slow weights, from the same initialisation point as detailed in the previous experiment. The 
optimum combination of decay rates for the fast weights is highlighted in red. 
 
Phase 1 (20 associations) Phase 2 (5 associations) Phase 3 (10 associations) 
Sim. No. 
 Decay rate 
(% decay) Sweeps 
Decay rate 
(% decay) Sweeps 
Decay rate 
(% decay) Sweeps 
1 0.999 (0.1) 83,001 0.99 (1) 251,001 0.99 (1) 10,001
2 0.999 (0.1) 83,001 0.99 (1) 251,001 0.995 (0.5) 11,001
3 0.999 (0.1) 83,001 0.99 (1) 251,001 0.999 (0.1) 1,001
4 0.999 (0.1) 83,001 0.995 (0.5) 15,001 0.99 (1) 3,001
5 0.999 (0.1) 83,001 0.995 (0.5) 15,001 0.995 (0.5) 1,001
6 0.999 (0.1) 83,001 0.995 (0.5) 15,001 0.999 (0.1) 81
 
To Find the Optimum Fast Weight Decay Rate for Phase 2 
The weights of Phase 1 were saved before training resumed on 5 previously unseen 
associations in Phase 2, without continuing training on the Phase 1 associations. 
 
Simulations 1, 2 and 3: 0.999-0.99 
The combination of fast weight decay of 0.999 for Phase 1 followed by 0.99 for 
Phase 2 satisfied the three criteria for Phase 2 learning, namely: (i) an initial 
reduction was seen in the error for the fast weights, which decayed before the 
stopping criteria had been met; (ii) initially the error for the slow weights was high 
and this gradually reduced over the course of the task to approach the total weights 
error by the time the stopping criterion had been reached; and (iii) an interaction was 
seen between the errors of the fast and slow weights, where a crossover occurred as 
the knowledge was transferred from the fast to the slow weights. Figure C.1 shows 
that all three criteria were satisfied for Phase 2 learning by the first 60,000 sweeps 
through the associations (although it took a further 191,000 for the stopping criterion 
to be reached), while the interaction between fast and slow weights had occurred by 
5,000 sweeps. 
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Figure C.1 Optimal combination of 0.999-0.99 for Phase 2 learning, fulfilling all three criteria. First 
60, 000 of a total of 251,000 sweeps necessary to reach stopping criterion.  
 
 
 
Simulations 4, 5 and 6: 0.999-0.995 
Criteria 1 and 3 for a satisfactory fast weight decay rate were also met using a fast 
decay rate of 0.995 for Task 2. However, Criterion 2 was not fulfilled as full 
knowledge did not transfer sufficiently to the slow weights before the stopping 
criteria were met (Figure C.2). The effect was even less using a slower decay rate of 
0.999 (Section B, Figure B.2). 
 
It was decided, therefore, that the optimum decay rate for the fast weights for Phase 2 
learning was 0.99 as it satisfied all three criteria for that phase and showed the best 
interaction between the fast and slow weights. Coupled with the optimum decay rate 
of 0.999 for Phase 1 learning, the next task was to find which of simulations 1, 2 or 3 
had the optimum combination of decay rates for all three phases.  
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Figure C.2 Suboptimal combination of 0.999-0.995 for Phase 2 learning, fulfilling only two of the 
three criteria. 
 
To Find Optimum Fast Weight Decay Rate for Phase 3 
For Phase 3 the weights of Phase 2 were saved before training resumed on 10 of the 
20 associations previously learned during Phase 1, without continuing training on the 
5 Phase 2 associations. Using 0.999-0.99 as a base, being the optimal combination 
for Phases 1 and 2, simulations were continued for Phase 3 to ascertain which of 
Simulations 1, 2 or 3 gave the best performance. The only criterion need to be 
satisfied during this phase was for an initial reduction to be seen in the error for the 
fast weights, where the fast weights were being seen as providing a temporary 
context in which the old associations were present again without permanently 
interfering with the new associations. The other criteria for Phases 1 and 2 do not 
apply here as the aim of this phase is to regain temporary access to old information in 
the fast weights and not to relearn the old information in the slow weights. However, 
it should be mentioned that if Phase 3 training is allowed to continue until the 
stopping criterion has been reached, the associations from Phase 1 represented to the 
network during that phase will be gradually assimilated into the slow weights and 
disrupt the Phase 2 associations. 
Simulation 3, with decay rates of 0.999-0.99-0.999, provided the best combination. It 
can be seen from Figure C.3 that the criterion for Phase 3 had been met as there was 
a dip in the error for the fast weights during the first 150 or so sweeps, where the fast 
weights dominated due to the reintroduction of 10 of the 20 original associations in 
Phase 1. With Simulations 1 and 2 (decay rates of 0.99 and 0.995 for the fast weights 
in Phase 3, respectively) the fast weights decayed too rapidly for the complexity of 
this task and did not dominate sufficiently during the initial stages of training to 
provide a temporary context with the change in associations (not shown). 
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Figure C.3. Optimal combination of 0.999-0.99-0.999 for Phase 3 fulfilling the criterion of an initial 
reduction in the error for the fast weights which should decay before the stopping criteria of the task 
has been met.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The simulations in this experiment demonstrated that the interaction between the fast 
and slow weights is enabled by the decay rate for the fast weights where the weights 
rapidly decay towards zero by some fraction, h, after each weight change. It was 
clear that tasks with different learning complexities will require different decay rates 
for the fast weights in order for the knowledge of the task to be transferred to the 
slow weights by the time the stopping criterion has been reached. It would appear 
that the decay rate of the fast weights is a critical factor in the interaction between the 
fast and slow weights in this model: A fast decay rate (0.99) is appropriate for tasks 
with a lower complexity that train in a minimal number of sweeps where the 
contribution of the fast weights is minimal, such as in Phase 2 where the network has 
to learn only 5 new associations; and a slower decay rate (0.999) is more appropriate 
for tasks with a higher complexity that take longer to train and are facilitated by the 
fast weights, such as in Phases 1 and 3. Accordingly the optimal combination for 
decay rates over Phases 1, 2 and 3 is 0.999-0.99-0.999. 
 
 
Section D  
The Contribution of the Fast Weights 
 
In order to investigate the contribution of the fast weights in the dual weights model I 
looked at the effect of training over the three phases using just the slow weights. Two 
control conditions were implemented, where progression was made though the three 
phases using slow weights only using learning rates of either 0.001 or 0.41, being the 
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optimum learning rate values for slow and fast weights determined in the pilot study 
and used in the experiments detailed in the previous two sections. This involved 
setting the fast weights to zero, however, it was still necessary for a decay rate to be 
applied to the fast weights in order to allow for any random initialisation weights to 
decay to quickly to zero. The decay rates were set at the optimum combination of 
0.999-0.99-0.999 and a momentum of 0.9 was applied to the slow weights. 
 
The control conditions were compared to a third condition using fast and slow 
weights, being the results from Simulation 3 in the previous experiment, the optimal 
combination of decay rates for the three phases of 0.999-0.99-0.999. The three 
conditions in this experiment were all performed from the same initialisation point 
and so by comparing the results of these two control conditions using slow weights 
only to the results obtained from Simulation 3 of the previous experiment, using both 
fast and slow weights, it will be possible to ascertain the contribution of the fast 
weights over the three phases of the experiment. 
 
RESULTS 
 
As the three conditions in this experiment were all performed from the same 
initialisation point it was possible to ascertain the contribution of the fast weights 
over the three phases of the experiment by comparing two control conditions using 
slow weights only to a condition using fast and slow weights. However, as 
previously mentioned, it is important to note that the total error of the system should 
not be confused with the total weights of the system, where fast and slow weights 
sum together to give the total weights. The fast and slow weights are both free 
variables that can operate together to give many different solutions to a problem, 
unlike using slow weights only with a single solution. Therefore in Figures D.1 to 
D.3 the errors plotted for the fast and slow weights will not sum together to give the 
total weights for Simulation 3 and, likewise, they are not comparable directly to the 
errors for either of the controls. However, direct comparison can be made between 
the overall error for Simulation 3 and the errors for each of the control conditions, 
while the fast and slow weight errors give an indication of which of the two is 
contributing the most to the total weights at each stage of learning.  
 
The numbers of sweeps taken to train each of the three conditions over the three 
phases of training are given in Table D.1 and the results are discussed in the next 
three sub-sections. 
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Table D.1 showing number of sweeps taken to reach the relevant stopping criteria for the three phases 
of training for three conditions: (i) Simulation 3, the optimum combination of decay rates of 0.999-
0.99-0.999 ascertained from Section C, using both fast and slow weights with learning rates of 0.41 
and 0.001, respectively; (2) Control 0.001 using slow weights only and a learning rate of 0.001; and 
(3) Control 0.41 using slow weights only with a learning rate of 0.41. All three conditions were 
preformed from the same initialisation point.  
 
Phase 1  
(20 associations) 
Phase 2  
(5 associations) 
Phase 3 
 (10 associations) Condition Decay 
rate 
Number 
Sweeps 
Decay 
rate 
Number 
Sweeps 
Decay 
rate 
Number
Sweeps 
Simulation 3 
LR Slow: 0.001  
LR Fast: 0.41 
0.999 83,001 0.99 251,001 0.999 1,001 
Control 0.001 
LR Slow: 0.001  
LR Fast: Zero  
0.999 227,001 0.99 43,001 0.999 10,001 
Control 0.41 
LR Slow  0.41 
LRFast: Zero  
0.999 2,001 0.99 41,001 0.999 766 
 
 
 
Phase 1 
As would be expected it takes longer to reach the stopping criterion using slow 
weights only and a learning rate of 0.001 (227,001) than a learning rate of 0.41 
(2,001 sweeps). Whereas Simulation 3, using both fast and slow weights with the 
same learning rates takes an intermediate number of sweeps (83,001). 
 
Figure D.1 shows the effect of adding the errors for the slow weights for the two 
control conditions during Phase 1 to Figure B.1 in Section B, for Phase 1 of 
Simulation 3 which contains the errors for both fast and slow weights for Phase 1. By 
comparing the overall error of a dual weighted network (dark blue line) to the two 
control conditions using slow weights only, it can be seen that Control 0.001 (red 
line) is slower to learn during the early stages, while Control 0.41 (light blue line) 
learns almost immediately. A closer inspection of the fast weights for Simulation 3 
shows that they make a substantial contribution to the early stages of learning, and a 
network using fast and slow weights with learning rates of 0.41 and 0.001 learns 
more rapidly during the initial stages of training and takes fewer sweeps to reach the 
stopping criterion than a network consisting of slow weights only and a learning rate 
of 0.001.  
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Figure D.1 Controls for Phase 1. The errors of the fast (green line), slow (pink line) and overall (dark 
blue line) for a dual weighted network (Simulation 3) compared to the total weights of two control 
conditions using slow weights only with learning rates of 0.001 (red line) and 0.41 (light blue line). 
The fast weights in Simulation 3 make a substantial contribution to the early stages of learning.  
 
While the combination of fast and slow weights does not learn as fast as using a 
learning rate of 0.41 alone, such a high training rate often leads to error and will not 
always find a solution for the network, unlike a very slow learning rate, and so the 
combination of fast and slow weights offers an alternative to using an error-prone 
high learning rate only.  
 
Control: Phase 2 
Figure D.2A shows the effect of adding the errors for the two control conditions 
during Phase 2 to Figure C.1 in Section C above for Phase 2 of Simulation 3. Again, 
Control 0.001 with the lower learning rate (red line) is slower to learn initially than 
the dual weighted network (dark blue line), while Control 0.41 with the higher 
learning rate (light blue line) learns the fastest. However there is a short period of the 
first 30 sweeps where the overall error for the dual weighted network dominates over 
Control 0.41 with a high learning rate (Figure D.2B). As with Phase 1 a closer 
inspection of the errors for the fast weights for Simulation 3 shows that they make a 
substantial contribution to the early stages of learning and a network using fast and 
slow weights with learning rates of 0.41 and 0.001 learns more rapidly during the 
initial stages of training than a network consisting of slow weight only and a learning 
rate of 0.001. 
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Figure D.2 Controls for Phase 2. The price to pay for early rapid learning in a dual weighted system is 
the time taken for the network to converge on a solution. (A) Errors for the first 60,000 sweeps. (B) 
The first 200 sweeps in greater detail show the temporary domination of the dual weighted system 
(dark blue line) during the first 30 sweeps. 
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However, the dual weighted network takes longer to reach the stopping criterion 
(251,000 sweeps) than the control conditions with learning rates of 0.0001 (43,001 
sweeps) and 0.41 (41,000 sweeps). While the addition of the fast weights provides 
rapid learning during the initial stages of training (green line) and the overall error 
(dark blue line) for the dual weighted network is lower early in training than Control 
0.001 (red line), it does so at the expense of the number of sweeps, or time taken to 
complete the task. A dual weighted network is trying to converge on a solution using 
two sets of weights, which is a much harder problem than a standard network with a 
single set of weights. Thus, the price to pay for early rapid learning is the time taken 
for the network to converge on a solution. 
 
Control: Phase 3 
Once again the fast weights (green line) provide rapid learning/relearning during the 
early stages (Figure D.3) and this is reflected in the overall error for the dual 
weighted network (dark blue line). What is interesting about this phase is the extent 
of the fall in the overall error for the dual weighted network. In the previous two 
phases the control condition with the high learning rate of 0.41 produced the most 
dramatic reductions in the error (Figures D.1 and D.2), although there was a short 
period during the first 30 sweeps of Phase 2 where the total weights for Simulation 3 
dominated over Control 0.41 (Figure D.2B). The difference seen in Phase 3 may well 
be due to the relearning of the Phase 1 associations referred to by Hinton and Plaut, 
where retraining on some of those associations pushed back the weights to the point 
in time before the disturbance to the weight values occurred.  
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Figure D.3 Controls for Phase 3. The errors of the fast (green line), slow (pink line) and total weights  
(dark blue line) for a dual weighted network (Simulation 3) compared to the total weights of two  
control conditions using slow weights only with learning rates of 0.001 (red line) and 0.41 (light blue 
line).  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The control conditions in this experiment have demonstrated the contribution of the 
fast weights in a dual weighted system. In all three phases the fast weights make a 
substantial contribution to the early stages of learning compared to a network using 
slow weights only and a low learning rate of 0.001. Of special interest is that 
additional fast weights improve learning/relearning compared to a high learning rate 
of 0.41 during Phase 3 (and to a limited extent during the first 30 sweeps of Phase 2). 
The difference seen in Phase 3 may well be due to the relearning of the Phase 1 
associations referred to by Hinton and Plaut (1987), where retraining on some of 
those associations pushed back the weights to the point in time before the disturbance 
to the weight values occurred.  
 
While the addition of the fast weights provides rapid learning during the initial stages 
of training, it does so at the expense of the number of sweeps, or time taken to 
complete the task. A dual weighted network is trying to converge on a solution using 
two sets of weights, which is a much harder problem than a standard network with a 
single set of weights. Thus, the price to pay for early rapid learning is the time taken 
for the network to converge on a solution. 
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